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Abstract
The research presented in this Thesis investigates the strategic behaviour of generating
firms in bid-based electricity pool markets and the effects of control methods and
network features on the electricity market outcome by utilising the AC network model
to represent the electric grid. A market equilibrium algorithm has been implemented to
represent the bi-level market problem for social welfare maximization from the system
operator and utility assets optimisation from the strategic market participants, based on
the primal-dual interior point method. The strategic interactions in the market are
modelled using supply function equilibrium theory and the optimum strategies are
determined by parameterization of the marginal cost functions of the generating units.
The AC power network model explicitly represents the active and reactive power flows
and various network components and control functions. The market analysis examines
the relation between market power and AC networks, while the different
parameterization methods for the supply function bids are also investigated.
The first part of the market analysis focuses on the effects of particular characteristics
of the AC network on the interactions between the strategic generating firms, which
directly affect the electricity market outcome. In particular, the examined topics
include the impact of transformer tap-ratio control, reactive power control, different
locations for a new entry’s generating unit in the system, and introduction of
photovoltaic solar power production in the pool market by considering its dependency
on the applied solar irradiance. The observations on the numerical results have shown
that their impact on the market is significant and the employment of AC network
representation is required for reliable market outcome predictions and for a better
understanding of the strategic behaviour as it depends on the topology of the system.
The analysis that examines the supply function parameterizations has shown that the
resulting market solutions from the different parameterization methods can be very
similar or differ substantially, depending on the presence and level of network
congestion and on the size and complexity of the examined system. Furthermore, the
convergence performance of the implemented market algorithm has been examined
and proven to exhibit superior computational efficiency, being able to provide market
solutions for large complex AC systems with multiple asymmetric firms, providing the
opportunity for applications on practical electricity markets.
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1Chapter 1:
Introduction to the electricity markets
1.1 Introduction
In recent years electricity market reform has taken place all over the World, with
the objective of replacing the existing monopolistic structure by a more
competitive one giving the opportunity to new participants to enter the electric
power trading sector. However, the electricity market has been proven to have a
tendency to oligopolistic behaviour due to a number of factors, such as the entry
barriers caused by the unique nature and operational complexities of the
electrical power systems, the potential market power of the participating
generating firms related to locational and other characteristics of the electrical
grid, and the distinctive requirements for the transmission and distribution of
electrical power. The resultant deregulated market structure and the
establishment of independent generating firms in a liberalised environment have
brought forward the development of economic tools for the investigation and
analysis of the function of electricity markets. Among the variety of the different
methods proposed, the concept of market equilibrium analysis has received
considerable attention, since it is an appropriate tool for exploring the
oligopolistic strategic behaviour that characterises the restructured electricity
sector being able to provide meaningful predictions for the market outcome.
The research on the subject has contributed to the literature in several ways by
the proposition of employing different economic approaches for the
determination of the electricity market equilibrium. The equilibrium models
proposed differ in the representation of the market competition and structure in
terms of firms’ behaviour, market regulation, interactions between the market
participants and practicality of model assumptions. The supply function
equilibrium model has been found to match the requirements for representing the
features of the electricity market and has been proven to exhibit certain
2advantages over the choice of the other relevant methods. In addition to the
diversity of the applicable economic principles, various numerical methods have
been suggested for the implementation of appropriate algorithms for computing
the electricity market solution. The evolution in the area of mathematical
programming has provided the ability of improving the computational
performance and precision of the proposed numerical methods, enabling more
advanced and comprehensive investigations.
The work presented in this Thesis proposes an electricity market equilibrium
model based on supply function theory applied to bid-based pool markets, for the
investigation of market power and the interactions between the strategic
generating firms. The analysis explores topics that have not be addressed well in
the literature, including investigations of the impact of control methods and
network constraints on the market equilibrium related to the nonlinearities of AC
systems, the effects of new generating units of conventional nature and grid-
connected photovoltaic sources, and the different methods in which a profit-
maximising supply function strategy can be constructed by parameterizing the
marginal cost of generation. The numerical algorithm for the market solution is
implemented based on primal-dual interior point optimisation, which has been
proven to be very efficient.
The remainder of this chapter provides a comprehensive introduction on the
electricity markets and the deregulation process towards the liberalised
environment, followed by Chapter 2 that presents an extensive review on the
concept of market equilibrium and in particular the supply function equilibrium.
Chapter 3 provides information about the numerical method employed and
outlines the mathematical formulation for the proposed electricity market
algorithm. Chapters 4 and 5 present numerical results and discussions on the
impact of transformer tap-ratio and reactive power control on the electricity
market equilibrium. Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate how the introduction of new
generating units and photovoltaic sources in the system affects the existing
market conditions. Chapter 8 investigates the different parameterization methods
that the generating firms utilise to construct their strategic supply function offers.
Chapter 9 analyses the convergence characteristics of the implemented algorithm
3and concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 10. Further details on the
structure of the Thesis are given in the last section of this chapter.
1.2 History and evolution of electricity markets
The electricity industry has existed for more than 130 years, in which time major
changes in structure and regulations have occurred. Alterations due to continuous
technical and economic developments have been experienced, resulting in an
overall transformation of the electricity sector.
In the very beginning, the infancy of the electricity industry was dictated by
privately owned companies, experiencing brutal competition and high
inefficiencies. The transmission grid development was very limited and almost
no regulation existed. Initially in the USA, Thomas Edison has offered a
replacement to gas lighting using DC technology, around 1878, charging by the
number of light bulbs installed on the site. In the following years, suppliers that
were also providing the electricity infrastructure were taking advantage of areas
of dense load, such as cities and industrial sites. For example, between 1887 and
1893 there were 24 power companies within the city of Chicago, with
overlapping lines and enormous costs, subject to fierce competition [1].
Following the innovative example of the Westinghouse Company, which
introduced high-voltage transmission and AC technology in the USA in 1886, the
Southern California Edison integrated a full-service utility, operating a 10kV 28-
miles transmission line, in 1892. A few years later in 1898, the president of the
National Electric Light Association, Samuel Insull, which had already switched
his support to the AC technology, attempted to eliminate the problems associated
with inefficiencies due to brutal competition. Insull acquired a monopoly over all
central-station production in Chicago, explaining why the electricity business
was a natural monopoly that should be regulated at state level, with all charges
based on costs plus a reasonable profit. The aforementioned measures led to the
introduction of regulatory laws in the USA, establishing the first state utility
commissions, around 1907 [1].
4In the following years, the states in many countries tried to guide the electricity
industry, regarding electrical power as an everyday necessity, instead of a luxury
commodity. Further developments on the transmission grid had been observed,
but there was a lack of interconnection between individual networks and also
inadequate network control. This resulted in uncertain supply and large losses
during the transmission of electrical power [2]. After World War II, it has been
addressed that in many countries, mainly in Europe and Latin America, the
electricity industry was integrated into a single nationalised company, for
strategic reasons. Such state ownerships led to new problems, since some
governments were unable to invest in generation to cover the high-pace demand
growth [3]. Meanwhile, economic concepts were employed in the electricity
sector in order to deal with the negative economic behaviour. The increasing
economics of scale prevailed and the transmission and distribution grids were
nearing completion. Eventually, almost all governments in Europe considered the
electricity sector as a natural monopoly and small producers were merged into
single nation-wide monopolies, placed under public ownership to prevent
oligopolistic behaviour; France initiated this in 1946, while Italy, in 1962, was
the last one. In many countries new entries into the electricity sector were
forbidden by law, with the exception of Spain that had no entry barrier laws and
some local competition also existed [2]. During the following years, it was well
accepted that the electricity industry is principally of a monopolistic nature [4].
In the USA, the established privatised monopoly was regulated by an
independent regulatory commission until the early 1970s, during which the first
doubts about the efficiency of the regulated monopoly utility emerged. Earlier
studies had already showed that a private monopoly subject to a “fair rate of
return” regulation gives incentives to overinvest in capital assets [5]. In the
meantime, the oil crisis of 1973 raised the price of the main input fuel of
electrical power. While efforts in replacing oil with coal for the electricity
production and investments to nuclear programs had been attempted, a critical
discovery was made: independent generators can operate without destroying the
stability of the system [2]. The conclusion was that other structures than the
vertically integrated monopoly could exist. The impending result was that the
USA adopted a new regulatory policy in 1978, requiring the utilities to buy
5electricity from “qualified facilities”, such as cogenerators and small power
producers [6]. However, improvements in transmission, which were done mainly
for reliability purposes, were responsible for removing the natural monopoly
character of the wholesale market, rather than changes in generation technology.
Development in high voltage networks over long distances made possible the
trading of electricity from producers located away from the consumers [1].
The pioneer in introducing some competition in the electricity market was Chile
in 1982, by allowing large consumers to choose their suppliers and negotiate the
prices. This was followed by the establishment of market mechanisms for the
determination of generators’ dispatch and the wholesale price of electricity,
permitting competition between generators. In 1990, the England and Wales
market established the pool market mechanism for the first time in the history of
the electricity power sector, by privatising the electricity supply industry [7,8].
The following year Norway also adopted a competitive electricity pool scheme
creating the Nord Pool, which was afterwards extended to include Sweden in
1996, Finland in 1998 and Denmark in 1999 [9]. The Nord Pool is the only
multinational exchange for trading electric power, while it is the first that
permitted all end-users to choose their supplier. By that time the European Union
(EU) directive on the internal electricity market [10] has allowed large
purchasers of electricity to choose their suppliers freely from throughout the EU,
introducing full competition amongst generating firms. During the 1990s several
other countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Canada and Australia, created
regulated pool markets for electrical power, while competition in various forms
was introduced in most countries [6]. These actions initiated the era of
deregulation and liberalisation of the electricity market.
1.3 Liberalisation and deregulation of the electricity markets
Liberalisation of the electricity market refers to one or more reforms related to
the electricity supply industry. These include the corporatisation of previously
state-owned utilities, the transfer of electricity industry assets from the state to
private organisations (i.e. the privatisation), the deregulation of various aspects
6of the industry operations and the introduction of competition. However, besides
the unbundling of most branches of the electricity sector in the restructured
power systems, the transmission ownership is still considered, in general, as a
monopoly element not subject to competition [11].
The electricity markets around the World, following the liberalisation trend
during the 1990s, were undergoing major reforms, as the governments were
privatising and restructuring the initially monopolistic state-owned, or private
state-regulated, electricity utilities. The competitive part of the former utility
companies, mainly the electricity generation sector, was separated from the
natural monopolies, such as the ownership of the grid for transmission and partly
the distribution of electrical power [6]. While many countries associated the
liberalisation of the electricity market with direct privatisation of the existing
utilities, some of the leading European energy companies, such as EDF in France
[12] and Vattenfall (translated as Waterfall) in Sweden [13], remained partially
or completely in government ownership. Market forces were gaining control over
the electricity business environment as government regulations were withdrawn
during the liberalisation process, shifting the decision making from the state to
the market and giving choice to the consumers. The main reasons that led to
extensive deregulation of the electricity sector were that new technologies
reduced the optimal size of generators, mainly due to the development of
combined cycle gas turbines, and that the competitive global economy required
lower input costs. The existing state-owned utilities were unable to respond to
these economic and technological changes as quickly as private owners, while
advances in communications made possible the exchange of large information
needed for the management of electricity markets [2,3].
In order to guarantee the independent operational control of the transmission grid
and facilitate a competitive market for power generation and retail, an
independent entity that monitors the market, often referred to as the Independent
System Operator (ISO), is required. The ISO must be unbiased and independent
of all the individual market participants, such as the transmission owners,
generating firms, distribution companies, retailers and end-users, in order to
operate the competitive market effectively and ensure the reliability of the power
7system. Certain rules must be established by the operator regarding the energy
and ancillary services markets, the management of the transmission system, the
market risks and the monitoring of the system for the elimination of any sources
of market power. Among others, the ISO responsibilities include monitoring of
ancillary services auctions if in effect, for example spinning reserve, and
congestion management [14].
1.4 From perfect competition to oligopoly
The main objective of deregulation was to achieve efficiency through
competition. Competition provides strong minimising incentives for the suppliers
in terms of labour savings, efficient maintenance, reduced construction costs for
new plants, wiser investment choices and flexibility in new projects, such as
distributed generation and renewable energy sources. It also encourages real-time
pricing, which is considered to be more accurate [1]. In a monopolistic
environment where the electrical power generation, transmission and distribution
are bundled, the monopolist can set prices above the cost of production, while
competition in a deregulated environment can bring the market price down to
marginal cost of generation levels [3]. Although many attempts have been made
all over the World to increase the degree of competition in the electricity
markets, especially at the wholesale level, perfect competition conditions have
not been established [15].
Perfect competition exists if all market participants act as price takers. Each
supplier should increase its production up to the point where its marginal cost
equals the market price. If a supplier asks for a price higher than the market price
or a consumer offers less than the market price, in a market that consists of a
large number of small competitors, this action will be ignored and other
participants will replace that particular participant’s contribution to the market.
Hence, the market price is set by the interactions of sellers and consumers, taken
as groups [16].
8The requirements for successful perfect competition in the short-run in a
deregulated environment are that the market participants act as price takers, the
traders have adequate information including the electricity market price to be
publicly known, and the costs are well-behaved. Long-run perfect competition
conditions include the above, while the production costs should not allow natural
monopoly conditions to emerge, and the competitors must be able to freely enter
the market with no entry barriers [1].
The lack of each of the aforementioned requirements for the existence of perfect
competition will result in oligopolistic conditions, such as the ability of particular
participants for exercising market power leading to high prices, or in other forms
of economic deficiencies. An oligopolistic market is characterised by a small
number of producers of significant size where the action of one has an influence
on the overall market, and the prices and payoffs are influenced by the behaviour
of the producers. The main reasons for the electricity market to be an oligopoly
rather than a perfect competition market are the limited number of producers, the
transmission constraints and congestion that isolates consumers from some
generators, the transmission losses that discourage consumers from distant
producers, and the entry barriers for new competitors, such as the large
investment size [17]. Considering these circumstances, which result from the
unique nature of the power generation, transmission and distribution, perfect
competition is very difficult to be established in the deregulated electricity
markets, and therefore the traditional assumptions of a perfect competitive
market in the economic sense should be replaced with those of the more realistic
oligopolistic approach, as far as the electricity sector is concerned [15].
1.5 Electricity market types: contracts and centralised trading
In an electricity market, physical trading of power may be allowed between
buyers and sellers directly, in the form of bilateral contracts. A bilateral contract
involves two parties that they trade power quantities at negotiated prices, terms
and conditions, with no interference from a third party. Generating firms can
directly contract with buyers in wholesale electricity markets and purchase
9transmission services from the transmission owner or system operator. If retail
competition is allowed, the generating firms can also directly contract with the
consumers [3]. All the transactions are announced to the operator to verify if the
transmission capacity is sufficient to complete the transaction and maintain the
transmission security, but it determines the feasibility of the contract without
knowing the prices agreed. This trading approach has the advantage of being
extremely flexible, while its disadvantages stem from the high cost of negotiating
for the contracts and the risk of creditworthiness of counterparties [14].
Nonetheless, the implementation of bilateral contracts minimises the role of the
system operator [1].
Certain contracts require immediate delivery, while the terms and conditions of
others may be fixed in advance. A forward contract states the agreed price and
defines the location for the delivery of an asset at a specified time in the future,
without any payment until the time of delivery. Any differences between the
current market price and the contract price at the time of delivery, represents a
profit or loss for the contractors [18]. A secondary market may exist, in which
producers and consumers buy and sell forward contracts, called future contracts,
in order to manage their exposure to fluctuations in the spot price. Other parties
apart from generating firms, retailers and consumers may participate, such as
speculators who want to buy a future contract hoping of being able to sell it later
at a higher price [16].
A different type of electricity market, where centralised trading takes place, is the
poolco type market. Instead of agreements between the market participants, the
poolco market assumes that the generating firms sell power into a pool, which is
supervised by a market or system operator, usually an ISO. In wholesale markets,
the distribution companies buy from the pool to sell at retail to small customers,
while if retail competition is also allowed, buyers could be individual customers,
suppliers or retailers. The operator holds an auction in which each producer bids
different prices for different amounts of power for each trading period (the
bidding interval), which can be the following day, or the following hour, etc [3].
The sellers compete with each other to supply power to the pool, but not for
specific customers, while the buyers compete to buy power from the pool. If a
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seller bids too high it may not be able to sell, and if a buyer bids too low it may
not be able to purchase [14]. The ISO implements the economic dispatch, usually
based on a social welfare maximisation or a costs minimisation scheme, and sets
the market clearing price based on the submitted bids, the demand levels and the
supply quantities. A standard procedure is that the ISO chooses first the
generators with the lowest bids and the customers with the highest offers in
order, until the load demand is met. The scheduled producers and customers are
represented by the intersection of the supply and demand curves (see Section
2.1). Trading outside the pool, as in a bilateral agreement, may avoid the general
management costs created by centralised coordination shared by all market
participants, but as the pool market price is publicly known, significant savings
result by avoiding the need to discover prices. A poolco market is more efficient
than a market based on bilateral contracts because most market participants are
scheduled and tracking agreements between pairs of traders is not necessary [3].
Furthermore, a pool market gives incentives to small consumers to have an active
part in the electricity market, while, since the pool reduces the scheduling risk,
the generating costs will be less [16].
In the case were the market participants are obliged to trade only through a
centralised market and bilateral agreements are not allowed, they may choose to
enter into contracts for differences in order to reduce their exposure to price
risks. In a contract for differences the parties agree on a strike price and an
amount of power. Once the trading through the centralised market is complete, if
the strike price is higher than the centralised market price, the buyer pays the
seller the difference between the two prices times the amount agreed, or if the
strike price is lower than the market price, the seller pays the buyer the price
difference times the specified amount [16].
A hybrid market that combines various features of the aforementioned market
models can exist. A bid-based pool market may open after the bilateral contract
market closes, giving the opportunity to the market participants to buy or sell
more electricity to meet their requirements if not already concluded in their
transactions [15]. Apart from the fact that such a combined market gives the
choice to sellers and buyers to participate in both or only one of the two markets,
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the most important reason for the simultaneous existence of bilateral trades and
pool market is to ensure the reliability of the system. Since the actual demand is
never exactly equal to the value forecasted and unpredictable problems may
prevent generators to deliver the contracted amount of power, a pool-type market
mechanism is used to settle the imbalances between supply and demand at every
moment. Such a market for imbalances is often called a spot market, since power
is delivered immediately and the buyer pays on the spot. Even if bilateral trading
represents the main market mechanism in a wholesale environment, a spot
market can be implemented as a balancing mechanism, by pooling all available
surplus generation, in a similar manner as in the poolco type market. A spot
market for handling the supply-demand imbalances has the advantage of
immediacy, but the spot prices tend to change quickly depending on the load
demand, and are essentially unpredictable [16].
In addition to energy prices and quantities for selling and buying electrical
power, the ISO in a pool type market may require other information associated
with the generating units to be provided with the submitted bids by the
competing producers. These may include start-up prices, offered capacities, ramp
up and down rates or rate limits, minimum and maximum generation levels,
minimum up and down times, and regulation band for automatic generation
control, depending on the specifications and regulations of the particular market
[19]. Note that, in some markets the operators run appropriate competitive
processes or establish joint markets for energy and ancillary services, such as
spinning reserve, reactive power control, frequency control and black start
capability services. Depending on the service procured, bids may be required to
be submitted or flat rates may be applied for each service. However, these issues
are not discussed here as they are beyond the scope of this Thesis.
1.6 Pricing of electrical energy
Producers and buyers in different electricity markets may receive and pay
different prices for the same amount of energy delivered, depending on the
pricing scheme employed. When the vertically integrated institution was still in
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effect, flat rates were defined annually or monthly, based mainly on expected
costs. By the time that electricity deregulation was a close target the spot pricing
method has emerged. The spot prices, that were recalculated every hour (or every
fixed time interval), were dependent on the variation of generation fuel costs and
capacities, the transmission losses and capacities, and the demand patterns. The
average spot price was proven to be lower than the corresponding annual flat rate
[20].
As far as the deregulated environment is concerned, the most common method to
set prices in auction-type electricity markets is the uniform pricing approach. For
each bidding interval, all the market participants pay or receive the same system-
wide pool price that equals the bid of the last generator scheduled, and there are
no transmission price differences. Therefore, a firm can receive profit even by
bidding its marginal cost. Such an approach could be particularly appropriate for
well connected networks with no congestion problems [3]. Since the choice of
setting the uniform price at the last bid accepted is regarded as a process that
does not reveal costs, another alternative, which is considered to be more
efficient, is to set the uniform market price at the first bid rejected [21].
The pay-as-bid pricing, where each supplier is paid the price quoted, has also
been used, but only in very few electricity markets [18]. It has been argued that
such a scheme would lower the risk for tacit collusion compared with uniform
pricing [22]. However, its adaptation would discourage generators to submit bids
that reflect their marginal costs and low-cost generators may be left out of the
schedule by bidding high [16]. The analysis in [23] has shown that a change from
a uniform price auction market to this discriminatory pricing scheme will result
in a trade off between efficiency and prices in a perfect competition environment,
while under monopoly conditions there will be a negative effect on the profits
and output, as the market power of the generating firms will be strengthen. The
oligopolistic approach of [24] demonstrates that for an unconstrained electricity
market the optimum market outcome for both pricing mechanisms is the same,
but the introduction of network constraints discriminates between the two. In
addition, the study in [25] carries out short-run duopoly simulations using both
pay-as-bid and uniform pricing electricity market models and concludes that the
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expected total revenue under uniform pricing is larger than under pay-as-bid
pricing when the firms compete in prices. Then it proves that, under elastic
demand, the expected demand served for the pay-as-bid scheme is more and the
expected total revenue less than for uniform pricing.
Despite the fact that some markets charge for the electrical energy using a
uniform price, the energy prices differ by location because it is cheaper to
produce energy in some locations, and transmission is limited [1]. The pricing of
electricity is affected by the transmission line capacities and losses, the energy
balance constraint, and the power flows, which cannot directly be allocated
among transmission lines. For more accurate pricing, the network characteristics
should be reflected in the price of electricity at different locations and times. A
methodology was developed in [26] for pricing network transmission losses and
constraints in real time, which was the foundation for the locational spot pricing
analysis.
Pricing methods based on locational prices have become popular in the
deregulated electricity markets, following the pricing mechanisms provided by
Schweppe et al. in [26] and [20]. The study in [27] has first proposed the
application of locational spot pricing in real power systems. The locational spot
pricing, also called nodal pricing, assigns a different price at each bus (node) and
considers, apart from the generation costs, the cost of transmission losses and the
extra generation cost to supply the demand increment if transmission congestion
exists. The difference between two nodal prices is the value of the transmission
between the two nodes, resulting from the transmission capacity constraints.
Note that congestion in a line produces nodal price differences in other
noncongested lines as well [3]. The use of such efficient short-run pricing is
consistent with economic dispatch and provides an efficient use of the
transmission system [27]. The nodal prices allow for an efficient management of
congestion, since higher price at a node will decrease demand and resolve
congestion, but they are not immune to the consequences of exercising market
power [6] (see Section 1.8).
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An alternative to nodal pricing is the zonal pricing, in which nodes are grouped
into zones bounded by potential constraint interfaces and each zone has a spot
price. This method encourages generators to locate within high-priced zones and
focuses on relieving flow constraints in the congested interfaces between zones.
In such a market, the boundaries must be updated from time to time to
accommodate the generation and transmission expansion [3].
1.7 Electricity from renewable energy sources
Apart from the conventional generating units that utilise fossil fuels, such as coal,
heavy fuel oil and natural gas, and nuclear generators, investment in other
developing technologies for generating electricity is taking place. The EU is
currently in the process of promoting the exploitation of the available Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) by its Member States for the production of electrical
energy. The directive of the European Parliament and Council [28] issued in
January 2008 proposes that an overall binding target of a 20% share of RES in
energy consumption must be achieved by the Member States by the year 2020.
One of the principal aims of this effort is to mitigate the climate change effects
by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as CO2. Furthermore, as the
increasing dependence on energy imports threatens the EU supply security and
implies higher electricity prices, the boosting of investment in energy efficiency,
renewable energy and new technologies is expected to exhibit wide-reaching
benefits, since RES are largely indigenous. It is anticipated that the broad usage
of RES will contribute to growth and jobs in the EU, as they constitute a key
element of a sustainable energy future [28].
According to the figures presented in [28] for the individual European countries,
the percentage share of energy from RES in final energy consumption in the year
2005 was found to vary from 0% in Member States with isolated electrical
networks, such as the island of Malta, up to about 40% in northern European
countries where they utilise the largely available hydroelectric energy. The
percentage targets for each member state by 2020 have been set to within a range
of 10% to 50% depending on the starting point for each state, in order to achieve
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an overall 20% share. The primary RES that are expected to be largely exploited
in the EU apart from the hydroelectric energy are the solar and wind energies.
Other notable RES include geothermal, wave, tidal and biomass. Further details
on RES and solar energy are provided in the introductory section of Chapter 7.
1.8 The issue of market power
Market power is the antithesis of competition [29]. Several definitions have been
proposed, for example, market power is the ability of one or more market
participants to maintain prices profitably above competitive levels for a
significant period of time [29]. More generally it is defined as the ability of the
market participants to manipulate the market in their own favour [15].
The generating firms may be able to exercise market power due to several
reasons. Global market power may exist in the market due to the relative size of
the competitors [15]. In a market with a small number of competitors, a producer
with a large share can raise the market price by asking for a higher price, or by
withholding output that could be produced profitably at the market price [1]. In
addition, especially in electricity markets, entry barriers prevent new competitors
to enter the market, acting as a source of market power. The entry barriers may
be created by existing market participants, e.g. by predatory pricing where the
product is available in very low prices that will also drive other producers out of
the market [18], but typically entry barriers exist due to the high investment costs
and the cost in obtaining permission to build generation [1]. In the case where the
electricity market is still vertically integrated in some degree, vertical market
power may be exercised from a single firm that controls domains in the
generation, transmission and distribution sectors [3].
Locational or local market power may exist in certain areas in the market due to
the geographical nature of the power system and the physical and operational
constraints of the transmission network. Transmission congestion may isolate
regions from outside competition and transform a reasonably competitive global
market into a collection of smaller local markets where the small number of
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participants will give rise to market power [16]. Early investigations have shown
that transmission costs isolate generators from competition with distant
producers [30]. Large firms may increase their production in order to lower some
prices, exploiting the network constraints to foreclose competition from others
[31]. On the contrary, a firm may reduce its output to congest transmission into
its area of dominance, in order to remain the sole local supplier [32]. Similarly,
firms can buy physical transmission rights and choose not to use them to enhance
their market power by artificially reducing the transmission capacity into their
area [16]. Load pockets, such as cities that require more power than that they can
import may give rise to the ability of exercising extreme market power during
peak hours. In some cases, certain generators may be declared must-run, mainly
for the need of reactive power instead of their active production, enhancing their
market power [1]. Furthermore, as the level of transmission congestion directly
relates to the load, the demand behaviour will affect market power abilities [33],
while a slow response of the consumers to lower-price supply options favours
market power [34].
1.9 Assessment and mitigation of market power
Any attempt of a player to exercise any form of market power interrupts the
proper function of competition. In addition to higher prices, the consequences of
market power by the suppliers include higher profits for all firms due to the
higher market price, transfer of wealth from consumers to producers and higher
economic inefficiency in the form of deadweight welfare loss [1].
Several measures can be applied for the mitigation of market power. In order to
eliminate the market power of large producers, regulations for reducing the
market shares of dominant suppliers can be applied, and the regulators can
encourage more suppliers to enter the market by providing profitable entry in a
short period of time. Long-term contracts will reduce the incentives of the firms
to exercise market power, since they will be less motivated to participate in the
spot market. Demand-side bidding is important for the mitigation of short-term
market power, because the lack of real-time price responsiveness exacerbates the
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potential for market power during peak-load hours, but this may affect the
market efficiency. If the market prices are persistently high, certain market rules,
such as price caps or bid caps in bid-based pool markets, can be established in
order to limit the prices. Such measures should only be used after careful study
of the current economic signals, because it may not be possible to prove that the
high prices result from market power abuse [17]. Regarding this, the firms may
be restraining prices in order to deter new competitors or to avoid substantial
regulatory actions taking place [35].
For the elimination of local market power due to transmission congestion,
expansion on the network can take place. However, this is a less popular
approach due to the opposition of the market participants, based on the fact that
this will affect the overall power flow operation of the system and, consequently,
dramatically change the electricity market [17]. The study in [34] argues whether
it will be more profitable to provide new transmission capacity by augmenting
the existing system, altering the operating procedures or building new lines, or by
constructing additional nearby generating capacity. For the case where
transmission capacity expansion is not attractive, the incentives to develop
distributed generation by implementing smaller scale technologies are
highlighted. Furthermore, distributed generation can serve as a price hedging
mechanism during peak load periods [36].
The main methods that have been developed to detect the presence of market
power in the electricity market can be categorised in the following:
- market concentration analysis
- estimation of pricing behaviour
- oligopoly equilibrium analysis.
The market concentration analysis utilises appropriate indices to assess the
market competitiveness. The most widely used index is the Herfindalh-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which equals the summation of the percentage of the
market share of each supplier squared, to represent the market concentration.
Such indices are used only as a rule of thumb and their disadvantages include the
lack of supporting theory and ability to explicitly represent the supply and
demand elasticity [17,37]. The estimation of pricing behaviour through
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simulation analysis is a better approach, in which the market clearing price can
be estimated by studying the optimal bidding strategies of the market participants
and then be compared with the perfect competition price, or ex-post analysis
using historical data can take place to measure the margin between the market
price and the marginal cost of generation. A retrospective method that assesses
the market price level is the application of the Lerner Index, which is defined as
the difference between the actual market price and the marginal cost divided by
the market price [17]. However, these methods have the disadvantage that
marginal costs and perfect competition prices cannot be easily revealed, while
retrospective analysis is only a way of ex-post assessment [15].
The most effective method for evaluating the sources and degree of market
power in the electricity market is the oligopolistic equilibrium analysis, in which
the equilibrium market prices are calculated. This analysis is based on the
modelling of specific markets in terms of operational, physical and market
constraints, and the simulation of the strategic behaviour of the generating firms
[15]. The main oligopolistic competition types applied in such electricity market
models are the Cournot, Bertrand and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE)
competitions, which are discussed in detail in the next chapter. The SFE
competition, which is considered as the most appropriate for modelling the
electricity market, is the main topic of the research presented in this Thesis.
1.10 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the remainder of this Thesis is organised as follows:
- Chapter 2:
This chapter commences with the description of basic economic theory related to
the concept of market equilibrium, such as the supply-demand equilibrium, the
theory on economic surplus, and the Nash equilibrium and non-cooperative
games. The available oligopolistic equilibrium models for the investigation of the
electricity market are discussed and the advantages of the linear supply function
equilibrium model are highlighted. The literature on the latter model is presented,
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with discussions on the parameterization methods employed for the strategic bid,
the representation of the electrical network and the numerical methods applied.
- Chapter 3:
The proposed work for this Thesis is analytically presented with justifications for
the chosen methodology, identifying the major contributions to the literature. The
primal-dual interior point method is outlined with a brief review on relevant
applications, pointing out its advantages. The mathematical formulation for the
implemented equilibrium market model is presented, accounting for the AC
network representation and the iterative process of the algorithm.
- Chapter 4:
The contribution of the mathematical formulation of modelling the transformer
power flows, losses and tap-ratio control in the electricity market algorithm is
described. Numerical results are presented for test cases with and without
transformer tap-ratio control to demonstrate its appreciable impact on the
electricity market outcome for different operating conditions. The analysis
extends to cases with congested transmission networks, illustrating the
significance of modelling such control functions in the electricity market
equilibrium algorithms.
- Chapter 5:
This chapter investigates the impact of reactive power control on the electricity
market equilibrium. The examined control methods include voltage control using
different regulation modes, variations of the reactive capabilities of the
generating units in terms of reactive power generation and absorption, and load
power factor adjustments. The analysis employs a wide range of test systems
with networks from 3 to 118 buses, to show the effects on the market outcome of
larger power systems.
- Chapter 6:
The choice between different buses in the system for the instalment of new
generating units is investigated. The analysis focuses on the impact of the new
entrant’s location on the profits and scheduled production of the existing firms,
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social welfare and nodal prices. It is shown that the new firm receives profits of
substantial difference depending on the location chosen across the network,
showing the importance of employing the AC meshed network constrained
market model.
- Chapter 7:
The modelling of grid-connected photovoltaic (PV) systems in terms of
economic and operational aspects is integrated into the electricity market
algorithm, in order to represent a diverse market able to accommodate power
generated from conventional sources and RES. The modelling of the PV unit
output performance that explicitly represents the solar irradiance-dependent
active and reactive PV power components is based on statistical analysis on
experimental data recorded in a PV test facility. The importance of modelling the
dependency on the solar irradiance and the nonlinear characteristics of PV
reactive generation in the market model is highlighted.
- Chapter 8:
The different parameterization methods for obtaining the SFE strategic bids from
the generating firms and the interrelation between the corresponding market
solutions are investigated. The analysis focuses on the examination of the
different market outcomes for the available parameterization methods under
different levels of network congestion, showing that the parameterization impact
on the market depends on the level of network stress and on the system size.
Possible reasons for the convergence problems encountered in large systems for
the arbitrary parameterization of linear supply function bids are established.
- Chapter 9:
This chapter examines the convergence characteristics of the proposed market
model in terms of CPU time and number of iterations for convergence
requirements. It is shown that the implemented algorithm exhibits superior
computational performance and robustness, being able to provide market
solutions in terms of milliseconds. The convergence for the different SFE
parameterization methods is also examined.
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- Chapter 10:
The last chapter of the Thesis provides concluding remarks on the main
contributions of the presented research and evaluation of the analysis and
numerical studies performed. The opportunity for integrating other network
components and control functions in the electricity market model for a more
precise and versatile market analysis and the possibility for further work on
related research topics are discussed.
- Appendix
The Appendix presents a list of the Newton matrix elements that result from
modelling the transformer power flows, losses and tap-ratio control in the




2.1 Supply - demand equilibrium
In a competitive electricity market the total cost of generation of each unit is
directly related to the supply. The operating cost can be represented by a variable
quadratic expression C that depends on the quantity q produced, such that:
2
2
1 qqC   (2.1)
where α and β are the generation coefficients that reflect the characteristics of the
various forms of costs involved. The corresponding utility function for the
consumers, i.e. the consumers’ willingness to pay, also termed as the consumers’
benefit, depends on the load demand d for each market period. This can be
defined as the following quadratic inverse demand function D:
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1 ddD   (2.2)
where γ and δ are the load demand cost coefficients.
In a centralised market the bidding process supervisor, such as an ISO, may ask
the market participants to reveal the quantities they are willing to buy or sell over
a range of prices for a given time period. The supply and demand curves can be
used to graphically represent quantities as a function of price. In a perfect
competition market for electricity, the marginal cost of generation and the linear
inverse demand function can be used as the supply and demand curves. The







and is defined as the change in total cost for a unit change in quantity produced.








shows the change in willingness of the consumers to pay for a unit change in the
load demand. Figure 1 shows a typical supply-demand relationship. If the buyers
and the sellers are both satisfied with the market outcome, the supply and
demand curves intersect at the market equilibrium point (q*, p*). At this point,
where MC equals MD, there is no shortage or excess of supply. The supply curve
has a positive slope because as the price becomes higher the firms are more
willing and able to produce power, and the demand curve has a negative slope
since the willingness of the customers to pay is restrained at higher prices.
Figure 1: Supply-demand equilibrium.
2.2 The concept of economic surplus
A basic tool for classical economic analysis is the theory of economic surplus.
The social surplus SS, i.e. the surplus to economy, is divided between buyers and
sellers as consumers’ and producers’ surplus. The producers’ surplus is the
difference between the market price and the marginal cost of production summed
over the output that benefits the producer, and the consumers’ surplus is the
benefit that the consumers have by purchasing at a lower price than that which
they were willing to pay [3]. The surpluses are graphically presented in Figure 2,
for a market in perfect competition equilibrium. The horizontally shaded triangle
is the consumers’ surplus CS and the vertically shaded triangle is the producers’




































   (2.7)
where *** dqp   at the perfect competition equilibrium point.
The expressions for oligopolistic markets can be worked out using integration.
Figure 2: The consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.
The producers’ surplus PS corresponds to the sum of the profits of all suppliers,
which can be defined as the revenues minus the true generating costs C. For a
market that employs uniform pricing, the profit is given by:
2
2
1** qqqpCqp   (2.8).
The social surplus SS is also termed the social welfare. From (2.7), the social
welfare SW is given by the consumers’ benefit, i.e. the inverse quadratic demand
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The social welfare is at its maximum when a competitive market is allowed to
operate freely and the market price equals the perfect competition equilibrium
price at the intersection of the supply and demand curves, as shown in Figure 1.












market price is set to a different value, a reduction in the social welfare will
occur and the remaining surplus will be redistributed among the consumers and
producers depending on the occasion. A price distortion may occur due to several
causes; for example it may be of the form of price caps that will benefit the
consumers, or of minimum price settings that will be in favour of the producers
[16]. However, neither the producers nor the consumers enjoy the lost surplus.
This is called the deadweight loss and is a representation of the loss to economy
of a market failure. In the case of the oligopolistic market, strategic producers
able to exercise market power may attempt to transform more consumers’
surplus into profit, and this will result in a deadweight loss [3]. This is discussed
further in Section 2.8.
If transmission expenses are included into the market structure, the transmission
rights owner claims the cost for the transportation of the product, such as in the
case of the electricity market where the market operator or a separate entity
collects the transmission congestion rent. For this case, the social welfare
consists of the sum of the consumers’ and producers’ surplus and the
transmission congestion rent. If the consumers are paying for the transmission
costs, the congestion rent CR for different locations l can be calculated by the





In the electricity market modelling in this Thesis it will be assumed that the
congestion rent is detained by the ISO.
2.3 Nash equilibrium
Any market environment for which each participant acts independently and no
coalitions are present among the players, can be described as a non-cooperative
game. John Nash [38] has proved that a finite non-cooperative game always has
at least one equilibrium point for which the strategy of each player is optimal
against those of its rivals. At that point each player cannot increase its payoff by
changing its strategy unilaterally. That profile of strategies for which each
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player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies is defined
as a Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria may be defined by pure strategies or as
mixed strategies, in which the players choose from a set of strategies based on
associated probabilities. In a bid-based electricity market equilibrium model, a
Nash equilibrium results if none of the market participants has an incentive to
unilaterally change its bid. The equilibrium point of an electricity market for a
given market period can be defined as the set of prices at different nodes, profits
of the generating firms, social welfare, power generation output, power
distribution in the electrical network and load demand at each node.
Nash equilibria are consistent predictions of the outcome of the game in the
sense that if all the market players are able to predict that a particular Nash
equilibrium will occur, then no player will have an incentive to change its
strategy. This will occur if all the players predict a particular Nash equilibrium
point and also predict that their opponents will predict it. A prediction that any
fixed non-Nash profile of strategies will occur, implies that at least one player
will make a mistake in predicting its rivals’ strategies or in optimising its payoff
[39].
In many games, such as markets in which the supply curve crosses the demand
curve more than once, several Nash equilibria may exist. In this case, the
assumption that the outcome of the game will be a Nash equilibrium relies on
some process that will lead all the players to the same equilibrium point. Thomas
Schelling [40] suggested that the participants in a game can often concert their
intentions or expectations with their opponents, if each player knows that the
others are trying to do the same. In a situation that provides some clue for
coordinating behaviour, each player’s expectation of what the others expect him
to expect to be expected to do, will lead to a focal point. This Nash equilibrium
point is called a focal equilibrium [41] (also sometimes called a Schelling point)
and, if its existence is realised, it is preferred by all players. Although games with
multiple equilibria may have focal points, game theory lacks a general argument
that a Nash outcome will occur [39].
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2.4 Oligopolistic electricity market equilibrium models
Several equilibrium models have been proposed for the simulation and
investigation of markets that exhibit oligopolistic behaviour, such as the
emerging deregulated electricity markets, which vary in terms of competition and
market assumptions. Some of the most popular models include the Cournot,
Bertrand, and Supply Function competition, while other approaches, such as the
Stackelberg competition and the conjectural variations method, have also been
used for electricity market analysis. These models are described below.
2.4.1 Cournot competition
The Cournot competition model has been proposed by Augustin Cournot in 1838
[42]. This is an oligopolistic, non-collusive economic model, which assumes that
all the firms that participate in the market act strategically and choose the
quantities that they are willing to produce simultaneously, which they will then
sell at the market clearing price. In Cournot’s original model the price
mechanism was not specified, but the market clearing price can be thought as
being determined by an auctioneer that equates the total supply and demand.
Suppliers maximise profits under the assumption that all the other players will
keep their output fixed and all the market participants are assumed to have the
same information for their rivals’ cost functions and the load demand. An
equilibrium point for this game can be determined by the condition that all the
firms will choose strategies that are best responses to the anticipated actions of
their opponents. This will be a Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game and none
of the firms will benefit by changing its output quantity, given the output levels
of the rival firms [39].
In the early development of the electricity market equilibrium analysis, the
Cournot model was considered as the most appropriate one to be applied. Such
orientation resulted from the fact that it was an important step beyond monopoly
models, being able to assess market power up to a point. However, experience
has revealed drawbacks for this approach. The principal shortcoming of the
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application of the Cournot model in the electricity markets is that a power
generation market is a type of supply-curve competition and not a quantity-based
one. Such applications may provide inconsistent or non-realistic estimates for the
market outcome, or misinterpret the ability of a firm to exercise market power.
Other shortcomings arise from the fact that demand elasticity in the electricity
markets is unknown [1]. The Cournot competition model suggests that the
strategic generating firms should be able to sustain prices above marginal cost
levels with the difference determined by the price elasticity of demand. The
Cournot results for the market outcome are very sensitive to this elasticity and
the equilibrium prices calculated by Cournot models tend to be higher than the
prices observed in practice because the electricity markets have very low
elasticity [16]. For instance, the investigation on the England and Wales market
in [35] reports that the actual market prices observed were higher than the
marginal costs, but not nearly as high as the theoretically calculated prices.
Nevertheless, applications of the Cournot model have contributed in the literature
in many distinct ways and this method is still used for investigating numerous
subject matters concerning the electricity markets. Some notable applications
include the following.
The studies in [33,43] have recognised that the shortcomings of applying
concentration measures techniques to assess market power abilities are
exacerbated in the case of restructured electricity markets and proposed a
Cournot oligopolistic model that considered transmission constraints. The model
was applied on the California electricity market and the geographic extent of the
restructured market was explored, as it was argued that transmission congestion
could isolate competition. The analysis shows that the congestion effects depend
on the levels of demand and it is also advised that policy makers should take a
strong interest in improving the short-run demand price responsiveness in the
electricity market in order to limit market power. A subsequent study [37] that
simulated future situations in the California market by representing the
hydroelectric production in the Cournot model has also shown that the
hydroelectric availability affects the extent of market power.
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Based on the arguments in [44], the investigations in [45,31] have applied
Cournot competition in linearized DC power networks to show the interactions
of geographical and electric topology of the network and identify sources of
market power other than capacity withholding for raising prices. The
representation of network loop flows has illustrated that firms may increase their
production in order to block transmission of competitive power supply to
increase their profits. The firms may foreclose competition by even producing
below marginal costs [46] and this action will affect the nodal prices across the
whole network.
The model proposed in [32] shows that transmission constraints affect pure
Cournot equilibria, demonstrating that limited transmission capacity may give a
producer incentive to restrict its output in order to congest transmission into its
area. The analysis in [47] investigates the existence and uniqueness of Cournot
equilibria in looped transmission constrained systems and shows that a pure
strategy equilibrium may cease to exist when a transmission constraint is
introduced, even if the limit is higher than the flow in the unconstrained
equilibrium. In addition, the existence and uniqueness of Nash-Cournot
equilibria in cooperative games are investigated in [48].
In [49,50], using a DC network Cournot model, it has been shown that generators
are able to capture the congestion rents and leave the transmission rights holders
uncompensated by adjusting prices accordingly even in the absence of locational
market power, resulting in inefficient dispatch and misplaced investment
incentives. It has been suggested that strategic consumers may contribute to this
inefficiency. This analysis was contradicted in [51], where transmission
congestion contracts were introduced in the Cournot model, showing that they
may force the firms to sell at marginal cost. A subsequent report [52] classifies
the solution of [49,50] as one for a particular type of game that deviates from the
definition of non-cooperative games, but it is stated that in Cournot games firms
will be able to exercise market power and capture some of the congestion rent.
However, the Cournot investigation in [53] shows that an integrated market for
transmission and energy, in which the ISO allocates transmission capacities
based on optimal operation of a meshed network, reduces market power and
30
prices compared with a design for separate markets where transmission rights are
allocated by auctions.
Following the models proposed in [45,49], other Cournot competition studies
have also employed numerical methods to calculate equilibrium solutions for
more realistic systems. The model in [54] incorporates generation and
transmission constraints to calculate long-term Cournot equilibria for markets in
which the generators commit their output to customers through long-term
contracts. A more comprehensive numerical model was proposed in [55], where
the DC power network representation is implemented. Bilateral and poolco
markets are simulated and unique Cournot solutions are computed. An extension
of this model that considers forward contracts and accounts for the interactions
with pollution emission permits markets was provided in [56], while [57]
presented a modification of the DC network Cournot model that includes
nonlinear losses, phase shifters and controllable DC lines. A more advanced
Cournot analysis that considers nonsmooth demand functions, price caps and
joint constraints incorporated in the producers’ optimisation problem, such as
bounds on the proportion of transmission capacity allocated to each producer, is
provided in [58].
A two-settlement market model with DC network representation has been
proposed in [59]. The market is characterised by a two-period game, for which a
forward market is first operated and a spot market is settled in the second period.
Firms’ strategic behaviour and social welfare maximisation are assumed for both
markets and network uncertainties are modelled in the spot market. The system
capacities are unknown when firms enter forward contracts and Cournot
equilibrium is calculated for the spot market subject to stochastic fluctuations.
The model was modified in [60] to include price caps for both the forward and
spot markets, showing that this results in reduced forward contracting. A review
on such models can be found in [61] and a case study on a 24-bus system was
presented in [62], where it was observed that the strategic firms have incentives
for forward contracting. A developed version of the two-settlement market model
was proposed in [63], where alternative solution methods that aim to facilitate
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Cournot simulations of realistic electricity markets with probabilistic demand
and system contingencies are provided.
The report in [64] compares Cournot results for case studies carried out using
oligopolistic models from three different research groups and declares that
structural and behavioural assumptions affect the equilibrium results. A Cournot
game of incomplete information was presented in [65] and equilibria were
calculated for different estimation models of the rivals’ production costs, to show
how the accuracy of such predictions affects the market outcome. Additionally, a
computationally efficient algorithm for the calculation of Cournot equilibria with
comparisons of test cases for different market concentration and demand
elasticity is provided in [66].
The report in [67] calls to attention that reactive power and voltage related issues
are commonly neglected in Cournot oligopolistic models. The authors proposed
that a DC approximation does not capture properly the features of the electrical
network, providing an example in which Cournot players identify the potential
for market power due to voltage constraints and reactive power in the system.
Then, they presented a Cournot model that employs AC network representation
and considers both active and reactive power quantities as strategic variables in
[68,69], showing the significant impact of reactive power on the market outcome.
Comparisons of Cournot outcomes under DC and AC assumptions are presented
in [70].
2.4.2 Bertrand competition
A review that criticised Cournot’s theories on oligopolistic competition was
published by Joseph Bertrand in 1883 [71]. His argument was that an equilibrium
based on quantity decisions was not a true equilibrium because if a supplier was
offering the product at a lower price could attract all buyers. In the Bertrand
model, prices are considered to be the strategic decision variables, instead of
quantities. The non-collusive firms compete by setting their prices
simultaneously and letting the market decide how much each firm will sell, under
the assumption that all firms can produce as much output as required to meet
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demand. Since there are no output restrictions and the buyers will choose the
cheapest price, a firm can capture the entire market by setting its price slightly
less than those of the other firms, if the product is homogeneous (as in the case of
a general deregulated electricity market). The other firms will anticipate the
action of the one with the lowest price offer and in retaliation they will bid
slightly lower, so that a sustainable equilibrium will be reached only when the
price is reduced to the marginal cost of generation, since lower offers will result
in a loss and a firm will choose instead not to produce at all. The market price
will be equal or near to the marginal cost of generation of the most efficient firm,
since a higher price will be undercut by the offer of a firm with lower costs.
Therefore, the competitive price is the best price that firms rationally expect to
achieve [16].
The assumption that a single supplier can capture the entire market is not
applicable in the case of the electricity market where the generation capacities
have strict constraints. In addition, a supplier cannot bid a lower price with the
aim of increasing its output, since the marginal cost of generation is increasing as
the output increases [17]. Also, it has been addressed in the literature that in the
presence of transmission costs and generation or transmission constraints, prices
can drift above the marginal cost and may fluctuate continually eliminating the
possibility for pure strategy equilibria. Consequently the only equilibrium is a
mixed strategy (probabilistic) one [72]. However, the analysis in [32] pointed out
that in a duopoly where a transmission constraint is present the firms’ behaviour
in choosing price offers will differ from the standard Bertrand outcome. In
addition, the discussions in [73] argue that the Bertrand model can give
interesting results if used in the context of generation capacity constraints and
increasing marginal costs, implying that since no single firm can capture the
entire market the resulting market outcome will no longer be competitive and the
equilibrium price will be higher than the marginal cost. However, this model still
assumes that the price decisions of one’s competitors are weakly linked to its
own decisions, while it does not resemble the supply-curve type competition that
dictates the electricity market.
33
Oligopolistic models based on Bertrand competition have been occasionally
applied to electricity market analysis. Nash-Bertrand equilibria were calculated
in [30,74], which consider spatial variations in demand functions and production
and transport costs, in order to compare regulated and deregulated electricity
markets. The Bertrand prices are assumed to be undercut to a value just less than
the second lowest marginal cost of the participating firms and the results have
shown prices above the marginal costs. A similar study [75] compares Bertrand
results for spatial and mill pricing (i.e. customer buys at the plant and
transmission is disregarded), as well as Bertrand and Cournot outcomes, for
short- and long-run operations.
A numerical approach for a Bertrand model was presented in [76], in which the
market participants submit prices with the quantity that they want to sell and they
are ordered by price to meet demand in a pay-as-bid scheme resulting in mixed
strategy equilibria. Similar assumptions are considered in [25], where firms
compete by submitting prices for their available production and a cap for the bid
prices is considered. Comparisons are made for price competition outcomes
under uniform and pay-as-bid pricing. Another study that employs unconstrained
Bertrand competition and assumes that the market clearing price equals the
marginal cost of generation is proposed in [77], in order to compare the mean
and variances of electricity prices for different competition types, with the
Bertrand solution being the lower benchmark.
2.4.3 Supply function equilibrium
In 1989 a publication by Klemperer and Meyer [78] has proposed a new
oligopolistic market model, called Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). The
original model was set as an oligopolistic framework in which the market players
are facing uncertain demand. Each firm in this non-cooperative game chooses a
strategy based on a supply function that relates the quantity it is willing to sell to
its price. This supply-curve bidding allows a firm to adapt better to changing
conditions, such as an uncertain environment, than either bidding fixed quantities
or in a commitment to fixed prices as in the Cournot and Bertrand settings. The
decision variables for the strategic firms are the parameters of their supply
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functions that are usually related to production costs, capacity constraints and
demand elasticity to price. Klemperer and Meyer calculated the equilibrium
solution by solving a differential equation for profit maximisation to find the
optimum bids for the firms and allow the supply functions to take any form. This
approach will be referred to as the general case SFE. Furthermore, under
sufficient conditions they have proved that the linear SFE solution is unique (see
subsequent sections). Later studies have utilised different formats of supply
functions, while it was proposed that the modelling of supply function bids
restricted to linear form exhibits certain advantages, which will be discussed later
on. Qualitative examples for general, linear and step-wise supply function bids
are shown in Figure 3, (a), (b) and (c) respectively.
Figure 3: Examples of supply function bids.
At the equilibrium point of the supply function game each player determines its
optimum supply-curve bid that maximises its profit based on how the other
players will adjust their output to changes in market prices, anticipating their
strategies. This type of competition leads to a less profitable outcome for all
suppliers compared with Cournot competition. By switching from quantity bids
to supply function bidding it is possible to exercise market power in any demand
level in the case of uncertain demand, but if all players bid in this manner the
majority of the profits will be reduced as competition will be increased [1].
Klemperer and Meyer [78] have shown that price and quantity in any SFE are
bounded by the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes. Cournot equilibrium resembles
a vertical supply function, being a worst-case scenario, and Bertrand corresponds













could be a better approximation in markets with steep marginal cost curves
relative to demand, while markets with flat marginal costs may be approximated
by Bertrand competition. However, if supply-curve bidding is allowed, a fixed
price or a fixed quantity cannot be an equilibrium strategy if marginal costs are
upward sloping, as in the case of the electricity market.
In contrast to the Cournot model, the SFE model offers the possibility of
developing insights into the bidding behaviour of the firms and offers the ability
of representing the obligation to bid consistently over a time horizon. As
electricity markets often require suppliers to offer a price schedule that applies
throughout a day rather than a series of quantity bids, the SFE approach is more
attractive compared to the Cournot model since it is a more realistic view of
electricity markets. Furthermore, the SFE prices are not very sensitive to their
dependency on demand as in Cournot competition, and the price predictions will
be more reliable [79].
The study in [78] shows that in the absence of uncertainty an enormous
multiplicity of equilibria exists, but uncertainty reduces this set dramatically. It is
shown that if the range of demand is unbounded then there is a unique symmetric
linear SFE for a market with linear demand and identical marginal cost curves. If
demand is bounded, as in realistic electricity markets where the load demand
cannot be infinite, then a continuum of equilibria exists, ranging from Cournot
solutions being the highest prices, to competitive prices. A similar effect to
demand uncertainty can be imposed if the market players are required to submit a
single bid schedule for a time horizon that accommodates a variety of different
demand levels. The main criticism of the SFE models is that they produce
multiple equilibrium solutions and therefore they have little predictive value in
practical investigations. Fortunately, several studies have determined conditions
under which the range of equilibria can be very narrow, or a unique SFE may be
established.
Concerning the electricity market, the strategic bid of a generating firm can be
interpreted as a function mapping price into a level of active power production,
independent of time. Since cost functions for producing electricity are in general
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increasing functions of output power and different demand levels that are
unknown at the time of bidding require different quantity bids, the supply
function equilibrium has been widely considered as the most appropriate model
to represent the interactions between strategic generating firms. The first that
applied the SFE model in the electricity market were Green and Newbery [8] and
Bolle [80] in 1992.
Green and Newbery’s innovative model, which opposed the opinion that the
1990 restructuring in the England and Wales market would eventually result in a
competitive market, has drawn the attention of many researchers to focus on
different approaches that employ the SFE model. Research in the following years
varies in market assumptions and representations of suppliers’ constraints and
electricity networks. Apart from the general SFE model, the most popular
approach is the linear SFE model [81], in which the market players parameterize
their linear marginal cost function by varying its slope and intercept in order to
construct their optimum bids. A detailed literature review on the linear SFE
models and their applications, as well as on advances of the general case SFE,
follows in the subsequent sections.
2.4.4 Stackelberg and multi-leader-follower games
The Stackelberg model has been proposed by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934
[82] to investigate non-cooperative games in which a leader that dominates the
market acts strategically and naive followers believe that they cannot affect the
market conditions through their decisions. The leader chooses its strategy first,
while the followers observe this action and participate in the market sequentially.
The leader recognises how the followers’ decisions will depend on the market
variables and is able to explicitly account for their reactions in its strategy. The
original formulation by Stackelberg examined duopolies that take decisions on
their quantities, but different strategies with a number of market participants can
be modelled in this manner. This single-leader-follower method has been
regarded as an oligopolistic application, but due to its hierarchical structure it is a
rather monopolistic approach. An extension of the Stackelberg game is the multi-
leader-follower game, in which two or more leaders act strategically and compete
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with each other. In the case of the electricity pool market, the ISO is considered
to be a follower [83]. It may be assumed that the followers compete with each
other and with the ISO after the leaders choose strategies, but most commonly
perfect competition conditions hold for the followers in most electricity market
models.
Stackelberg formulations have sporadically appeared in electricity market
studies. A dynamic Stackelberg model that examines the long-run transmission
expansion decisions was outlined in [84]. It describes the interactions between a
transmission firm that takes decisions on transmission capacity availability (the
strategic variable) and two followers that supply and purchase power. Another
Stackelberg equilibrium model, in which the leader is a strategic generating firm
that acts in a Cournot manner to maximise profit and the followers comprise a
competitive fringe, was presented in [85]. The electrical network is represented
by AC formulation to account for transmission congestion and reactive power
related issues and the numerical results show that the reactive power influences
the equilibrium point, while the leader exercises more intense market power in
the presence of tighter transmission capacity constraints. A detailed investigation
of Stackelberg games in a joint energy and emission permits market with DC
network representation was presented in [86]. The leader chooses quantities of
output and emission allowances to withhold, while the group of followers
consists of price-takers (Bertrand behaviour) and Cournot players that can
influence prices. Furthermore, the numerical algorithm of the SFE model in [87],
which undertakes two stages in updating the supply function strategies of the
firms in order to reach an equilibrium solution, employs a Stackelberg game in
the first stage.
The properties and numerical approaches for multi-leader-follower models were
explored in [88,83]. Multi-leader-follower games for the electricity market have
been proposed by using Cournot and supply function bids. The analysis in [69]
provides equilibrium results for leader-follower games where leaders bid in the
Cournot manner and present cases for different number of leaders. Also,
Stackelberg and 2-leader results were presented in [89] by employing supply
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function bids. Other studies that consider markets with strategic firms and price-
taking competitive fringes include [33,37,45,79].
2.4.5 Conjectural variations method and conjectured supply functions
The conjectural variations approach is used to estimate the strategic behaviour of
market players that maximise their profits while taking into account the reactions
of their rivals. This economic concept has been brought into attention by Bowley
in 1924 [90]. The first application for electricity market analysis appeared in
[91], where the conjectural variations method is used to overcome the
shortcomings of Cournot equilibrium related to demand elasticity. Instead of
considering the actual rivals’ supply bids, the model employs only public past
market data to represent the beliefs about the rivals’ bidding behaviour. The
rivals are supposed to adjust their supply offers in response to price changes and
their reactions are modelled by the residual demand, i.e. the remaining demand
after subtracting the rivals’ supply functions from the market demand curve,
which is characterised by its elasticity. The optimal supply decision is then made
based on this elasticity, which expresses the market conjecture of each firm. The
significance of this parameter is that different levels of competition can be
modelled by varying it, being a measure of the firms’ perception about their
market position, and the numerical results obtained are found to be more realistic
than the corresponding Cournot outcome. This method was extended in [92] by
defining the conjectural variation of a firm as its belief about the response of its
rivals’ quantity to a change in its own quantity, by facing its competitors as a
single entity. It is proven that conjectural variations solutions for electricity
markets are Nash equilibria, showing that a firm does not need to know the
rivals’ cost functions in order to make optimal decisions, and the strategies of
other games, such as Cournot, Stackelberg and perfect competition, are shown to
be special cases of conjectural variations strategies. A subsequent study [93]
presented a method in which the firms conduct learning in a conjectural
variations framework and tune their own responses to rivals’ decisions. The main
criticism for this method is the static nature of the analysis and the theoretical
difficulties involved in empirical estimation of the conjectural variations
parameter in the absence of cost data [94].
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A model that represents the conjectures of the firms regarding how their rivals
will adjust sales in response to price changes by implementing conjectured
supply functions in a DC network has been proposed in [94]. This approach is
termed as the Conjectured Supply Function (CSF) method and can be viewed as
an approximation of the SFE, but the assumed and actual response functions may
differ. The CSF approach represents the full range of the different types of
strategic interactions that vary in how firms anticipate the rivals’ reactions to
their decisions concerning either prices or quantities. It has the advantage that the
calculation of equilibria can be simplified, but it shares the same limitations as
the conjectural variations model. Formulations for bilateral and poolco market
models are presented by utilising linear response functions and the CSFs are
parameterized by varying either their slope or intercept. The presented results on
the England and Wales market show that the equilibrium prices from the CSF
model are more consistent with those actually experienced when compared with
Cournot results. Another study that employs the CSF method appears in [95],
which considers the deviation of the forecasted rivals’ reaction from the actual
response and introduces financial risk. A multi-period CFS model is presented in
[96] for a joint energy and spinning reserve market. CSFs are used for both
energy supply and spinning reserve in a DC network framework with
intertemporal constraints for ramp up/down rates and maximum output over a
time horizon. In addition, a CSF approach that analyses the demand
responsiveness to price is presented in [97].
2.4.6 Choosing the most appropriate method for electricity market
analysis
All the aforementioned oligopolistic models have contributed in their own way to
the electricity market literature in terms of, among others, investigating the issue
of market power and the strategic behaviour of the firms and predicting the
market outcome. However, considering the pros and cons of each method, the
SFE approach has been employed for this Thesis’ research because it has been
proven to be the more realistic representation for the electricity market.
Furthermore, despite the references about SFE’s limited potential in realistic
applications due to the mathematical complexity involved, this Thesis presents a
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versatile novel numerical SFE model able to solve large and complex systems,
contributing in a distinct way to the literature as shown in the subsequent
chapters. Therefore, the discussions that follow are limited to SFE studies only.
2.5 General SFE models
The SFE model proposed by Bolle [80] considers a pool type market in which
there are no restrictions for the producers in choosing the strategies that relate
prices and quantities. The model is based on the assumption that there are no
supply capacity constraints and different market scenarios in terms of pricing are
examined. A continuum of symmetric equilibria results for all the examined
games and the equilibrium selection is based on the solution with the highest
profit for all players. Recalling the proof from [78] Bolle shows that for the
symmetric unique equilibrium with linear demand and marginal cost curves, the
market prices decrease as the number of generating firms increases. The prices
will eventually converge to marginal cost values in the case where consumers
pay spot prices. If constant prices chosen by the auctioneer are to be paid, the
monopoly solution, i.e. the joint profit maximisation case, has been found to be
an equilibrium and the concluding remarks refer to the unrestricted supply
function model as a market that may be governed by tacit collusion.
The aforementioned study did not consider any limitations for the shape of the
supply functions. In some cases, such as in the numerical results of Bolle, the
SFE may be characterised by a decreasing supply function. Even though the
original SFE model by Klemperer and Meyer did not restrict the supply offers
from being decreasing functions, a non-decreasing constraint for the supply
function bids should be included, since in most realistic electricity markets the
participants are not allowed to commit to a decreasing schedule of supply
function offers, or decreasing supply functions are explicitly ruled out by design
[98].
Green and Newbery [8] have proposed an SFE approach to model the major
restructuring in the England and Wales electricity market using the general SFE
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model that solves a Klemperer-Meyer differential equation, by simulating a
symmetric duopoly to show the interactions of the two dominant firms in the
market. Instead of a single supply function bid for one bidding interval, the
generating firms submit a whole supply schedule of prices for active power
generation. The bidding takes place for the following day (a time horizon of 24
hours) for half-hour intervals. The dispatcher determines the spot price and the
required supply quantities assigned to each firm for each interval, by equating
supply to demand at each moment. The spot price is set at the bid of the marginal
(most expensive) generator. This model takes into account the generation
capacity constraints of the suppliers and it is shown that these constraints narrow
down the range of possible equilibria. The study extends to a simplified
asymmetric capacitated duopoly case and focuses on possible inefficiencies, such
as high deadweight losses due to the influence of the dominant firms on the
prices, and suggests that they can be avoided by subdividing the duopolistic
industry into five equal firms. An extension to this model was proposed in [99],
where the impact of the divestitures in the England and Wales market on the
prices is analysed, by simulating the market capacity from the asymmetric firms
as evenly distributed to symmetric firms, together with a competitive fringe.
The study in [100] has extended the model of [8] to include contracts, contestable
entry and variable number of competitors, showing the interactions of contract
and spot markets. It shows that the range of possible equilibria can be narrowed
down not only by generation capacity constraints, but also by increasing the
number of competitors in the market. Furthermore, it proves that the entry threats
and contracts can further narrow down the range of equilibria to give a unique
equilibrium point without the unrealistic assumption of unbounded demand. This
unique equilibrium can be sustained as long as entry is backed by contracts.
Market power of the incumbent players is reduced if entry remains contestable
and the contract market is reasonably active, while increased competition reduces
the prices. Another general SFE model that investigates the impact of contracts
on the bidding behaviour of strategic firms in the electricity spot market has been
proposed in [101]. This model considers a duopoly where the players submit a
smooth non-decreasing supply function. Price caps and generation capacity
constraints are considered, and the demand is a nonlinear function of price
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subject to a bounded random shock. However, these models consider the firms to
be symmetric, which is an unrealistic assumption.
In [102] a numerical approach has been proposed to calculate equilibria in
electricity markets with non-decreasing supply function bidding, considering
asymmetric generation capacity constraints, firms with asymmetric quadratic
cost functions, and price or bid caps. It is argued that it may not be effective to
calculate asymmetric SFEs using the Klemperer-Meyer differential equation
approach by itself because it produces solutions with supply functions that fail to
be non-decreasing, while even when non-decreasing SFEs are produced many of
these are unstable. In order to provide a method to calculate non-decreasing
stable equilibria, the model iterates in the function space of the allowable supply
functions to numerically solve for the solution. The resulting supply function
curves at the equilibrium point consist of a large number of successive affine
(linear) supply function segments, each constructed by one step of the iterative
process. A local search algorithm that identifies the optimum direction for the
supply function is used, and it is expected to yield only stable equilibria. Since
decreasing supply functions and unstable equilibria are ruled out the range of the
equilibrium solutions that are likely to be observed in practice is narrowed.
However, this search algorithm does not guarantee to find a global optimum
solution because there may be multiple local optima for the direction in the
function space. This algorithm was also used in [103] and a similar approach has
been proposed in [104] to provide a more computationally efficient algorithm.
The numerical results in [102] and [103] have shown that when price caps are
binding the range of stable equilibria is very small, and even when price caps are
not binding, this range is also relatively small. It is shown that with moderately
tight capacity constraints and price caps, unique equilibria with prices well below
Cournot prices will yield. All but one equilibrium are unlikely to be observed in
practice, with those that firms offer prices much higher than their marginal costs
being the less stable. It is shown under some restrictive assumptions that, with
quadratic cost functions (i.e. linear marginal costs), all SFE solutions between the
most competitive and the Cournot solutions, except the linear SFE, are unstable.
With bid caps, similar SFE bids result, while the profits are higher since the
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market price can exceed this cap. The investigation has shown that the SFE
prices appear to be well below Cournot prices at all times, strengthening the
observations of [8] for markets requiring fixed bids over a time horizon with
substantial demand variation, depicting the time horizon coupling effects on
limiting the possible resulting equilibria.
The model proposed in [105] has advanced the theory of Klemperer and Meyer
by implementing a special case for a market in which symmetric profit-
maximising firms submit step-wise supply functions to a pool. The uniform
market price is set by the bid price of the marginal unit and generation capacity
constraints are considered. The model was applied to data from the Pennsylvania
electricity market to produce symmetrical SFEs and the analysis elaborated on
the resulting equilibrium prices to show that even with a large number of market
participants the market price will still be significantly higher than the perfect
competitive price. The prices at equilibrium have been found to be sensitive to
the average reliability of the generators, the amount of the reserve capacity in the
system and the precision at which the strategic firms are able to predict the
demand. Subsequent studies [106,107] have provided the formulation and
methodology to implement general SFE games for uniform and pay-as-bid
pricing mechanisms, investigating the existence of equilibria and the ability of
the players to convergence to a linear equilibrium. The approach in [105]
attracted the attention for further investigations, such as the one in [108] where
the model was extended to include arbitrary convex cost function instead of
piece-wise linear forms. Also, the stochastic model in [77] that predicts the mean
and variance of electricity prices over a time horizon employs the
aforementioned SFE model and exhibits the advantage of capturing the effect of
the entire supply system on the prices, over similar models that employed the
Cournot and Bertrand theories.
Another study by Bolle [109] used aggregated step-wise supply and demand
functions to explore the effects of strategic demand-side bidding in unconstrained
markets. It was noted that depending on the proportion of the strategic demand,
such as big customers that can switch on and off their electricity-consuming
devices, the market prices may be much higher than marginal costs, or mixed
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strategies may result. If the market participants choose to play mixed strategies,
then instability in the form of fluctuations of supply and demand should be
expected and it may be advantageous for big customers to collude. It concludes
that the existence of strategic demand seems to be crucial for the absence of pure
strategy equilibria with low prices, and raises the question whether or not
demand-side bidding should be allowed in the electricity markets.
A different type of market equilibrium closely related to the SFE model was
investigated in [110], based on the Australian electricity market. This study
examines a duopoly where the firms choose a set of discrete prices that will be
fixed for 24 hours and then each firm chooses quantity bids to offer at each price
for each half-hour interval of the day. The actual scheduled quantities are
determined based on the system demand during a 5 minute period, in which the
cheapest bids are dispatched with a uniform market price. Nash equilibrium is
obtained for the quantity setting sub-game, in which the players aim to maximise
their expected profit based on probabilistic uncertain demand levels when prices
are already known. This study examines the stability and existence of
equilibrium for this particular type of market.
2.6 The linear SFE model
In 1996, Green [81] has proposed for the first time an SFE model that deals
exclusively with linear supply functions. The model considers asymmetric firms
with cost functions that dependent on a single quadratic component, i.e. the
marginal costs are linear and normalised to zero at zero output, and the time-
dependent demand is a linear function of price with negative slope. The bidding
process is similar to that of [8], i.e. the firms submit bids for the next 24 hours
etc. The form of the supply function bid that the firms are allowed to submit to
the pool is restricted to a linear function that relates price and quantity and passes
through the origin with positive slope – the same form as the marginal cost. The
firms make decisions on their strategies by varying the slope of the supply
function, which is the strategic variable. The pool operator schedules the firms by
ranking them in order of increasing bids to ensure that the bids are non-
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decreasing in price. The model solves a differential equation for profit
maximisation as in previous general SFE models but considers as an equilibrium
solution only the unique linear SFE solution. As already mentioned, in the case
of unbounded demand and linear marginal costs, the linear solution is the unique
one. In the electricity market where the demand is not infinite the linear solution
is not unique but is still the most tractable. Green shows that the linear solution is
a reasonable approximation for any equilibrium function at low levels of
demand, while even if, for higher demand levels there are multiple equilibria, the
linear solution still remains an equilibrium. The model has been successfully
applied to represent different policies that could increase the competition in the
England and Wales electricity spot market.
Even though Green [81] did not emphasise the unique advantages of the linear
SFE model, it has become the most popular oligopolistic equilibrium model
superseding the Cournot approach to a large extent. A comprehensive
development of the linear SFE model and discussions on its advantages and
properties have been given in [79]. The main advantage of linear SFE models
with linear marginal cost functions over the general form is the ability to handle
asymmetric firms for cases with more than two strategic firms. The general SFE
model requires the solution of a set of differential equations or iteration in the
function space of supply functions, which renders the solution very difficult to
find. Therefore, most investigations were confined to consider symmetric firms.
The linear SFE can handle asymmetry, as well as multiple strategic firms.
Furthermore, apart of Green’s remarks, the choice of approximating the market
by the linear SFE model can be justified, since [102] shows that for symmetric
cases with linear marginal costs and no capacity constraints, all SFEs except the
linear SFE are unstable, while based on numerical simulations of asymmetric
cases it suggests that the less competitive SFEs than the linear one are also
unstable. A different approach for the mathematical proof of existence and
uniqueness of the linear SFE is provided in [111].
The linear SFE model in [79] is a generalisation of [81] that includes asymmetric
costs, capacity limits, non-zero marginal cost and supply function bid intercepts,
a competitive fringe and allowance for piece-wise linear supply function bids. It
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simplifies the mathematical complexity of the problem by choosing a slope for
the demand function that is independent of time, and since the linear SFE model
does not depend on the load duration characteristic but only on the demand
function slope, it enables profits to be estimated over a time horizon, such as a
year. Also, by using the aggregated demand and price as a function of time,
equilibrium prices at any instance in a time horizon can be evaluated. In contrast
to Green’s model, this investigation suggests that a linear marginal cost function
that passes through the origin will overestimate profits compared with a more
realistic piece-wise function with non-zero cost at zero output that has the same
cost at full production. Therefore, a zero-intercept function is not sufficient being
particularly unrealistic if supply is close to the lower limit of the generator and a
linear approximation of the marginal cost function must match the piece-wise
function at both full and zero output. A very important feature of this
investigation is the analytical proof for the uncapacitated case that it is profit
incentive for the strategic firms to reveal the true intercepts of their marginal cost
functions for equilibrium bidding. Therefore, as in Green’s model, the strategic
variable is the slope of the supply function, but this stems from the mathematical
analysis of varying independently both coefficients of the marginal cost function
showing that the strategic players should bid an intercept equal to the true value
in order to achieve maximum profit at the equilibrium point. The market model
in [79] has successfully simulated the divestitures in the England and Wales
electricity market and seems to fit the price behaviour better than the zero-
intercept linear SFE model in [81]. An earlier version of this investigation can be
found in [112].
2.7 Parameterization of linear supply functions
The models in [81] and [79] have used the slope of the supply function as the
parameter that defines their strategy, while they kept the intercept of the supply
function fixed to the true value of the linear marginal cost function intercept.
This can be interpreted as parameterizing the marginal cost function by adjusting
its slope to construct the strategic supply function bid. Such an approach for
modelling the SFE bids has been referred in the literature as slope-
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parameterization. Four different parameterization methods have been proposed
for the linear SFE models, each one considering different strategic variables and
restrictions on the choice of the supply function offer. Discussions on the impact
of the chosen parameterization method on the resulting SFE can be found in
[113], while further elaboration on this takes place in Chapter 8.
By considering a linear marginal cost function as in (2.3) and a supply function
bid qSB   ˆˆ with 0ˆ  , where ˆ and ˆ are the parameterized bid terms
that correspond to the true generation coefficients α and β, the different
parameterization methods that can be used to construct the linear supply function
bid SB can be described as:
(i) Intercept-parameterization: the strategic players adjust the
intercept α of their marginal cost functions to construct the profit-maximising bid
to be submitted to the pool, while keeping constant the slope β. Most models
keep the slope fixed at the value of the marginal cost function slope, but a model
may assume that the players are allowed to fix the slope at a pre-assigned non-
negative value that might be other than the true slope. In this Thesis the
intercept-parameterization approach will be referred as α-parameterization.
(ii) Slope-parameterization: the strategic players’ behaviour is
modelled by varying the slope β of the marginal cost functions while keeping
constant the intercept. Again, most models set the intercept equal to the true
value of the marginal cost function intercept, but pre-assigned intercepts at other
values may be allowed. The slope-parameterization method will be referred as β-
parameterization.
(iii) Slope intercept-parameterization: in this parameterization
method the strategic players adjust both the slope and intercept in the supply
function, but in a fixed linear relationship as the one between the true α and β
parameters of the marginal cost function. This can be interpreted as multiplying
the marginal cost function by an arbitrary non-negative constant, say kF, in order
to construct the supply function bid, such that )( qkSB F   . The strategy
of the players is defined by parameterizing the supply function by adjusting the
kF factor. In this Thesis the kF term is termed as the bidding parameter and this
parameterization method will be referred as kF-parameterization.
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(iv) Slope-intercept-parameterization: this method allows more
degrees of freedom for the choice of the strategic supply function by arbitrarily
parameterizing both slope α and intercept β independently. This represents the
true flexibility in strategies available to bidders in the context of the linear SFE
model. It will be indicated as (α, β)-parameterization.
The choice of the parameterization method depends on the purpose of the
analysis for which the oligopolistic model is designed. The (α, β)-
parameterization is considered as the most realistic of these four since it allows
any non-decreasing linear supply function to be implemented as an equilibrium
strategy. It illustrates the true potential of the firms to exercise market power, as
far as linear SFE is concerned, and is expected to yield superior profits compared
with the other parameterization methods, as demonstrated by numerical results in
[104] for a 5-firm unconstrained system, and in [113] and [114] for linearized 2-
bus and 6-bus DC systems. However, such high profits may be limited and
subject to the network and market constraints present as it will be discussed later
in Chapter 8. The (α, β)-parameterization method has been employed only by a
limited number of studies for two reasons. Firstly, a unique (α, β)-parameterized
SFE exists only in rare cases under very restrictive conditions and therefore it
will be difficult to perform mathematical analysis for comparison of different
market situations as multiple equilibria will most probably be encountered. Such
comparisons would be fraught, even though the market outcome predictions are
more realistic, because it will not be apparent which equilibrium to select. The
second reason is related to the fact that complicated systems that consider the
electrical network and multiple players cannot be solved analytically and
numerical algorithm approaches are required. As this type of parameterization
has multiple SFE solutions, the algorithm employed will have difficulties in
converging if the SFE points are not (at least) locally unique, due to oscillations
in the convergence process caused by a continuum of equilibria [115,116]. Yet,
other reasons related to AC network modelling may also be responsible and
further discussions take place in Chapter 8. Other studies that use the (α, β)-
parameterization include [117-119,89] that present results for DC or relatively
small systems.
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The other three parameterization methods have been criticised to be less
predictive than the (α, β)-parameterization in describing the market behaviour,
since they may provide equilibrium results that can be artifacts of their restrictive
assumptions. In [113] it has been shown with a simple example that the SFE
solution of the (α, β)-parameterization differs from those of the other three
methods and in certain cases even the existence, non-existence or multiplicity of
equilibria can be an artifact of the numerical framework. Nevertheless, the α- and
β-parameterization methods tend to have locally unique equilibrium points when
modelling markets with transmission network representation, and the numerical
algorithms employed will converge to comparable equilibrium solutions for
different operating conditions in an electricity market. Furthermore, if only
intercepts or only slopes are manipulated by fixing the other coefficient to its true
value, the resulting local equilibrium point will also be an equilibrium for the (α,
β)-parameterization game as well, as long as the strategic variables do not reach
any limits specified in the market model [115,116]. Therefore, in either case, the
coefficient held constant can be chosen accordingly to result in a (very probably
unique) Nash equilibrium that corresponds to the most desirable equilibrium
point under (α, β)-parameterization (for further elaboration see Section 2.12).
However, congested lines in network constrained models may also lead to
multiplicity of local SFEs [120,116]. Note that the investigation in [118] reports
through numerical results on a 2-firm market structure that the choice between
the α-, β-, or (α, β)-parameterizations does not show appreciable difference in the
unconstrained SFE market outcome, while the investigation in [104] for a 5-firm
market makes similar observations for the α-, β- and kF-parameterizations.
Nonetheless, it seems that this is not the case if more complicated network
constrained systems are considered (as it will be shown later in Chapter 8).
However, each of the aforementioned parameterization methods may be used for
qualitative comparisons of different market situations and their employment can
be justified by the purpose and requirements of the apparent oligopolistic
analysis, but the equilibrium results of each parameterization model are expected
to differ from each other. Comparisons of the four methods based on numerical
results on an unconstrained system were provided in [104], while Chapter 8 in
this Thesis extends the analysis on AC network constrained systems.
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The slope-parameterization, as already discussed, is closely related to the
unconstrained linear SFE model resulting from the Klemperer-Meyer
formulation, in which revealing the true intercept in the strategic bid is profit
incentive, being an equilibrium condition for supply function bidding over a time
horizon [79]. Therefore, since this type of parameterization is naturally related to
the original SFE model in [78], it enables the ability to provide an extension to
model situations that incorporate network or other constraints. It has been used in
[81,111,104,118,113,115,116,124-132], being the most popular parameterization
approach.
The intercept-parameterization has been regarded by some studies as more
appropriate than the slope-parameterization, because the slopes of the marginal
cost functions are usually very shallow and the steep slopes that would result
from the strategic behaviour would not be credible. The intercept manipulation
approach can be utilised instead, since the steepness of an aggregate bid curve for
an entire multi-unit firm can be manipulated by different markups (â-α) for
different generating units [87]. A major advantage of the α-parameterization is
that in the case where the SFE approach is intended to be used for market power
assessment in the oligopolistic environment, the manipulation of the intercept
provides a clear picture of how the strategic firms shift their supply functions up
or down, specifying the price at which a generator is willing to start producing
[116]. This conception was primarily considered in [121] to assess the extent of
market power in the Nordic power market. The intercept-parameterization
method has also been employed by the studies of
[87,118,115,104,114,24,122,123,116].
The kF-parameterization method can be regarded as exercising market power by
offering optimised supply functions that are scaled versions of the true marginal
cost functions. Hence, this model depicts successfully the strategic behaviour in
the oligopolistic environment of the electricity market and is eligible for
comparisons of different market situations for qualitative purposes, such as the
investigation of the impact of network constraints on the equilibrium market
outcome and the interactions between the strategic firms. Examples of such
studies that employ the kF-parameterization include [73,133,120]. Furthermore, it
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appears to be a convenient way to simplify the SFE model in order to employ
easily numerical computation techniques to deal with complicated market
structures that involve electricity network representation and large systems. An
aspect that can be regarded as a drawback, which can also be shared with the α-
and β-parameterization methods if the non-manipulated term is fixed to its true
value, is that it cannot predict the focal equilibrium if multiple SFE solutions
exist [113]. However, the investigation in [128] has shown that the existence of
multiple equilibria should not be expected in large numbers for realistic cases but
only for small trivial systems (see Section 2.12). Other investigations that
employ the kF-parameterization appeared in [134-138,104].
2.8 Deadweight loss in SFE oligopolistic markets
As mentioned earlier, any distortion that forces the market prices to move away
from the perfect competition price will result in different consumers’ and
producers’ surplus, as well as in deadweight loss. The market prices in any
environment in which the players act strategically, as in oligopolistic electricity
markets, drift away from the perfect competition values. A graphical example
that depicts the qualitative behaviour of the oligopolistic market based on the kF-
parameterization SFE model is given in Figure 4 (PC stands for perfect
competition). The graph shows that if the strategic bidder chooses to submit a
supply function with a bidding parameter larger than 1.0, which is the most likely
case, the equilibrium point will be shifted to a higher price and lower supply.
The social welfare for perfect competition is graphically defined by the area
bounded by the marginal cost function, the demand curve and the price axis; this
is divided to consumers’ and producers’ surplus by the horizontal line PCpp  .
For the SFE case, the strategic producers transform some consumers’ surplus into
profit, resulting in deadweight loss. The resulting SFE social welfare is the area
enclosed by the line SFEqq  , the marginal cost function, the demand curve and
the price axis, which is smaller than that for perfect competition, divided into
consumers’ and producers’ surplus by the horizontal line SFEpp  . It can be
seen that the consumers’ surplus becomes smaller and the producers’ surplus
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higher, with a deadweight loss defined by the area enclosed by the marginal cost
function, the demand curve and the line SFEqq  . Similar observations apply for
all the aforementioned parameterization methods of the SFE model.
Figure 4: Distortion of social welfare in SFE oligopolistic markets.
In the case where for some reason the kF term in a submitted bid is less than 1.0,
perhaps due to a particular pricing scheme where a firm may expect to sell more
output and get profit from increased market prices due to strategic actions from
other firms, or due to other exogenous profit factors such as subsidies, it will
appear that the social welfare increases due to a deadweight gain as the decrease
in producers’ surplus will appear to be less than the increase in consumers’
surplus [139]. However, even if such uncommon strategies are possible for
individual generating units in a multi-unit system, this is impossible for
aggregated supply curves in electricity markets.
2.9 Electrical network representation and SFE market
modelling
The models that employ the general SFE competition do not consider the
electrical network representation as this will introduce mathematical
complexities that render inoperative the solution process. For example, Bolle
[80] did not consider any physical or operational constraints, while

















firms, but ignore the fundamental power system network theory1. This was also
the case for early investigations of the linear SFE model [81,124,117,125-127],
but as the exploration of the deregulated power markets have shown the
relevance of the network constraints to the potential of the firms to exercise
market power and change the market outcome as discussed in Chapter 1, network
constraints were introduced. The main conclusions on how the constraints affect
the market outcome are discussed in this section, while the impact on the nature
of the market equilibrium follows in Section 2.12. Note that, in contrast with SFE
models that do not represent the electrical network such as
[8,81,117,105,102,79], most of the linear SFE models discussed from this point
onward consider consistent bids only over a single bidding time interval rather
than over a time horizon, for example day-ahead markets. Such single-bidding
interval models may predict higher prices and profits, as reported in [102].
The analysis of the linear SFE model with transmission constraints in [73] shows
clearly that the outcome of a simple duopoly market is heavily dependent on the
presence of transmission constraints, the level of available transmission capacity
and also the topology of the network, and a similar approach appears in [131].
The study in [118] has introduced in addition to the transmission constraints the
DC model representation for the electrical network. Kirchhoff’s current and
voltage laws for linearized DC power systems have been incorporated in the
numerical formulation of a linear SFE model, in which the market clears based
on social welfare maximisation while the ISO takes into account the strategic
actions of the producers for profit maximisation2. The numerical results of this
framework have shown that, due to transmission constraints, dissimilar prices
exist at different buses of the system when the transmission lines are congested.
The prices, as well as the quantities dispatched by the ISO, depend on the level
of the transmission limits. It is also shown that the transmission capacity limits
have a distinctive effect on the profits and the surplus for consumers, producers
1 Other game theoretical applications on the electricity market that use supply function bidding
but not SFE had already introduced network representation; for example the study in [140] that
analyses the coalition behaviour of firms employed generation and transmission constraints.
2 Previous studies were usually adopting a market clearing process based on costs minimisation
or on the selection of the lowest bid offers first until demand is met. Most of the models
mentioned from this point onward consider maximisation of social or system welfare/benefit by
the ISO while considering the strategic actions of the market players to optimise their payoffs.
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and transmission right holders. It is mentioned that such constraints allow the
strategic bidders to bid around the transmission limit restraining the line from
being congested and effectively capture the transmission rent that otherwise
would be required from the transmission operator, being consistent with the
Cournot results in [49]. While this study explores new ways in analysing
electricity markets by innovatively introducing the linearized DC network
representation, it states that there may be ways of exercising market power that
are made possible only by the nonlinearities of the AC transmission systems.
A more comprehensive linear SFE model based on the DC network
representation was proposed in [87], where generation capacity limits for the
active power and a non-negativity constraint for the load demand have been
added in the DC formulation. Other models that include all or some of the
aforementioned features of the DC network representation can be found in
[119,122,123,128,134-136].
The model in [121], which considers generation and transmission limits,
introduces a constraint for the unavailability of installed generation capacity over
certain periods due to maintenance, and intertemporal constraints for the hydro-
production units, such as annual inflow, inflow storage between successive
periods and storage reservoir capacities, in order to simulate imports and exports
of power across the Scandinavian countries in the hydro-power supply dominated
Nordic market.
The DC model in [114] considers, in addition to the DC formulation, ramp up
and down rate constraints for the active power generation to simulate successive
bidding time intervals, and constraints for spinning reserve since it simulates a
joint energy and spinning reserve spot market with fixed load demand. The
strategic firms submit linear spinning reserve function bids, constructing their
strategies based on the α- and (α, β)-parameterization method. The results of this
model show that the active power and spinning reserve limits have a definite
effect on the market prices and firms profits. Different bids are submitted for
each period and, when the multi-bidding process is simulated, it is found that the
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strategic firms attain greater profits when both transmission and ramp up/down
rate constraints are enforced.
The dynamic non-cooperative game in [130], which relies on consistent bidding
over a time horizon as in [8,79] to simulate a multi-session market, defines the
concept of reference transmission network, i.e. an optimal network upgrade used
as benchmark for the approval or rejection of a transmission expansion, from an
economic point of view by employing the linear SFE model. Using DC power
generation, demand and transmission constraints it shows that the capacity of the
transmission network determines the degree at which the strategic players in
different locations compete with each other.
The lossless DC model in [115,116], which considers transmission constraints
defined by distribution factors based on the network topology and lines
susceptances, models in addition demand-side bidding. Strategic consumers bid
linear utility functions of the form of (2.4), which may deviate from their actual
demand functions by parameterizing the load demand cost coefficients γ and δ in
the same fashion as in supply function bidding, with the difference that the
demand function bid must be non-increasing. Equilibria are computed using all
parameterization techniques, applied in both supply and demand function
bidding. The numerical results in [115] have shown that consumers’ strategic
bidding results in higher consumers’ surplus at the expense of high deadweight
losses and less scheduled generation. Furthermore, demand-side bidding is found
to reduce significantly the congestion rents with the consequence of concealing
market signalling for new investment requirements. Therefore, it worsens both
short-run and long-run economic efficiency and these observations contradict
with earlier studies, such as [37], that make suggestions to policy makers to
promote demand-side bidding as a measure of market power mitigation.
The day-ahead market model in [138] considers the reliability of the generating
units in the market clearing process. The ISO observes the forced outage
probability of the generators from data submitted with the bids, and units with
low probabilities are rewarded by being scheduled for more output than others.
Therefore, the firms have incentives to improve the reliability of their units by
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regular maintenance, which increases costs. This cost should be compared with
the benefit secured, in order to take decisions on the bidding strategies and
whether or not reliability improvements are required. The model that accounts
for consistent linear supply function bids over one day considers DC power
flows, transmission constraints, generation capacity limits and inter-temporal
constraints for the generators, such as ramp up and down rate constraints,
minimum up and down time limits and state transition constraints for switching
the units on and off. Terms for the cost of activating the reserve and procuring
for reserve replacements due to outages in generation capacity and for the
reliability increments are incorporated into the objective functions.
Following the discussions in [141], which raise the suspicion that since reactive
power in AC power systems is of localised nature it may have a greater role in
the presence of market power than active power, a linear supply function model
with an AC network representation has been proposed in [133,120]. The model is
based on an individual welfare maximisation algorithm, for which each
individual market participant may control several strategically generating units
and/or loads to represent both supply- and demand-side bidding. It takes into
account the active and reactive power flow equations, the transmission limits for
MVA power flows, the reactive losses and the bus voltage limits. Examples on
meshed networks show that the strategic players may act in different ways
depending on the presence of MVA network constraints in order to exercise
market power for their benefit.
Even though the model in [133,120] has taken into account the presence of
reactive power and bus voltage limits, apart from the discussions for gaming due
to the MVA transmission flows, they received little attention. Another model
[137] based on linear SFE theory has implemented the nonlinear AC network
representation, which explicitly represents the active and reactive power flows,
MVA transmission line constraints, active and reactive power generation limits
and losses, and voltage limits. The preliminary results from this study appear to
fulfil the speculation in [118] about the connection of the AC nonlinearities and
market power abilities. It has been shown that the enforcement of constraints
such as the active power generation limits and the transmission MVA limits
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influence the market outcome by increasing the nodal prices and altering the
active and reactive dispatch, firms’ strategies, social welfare and profits. The
relevance of the presence of reactive power on the strategic behaviour that alters
the market equilibrium is depicted by comparing cases with and without reactive
load demand.
Another study that uses the AC network representation appears in [89]. In
addition to the abovementioned constraints for AC modelling, the constraints for
the active and reactive power generation are modelled as a trapezium domain that
spans from positive to negative values of the reactive power generation to
approximate the field generation limit and the under-excitation limit of the
generating unit, respectively (for the relevant assumptions see [68]). This
accounts for the trade-off between active and reactive power generation, being an
approximation of the capability curve of electrical power generators.
Furthermore, a spinning reserve market is also considered and the relevant
constraints are present, in which the strategic firms submit a constant bid for
spinning reserve offers rather than a function. The model considers elastic active
load demand, but the reactive load demand is uncoupled and constant. The
presented results for a monopolist demonstrate that by varying the constant
reactive load demand its profit fluctuates and the power distribution in the
network changes, since higher values of reactive demand require more reactive
power production and the use of higher transmission capacities. The discussion
highlights that reactive power flows congest the system to the same extent as
active power and the analysis extends to investigate the interrelation between
reactive power and bus voltages, and how the strategic producers may exploit the
voltage constraints to congest the system for their favour.
The results obtained from the implementation of the nonlinear AC network in the
linear SFE models in [133,120,137,89] have effectively demonstrated the
superiority of the AC model over the approximate linearized DC representation.
It enables the analysis of more realistic systems in order to identify how the
features of real-life power systems will allow the strategic players to explore
ways to exercise market power and gain profits in the expense of social welfare
and rivals’ payoffs. Such conclusions will help in identifying and eliminating
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such inefficiencies in the oligopolistic environment by the intervention of the
ISO and therefore ensure a more competitive and efficient market operation.
Other studies that have partially employed AC formulation include [142,132].
Apart from the implementation of the various network constraints discussed,
some linear SFE models consider constraints for the strategic variables as well.
The model in [87] incorporates maximum and minimum limits for the intercept
bid with the minimum value being zero, thus allowing supply function bids being
lower than the marginal cost function down to functions that pass from the
origin. Similarly, the formulation in [134] confines the strategic variable kF in the
range of 0 to 10 allowing even zero supply function bids. The model in [115,116]
sets limits for the intercept bids within the range of 0 to 200, and for the slope
bids within 10-5 to 6. This is done in order to tolerate for a wider range of
strategies, while restricting the supply function bid to be either zero or resemble
Cournot strategies (vertical supply functions). However, none of the reported
numerical results from these investigations present bid variables that reach the
aforementioned limits at the SFE solution. The models in [130] and [122]
consider only a lower constraint for the strategic variables, the slope and
intercept respectively, being equal to the true value from the marginal cost
function to force the bids to be higher than the marginal costs. Other studies that
consider constraints for the strategic variables include [135,137,89].
2.10 Contract markets in linear SFE models
The analysis in [117] has extended the preceding investigations on the day-ahead
restructured England and Wales electricity market by incorporating a contract
market in the SFE model, in which the firms hedge the price of the spot market
with forward contract sales. The contract agreements are set as contracts for
differences modelled using the conjectural variations approach and the spot
market equilibrium is based on the (α, β)-parameterization used by applying the
Klemperer-Meyer differential equation method. The equilibrium of the overall
market is achieved by optimal quantity and supply function offers in the contract
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and spot markets respectively, and the analysis shows that this setting removes
much of the short-run incentive for the exercise of market power.
A study that examines a 10-firm generation capacity limited day-ahead spot
market where the power traded by contracts is considered in the spot market
decisions appeared in [125]. It has been shown that the presence of bilateral
contracts causes the strategic supply function bids to move closer to perfect
competition offers as the traded amount of power increases, shifting the market
closer to perfect competition conditions. Another model [119] examines the
linear SFE of DC transmission constrained electricity spot markets using the (α,
β)-parameterization, for which particular levels of forward contracts are given
and the firms are allowed to own transmission congestion rights to hedge the risk
of congestion prices. It is proved that the slope of the strategic bids at
equilibrium does not depend on the amount of forward contracts and the
transmission congestion rights shares, while the intercept does, and for no
contracts is equal to the true value as it was shown in [79]. Numerical results
based on the Texas day-ahead electricity market are presented and the
conclusions are in agreement with those in [125]. Furthermore, the model in
[132] considers optimal bilateral contracting prior to spot market participation in
an electrical system with active and reactive generation and voltage constraints,
illustrating the impact of active transmission capacity constraints and bilateral
contracts on the market outcome.
2.11 Application of metrics in linear SFE models
The SFE analysis has been used in conjunction with the application of
appropriate indices to assess and explore the level of competition and the
different weight of strategic behaviour in electricity markets, as well as the
locational privilege and market power of the competitors, in the presence of
network constrains. Such approaches surpass the practicality of using
conventional market power indices alone, such as the HHI and Lerner Index,
since they correct their shortcomings as oligopolistic analysis that considers the
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demand elasticity and network representation is taking place prior to the
introduction of the metrics as a prediction of the market outcome.
The analysis in [122] depicts the effects of network constraints when strategic
behaviour takes place, by proposing performance and efficiency indices based on
price and surplus changes, respectively. It shows that these effects depend on the
actual structure of the grid and the type of the generators, while congestion offers
additional opportunities for gaming. In addition, [123] explores the advantages of
the producers related to their location and the degree of market power abilities
provided by the network structure, such as the exploitation of transmission lines.
The assessment identifies the most critical lines in the network, prompting for the
needed reinforcement.
The study in [136] utilises metrics to assess market power opportunities in
electricity markets, showing how demand elasticity affects the market
performance and facilitates market power mitigation. The analysis utilises linear
inverse demand functions and concerns with the impact of demand-side price
responsiveness on the market performance. It is argued that the market effects of
an increase in demand elasticity are the same as those of an increase in
competition. However, the results may not be favourable for the consumers’
surplus and, consequently, the social surplus, but the congestion costs and nodal
price differences appear to be reduced. It is concluded that the effects of
exercising market power in network constrained markets is more evident with
low demand elasticity and therefore real markets should introduce measures to
prevent such situations.
2.12 Existence and multiplicity of pure equilibria in linear SFE
models
The optimal response curve approach can be used to investigate the strategic
reactions of market participants on the strategy of their rivals and the consequent
impact on the existence of pure strategy equilibria in the presence of network
constraints. This approach is straightforward for analysing models that use the α-,
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β- or kF-parameterizations where only one strategic variable is involved, if the
market has only two strategic players, since the optimal response space will be a
2-dimensional graph. The optimal values for the strategic variable of one player
are plotted for all the possible values of the strategic variable of the other player,
and then this is repeated for the second player. The point or points at which the
two reaction curves intersect indicate the pure strategy equilibria for the linear
SFE game. If the reaction curves do not intersect no pure equilibrium point exists
and the Nash equilibria of the SFE game are confined to mixed strategies.
Numerical algorithmic market simulations of a simple 2-bus system have been
performed in [133,120] using the kF-parameterization SFE model to show the
dependency of the existence and multiplicity of pure SFE on the transmission
line constraints. The investigation in [133] considers one strategic supplier at
each bus, while that in [120] considers one strategic supplier at the first bus and
one strategic consumer (load) at the second bus. In both cases, the optimal
response curves for the kF variables of the players are found to intersect at a
single point when no transmission line constraint is considered between the
buses, indicating one pure strategy SFE for each case. When a transmission limit
is induced between the two buses, in [133] there is no intersection due to a
discontinuity on the response curve of the supplier at the load bus that eliminates
the pure strategy SFE, and in [120] the reaction curves overlap over a range of
values indicating a continuum of pure Nash equilibria. In the first case, the
nonexistence of pure SFE is owed to the fact that the supplier’s profit has two
local maxima and there is no preference in bidding either of the corresponding
strategic variables. Therefore, any probabilistic combination of choosing either
strategy is a mixed Nash SFE. In the second case, the continuum of equilibria
indicate the optimum responses of the market participants in order to adjust the
power flow to be exactly at the transmission limit and avoid the transmission
congestion penalties from the ISO. These simple trivial cases show that the
presence of network constraints may eliminate the pure strategy equilibrium or
introduce SFE multiplicity.
The study in [73] investigated a 3-bus duopoly with a single load by employing
the kF-parameterization SFE and highlighted the idea that the choice of the
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equilibrium strategies determines the output quantities and which lines will be
congested. The reaction curve space is separated in two areas, corresponding to
congested and uncongested operation of the transmission line and the reaction
curves are compared with those for a case with no transmission constraints. For a
particular topology of the system it is shown that for a relatively low constraint
the equilibrium is in the uncongested area, being the same as in the absence of
the transmission limit. For an intermediate constraint level a continuum of
equilibria appears on the boundary that separates the two areas, while when the
constraint is tightened a single equilibrium point exists in the congested region. It
is then shown that for different topologies the equilibrium point for a low level
constraint may be moved on the congestion boundary or eliminated, and that
nonexistence of SFE may occur if the demand elasticity becomes low enough.
This investigation proves that the particular topology of the network, as well as
the level of the transmission line limit and demand elasticity, play a major role
on the existence and nature of the SFE solution. A discussion of the same system
appeared in [131] where the slope parameterization is used, and speculates that in
more complicated systems there will be a continuum of equilibria if the binding
network constraints induce consistent bidding behaviour from the strategic
players around the constraint to eliminate congestion charges, or there will be no
pure equilibrium if this behaviour is inconsistent. Furthermore, a comprehensive
analysis in [116] based on the intercept parameterization method strengthens the
observations of [73] by showing that nonexistence or multiplicity of SFE
solutions occur in the presence of transmission constraints, depending on the
properties of the particular network arrangement of the examined market.
Unlike other studies that are based on the static analysis of the market
equilibrium, the analysis in [129] is concerned with the market evolution under
repeated bidding and with the learning behaviour of the market participants, i.e.
how the players use the available information to improve their bidding strategies
from their acquired knowledge. Recalling the proof from [111] that when all
players learn a unique equilibrium under slope-parameterization exists, it is
shown for an unconstrained market that each supplier has incentives to learn
about its opponents’ past submitted bids in order to maximise profit, since its
optimum strategy depends on its rivals’ strategies.
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The investigation in [113] has presented graphically the profits of the suppliers of
the 2-bus system in [133] at the SFE point, as a function of the strategic variables
using the (α, β)-parameterization. It is shown that there is an enormous
(seemingly infinite) number of equilibrium points in the unconstrained case, and
some of them are eliminated when the transmission constraint is introduced
(those that correspond to flows higher than the line limit). The SFE points that
cease to exist are among those that correspond to relatively low values of profits
and therefore the binding constraint can support high equilibrium profits. The
discussion compares the SFE solutions for the (α, β)-parameterization with the
Cournot solution and shows that the profits from bids with slopes that tend to
infinity and the corresponding intercepts that move towards large negative values
are equal to the Cournot profits. This limiting SFE is a focal equilibrium point
because it is mutually beneficial to all players and may be preferred by everyone
to all the other equilibria.
Since the optimal response curve method is effective in finding SFE solutions
only for duopolies, as markets with more than 3 strategies players cannot be
represented graphically, more complex situations have been investigated by
applying numerical algorithmic approaches based on the (α, β)-parameterization
method. The numerical model in [89] presented results for a monopolist in an AC
3-bus network and shows that it can choose equivalent strategies from within a
range of pairs of strategic variables to achieve the same level of maximum profit
at the equilibrium point; this is consistent with the results in [120] where the total
surplus of the market players along the SFE continuum is the same. A similar
observation was made in [104] where an unconstrained market with 5 strategic
firms is investigated showing that the submitted strategic variables at an SFE
point are not unique. Instead, several equivalent optimum strategies exist and the
corresponding profits, market price and output levels at the SFE point are unique
and equal to those of the Cournot solution for the single bidding period game. In
such cases the slope of the supply function for profit maximisation is required to
be a very large positive value and the intercept a very large negative value, being
in agreement with the discussion about the focal equilibrium in [113]. However,
when a single bid was applied to multiple pricing periods in [104] the bidding
variables for the (α, β)-parameterization become unique and the equilibrium
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results are close to those of slope-parameterization, as discussed by Baldick in
[113].
The investigation in [120] extends to analyse the behaviour of strategic firms in a
9-bus system showing that different local maxima for total profits may occur due
to the presence of physical system constraints. The SFE calculated from the
numerical algorithm may be attracted by a local maximum and miss the notion
that a global SFE would be more desirable in terms of predicting the market
behaviour. In order to deal with such complications in multi-unit networks an
algorithm has been implemented in [128] to identify all possible multiple SFE
points. The algorithm is searching the regions defined by all combinations of
system constraints (generation and transmission limits) and identifies the
different non-cooperative equilibrium points. It has successfully produced results
for a 30- and a 57-bus system showing that even though the existence of multiple
equilibria in realistic systems is possible they should not be expected in large
numbers.
2.13 Stochastic optimisation with linear supply function bidding
The discussion in the previous section concerns linear SFE models that assume
perfect and complete information among competitors, i.e. all players have the
same knowledge about their rivals’ true cost functions and the system
specifications. This represents the assumption that all market participants are
long-term players that have learned about their competitors [1]. However,
gaming in an electricity market may be characterised by incomplete information
depending on the knowledge of the players on their rivals’ payoffs and strategies,
on the amount of information that other players have on various aspects of the
game, and so on, such that players lack full information on the mathematical
structure of the game. An incomplete game, also called a Bayesian game, can be
transformed into a complete game with imperfect information in which the
market participants lack information on other players’ benefits in previous stages
of the game [143]. A game of imperfect information depends on whether the
market participants have complete knowledge of their rivals’ strategic actions or
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not. Such games have been modelled for the electricity market based on linear
supply function theory and solved by employing stochastic optimisation
approaches.
The first electricity market model that presented a non-cooperative game with
incomplete information using supply function bidding appeared in [124], where
players lack information on their rivals’ costs in an unconstrained system. The
incomplete game is transformed into a complete game with imperfect
information and a probability distribution is assigned to the unknown variables.
The market players compete by choosing strategies based on expected profit
maximisation and the optimal strategies depend on the level of information that
they have for their opponents. An extension of this model has been proposed in
[135], in which the probability distribution for the unknown information is
estimated based on information on fuel contracts and transmission availability.
The investigation in [142] modified the individual welfare maximisation
algorithm of [120] to propose a method for calculating Bayesian Nash SFEs in
games where asymmetric strategic firms have incomplete information about their
rivals’ costs. The model considers AC power flow equations with inelastic
demand and the unknown cost parameters are represented by probability density
functions. Numerical results report Bayesian Nash solutions computed by
applying the Monte-Carlo simulation that provides an approximate solution by
performing statistical sampling on the probability density functions [144]. It has
been shown that the uncertain information makes the players to bid less
aggressively and consequently they receive (slightly) less profits.
In the model presented in [126], the market players have imperfect information
for their rivals’ knowledge and act strategically based on the expectations about
how their opponents will bid. It is assumed that from a single player’s point of
view the coefficients of the supply function bid of each of its rivals obey a
normal probability distribution. A stochastic optimisation problem that considers
generation capacity limits is solved by two different methods; the first one is
based on the Monte Carlo simulation and the second one is an optimisation
approach that finds the solution by calculating the mean values of the expected
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variables of the market outcome. The Monte Carlo approach was extended in
[127] to model strategic demand-side bidding.
Based on the above market assumptions, the same authors have presented a
stochastic optimisation model for a joint energy and spinning reserve markets
with imperfect information [145], in which the players submit linear functions
for both energy supply and spinning reserve. Instead of calculating an
approximate solution for the market equilibrium, a solution for the optimal
strategy of a single supplier is obtained using a genetic algorithm. Moreover, the
model in [146] integrated this method with the optimisation approach from [126]
to provide a different method for obtaining optimal strategies for energy supply
and spinning reserve. Furthermore, the genetic algorithm approach is expanded
to model a day-ahead joint energy and spinning reserve market in [147], where a
single supplier is also required to take strategic decisions about its unit
commitment status. The benefit maximisation strategy considers start-up costs,
permissible starts/stops per day and unit min/max up and down times, and the
solution depends on the estimation of the cost functions of its rivals.
Another model that considers incomplete knowledge of rivals’ cost functions was
presented in [148]. DC network representation was employed and the uncertain
load demand is treated as a random variable. An arbitrary probability function is
assigned to the opponents’ behaviour and the resulting stochastic optimisation
problem is solved using the Monte Carlo method and a genetic algorithm in order
to calculate the optimum strategy for a single player. Other models that use linear
supply function bidding with the same objective can be found in [149,150],
where the particle swarm optimisation method is employed.
2.14 Numerical methods for SFE solutions
As already mentioned, early investigations on unconstrained linear SFE models
have used the Klemperer-Meyer differential equation method [81,117,79] while
others that involve transmission constraints have applied the optimal response
curve approach [73,131] to calculate mathematically the equilibrium point for
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simple systems, mainly duopolies. Other models, which examine markets that
involve larger or more complex (meshed network constrained) systems, require
the implementation of appropriate numerical algorithms. This section reviews
noteworthy iterative methods that employ DC or AC network constrained
systems. First, some necessary terms are introduced:
- Optimal Power Flow (OPF):
The formulation of a constrained nonlinear optimisation problem, which
determines the optimal settings for control variables in a power system by
optimising an objective function, while satisfying various constraints. This
concept was primarily proposed during the 1960s [151,152]. The most common
application of the OPF problem is the generation costs minimisation by the
system operator to obtain the optimal dispatch, but other optimisation
applications, such as transmission loss minimisation for reactive power planning,
production scheduling, maintenance scheduling, generation and transmission
expansion planning, are applicable. The constraints represent the physical laws
governing the electrical network, including AC or DC power flow equations,
power generation-demand balance constraints, generation limits, bus voltage
limits, transmission limits, reactive power support, load shedding, transformer
representation, security and contingencies constraints, and so on [153,154,19]. A
review of the literature on the programming methods employed over the years for
the solution of the OPF problem was given in [155,156] and a survey on the OPF
models proposed can be found in [157].
- Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 1st order optimality conditions:
The necessary conditions in an optimisation problem for determining the extreme
values of a function f that are obtained by setting to zero the first derivative of f
with respect to all of its independent variables [158].
- Complementarity constraints:
A complementarity constraint restricts two variables to be both either non-
negative or non-positive and in either case their product to be zero [159].
In general, the SFE problems that incorporate an ISO are of bi-level nature. In
the first level, each firm chooses strategy by taking as input its perceived market
conditions to maximise profit, restricted by given bounds on the bid. The second
level corresponds to the ISO market clearing process, which is an OPF problem
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that takes into account the relevant network constraints and is parameterized by
the firms’ bids [87]. One of the first algorithmic approaches that solve a system
with DC network constraints for calculating Nash SFEs appears in [118]. The
iterative process employed is referred to as a diagonalization algorithm and it
was previously applied to Cournot models [45,31]. This procedure starts by
fixing all supply function bids, say to the marginal cost function, except the bid
of the generator under consideration. Given the other generators’ fixed strategies,
the ISO problem is solved for a series of different parameterized bids and the bid
that produces the maximum profit is chosen to be fixed for that generator, and
then the procedure is repeated for another generator. This process continues until
the strategies of all firms are profit maximising given the strategies of their
rivals. When no firm can further improve its profit in this manner, Nash SFE is
reached.
The DC model in [87] has employed the same diagonalization approach but it
formulates the quadratic parametric problem of the second level as a Linear
Complementarity Problem (LCP). A mixed LCP formulation results by
introducing the KKT optimality conditions of the ISO’s second-level problem
into the first-level, regarded as constraints. The resulting constrained
optimisation problem for a single firm is a Mathematical Program with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), which here is solved using a penalty interior
point algorithm. Each firm is solving an MPEC considering fixed strategies for
the other firms and the process is repeated for all firms until a satisfactory
solution is obtained. This method has been proven able to solve systems with
several buses, in which the firms may own more than one generating units. The
studies in [130,114,138] extend this approach to multi-period markets.
Another model that uses the diagonalization approach based on a different
optimisation method, termed as the individual welfare maximisation algorithm,
has been proposed in [133,120]. Nash equilibria are reached by individuals
(economic entities) that control one or more generators and/or loads, while
maximising their welfare. In doing so, each player solves the ISO’s OPF problem
based on assumptions about its own and others’ strategies and, using the
information from the resulting OPF solution, it updates its bid to improve its
69
welfare by determining a Newton-step. When all players stop modifying their
strategies Nash equilibrium is computed. Similar approaches are presented in
[135,132] with the implementation of interior point algorithms to solve the OPF
problem. As in the case of the diagonalization models above, the resulting Nash
SFE points are local equilibrium points, while a global equilibrium cannot be
guaranteed3.
A different approach for calculating Nash SFEs was presented in [134]. It was
argued that, since the supply and price terms included in each firm’s profit
maximisation problem are produced by the ISO’s quadratic program and can be
expressed as implicit functions of all the firms’ strategies, they should satisfy the
KKT conditions of the ISO problem. Hence, these are formulated as
complementarity conditions and incorporated into each firm’s MPEC as
constraints. Then, by gathering the KKT conditions of all firm’s MPECs, the
equilibrium market problem that solves the overall game is faced as an
Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) and is formulated as
a mixed Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP). This is then reformulated
as a set of nonlinear equations using the nonlinear complementarity Fischer-
Burmeister merit function [160] and is solved simultaneously –rather than by re-
iterating over each MPEC– to give the SFE solution. A different version of this
method is provided in [137] by implementing a primal-dual nonlinear interior
point algorithm, in which a logarithmic barrier method is used to reformulate the
bi-level market problem into a set of nonlinear algebraic expressions. Both
models have been proven applicable for large systems.
The aforementioned EPEC approach presents iterative SFE results without
verifying that the equilibrium outcome is indeed a local Nash SFE. Those results
are classified as Nash stationary equilibria, since they satisfy the EPEC’s first
order stationary optimality conditions, i.e. the KKT conditions of the firms’
MPECs, being weaker variants of the classical Nash equilibrium concept [115].
However, the following two references show via numerous numerical tests that
3 Local Nash SFEs are less credible than their global counterparts, but they still have meaning as
they may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the players, due to difficulties in identifying a global
SFE or due to limitations on their rationality and knowledge [116].
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such methods always yield local Nash SFEs. The model in [115] replaced all
firms’ MPECs, or more precisely MPCCs since the equilibrium conditions are of
complementarity form, with their KKT conditions to express the game as an
EPEC (or EPCC). This EPCC represents the Nash stationary equilibria, which
are then obtained by applying Non-Linear Programming (NLP), in particular the
PATH solver [161], to solve the EPCC’s stationary (KKT) system. Then, these
stationary SFEs are verified to be local Nash equilibria by checking the sufficient
second-order conditions for optimality. A more comprehensive EPEC analysis
that distinguishes between Nash stationary and local equilibria was provided in
[116], where the differences in algorithm convergence and identification of local
Nash points for two diagonalization methods and an NLP approach for solving
the Complementarity Problem (CP) formulation of the EPCC similar to [115] are
compared. The diagonalization process that updates the players’ strategies in the
MPEC formulation is solved by applying either a standard NLP method or a
regularisation iterative method that remodels the MPECs as a better-behaved
NLP problem. The latter has also been used in [89]. In both [115] and [116], all
the acquired solutions from the complementarity formulation tests were
numerically established as local Nash equuilibria, proving the robustness of this




Methodology and implementation of the
electricity market SFE algorithm
3.1 The work in this Thesis
The research described in this Thesis is focused on the investigation of the linear
SFE methods and the analysis of the impact of various network constraints and
operational conditions on the electricity market equilibrium. The implementation
of an advanced nonlinear primal-dual interior point algorithm that considers AC
network representation is undertaken, and the efficiency and robustness of the
algorithmic iterative procedure is investigated and assessed. Numerous numerical
tests on several subject matters related to the electrical network operation and the
issue of market power in the electricity market are performed, in order to
examine particular and general situations that affect the individual market
participants and the market as a whole. The observations and conclusions are
compared with those from the existing literature and discussions are provided for
several issues that have not been addressed well in the literature. The reasons for
choosing the particular methodology and the modelling assumptions are given
below.
The electricity market equilibrium analysis was chosen over the market
concentration analysis with indices and the ex-post estimation of pricing
behaviour methods, since it is a much better representation of the interactions
between the strategic firms in the oligopolistic environment of the electricity
market. As discussed in Section 1.9, the oligopolistic equilibrium analysis is an
efficient method for the evaluation of the sources and degree of market power,
and hence it can provide a better depiction of the outcome of bid-based
electricity pool markets.
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The modelling of the market mechanism is based on the SFE theory, which was
chosen due to its perceived advantages over the other available equilibrium
methods. As discussed in Chapter 2, the market players are able to adapt better to
the uncertain environment of the electricity market owing to the unknown load
demand, by implementing function bids that relate different supply quantities to
different prices rather than discrete quantity or price bids, as in the Cournot and
Bertrand competitions. Hence the price predictions from the SFE model are more
reliable than the Cournot prices, since they are not very sensitive to demand, and
are more realistic than Bertrand prices, which resemble perfect competition
behaviour. In addition, the supply function bids, which are increasing in price,
reflect the generating costs for power production that are increasing with the
quantity produced; such features cannot be represented successfully by
applications of the Cournot and Bertrand settings.
In particular, the linear SFE model has been chosen for this investigation over the
other SFE forms for several reasons. The study in [81] has shown that the linear
SFE solution is a reasonable approximation for the general SFE form at low
levels of demand, while it still remains an equilibrium at higher demand levels.
The analysis on the California energy market in [163] is in agreement with this
by showing that the cumulative supply function bids in a practical market appear
to be 2-segment linear curves and modelling with linear bids is reasonably
accurate. Furthermore, the study in [102] has shown that, in the absence of
capacity constraints, the only stable SFE between the most competitive and the
Cournot solution is the linear SFE, if quadratic cost functions (linear marginal
costs) are modelled, and hence the only possible to appear in practice. In
addition, this model results in considerably reduced mathematical complexity
compared with the other available models, being able to handle multiple
asymmetric firms with quadratic cost functions [79], while it can offer
intelligible interpretations of the resulting market equilibrium solution. Since the
above findings support the functionality of the linear SFE model, the study in this
Thesis employs this theory with the prospect of further contributing to the
literature.
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The proposed electricity market model is implemented by considering AC power
flow analysis and the representation of various network constraints. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the AC model has several advantages over the DC model, since the
latter is a linearized version of the nonlinear AC system that stems from the real
characteristics and physical properties of practical power systems. Hence, in the
context of market equilibrium analysis, the DC representation cannot identify the
sources of market power related to the nonlinearities of real-life power systems
and electricity markets. In this Thesis, the AC representation is employed in
order to account for a more realistic market outcome, since the strategic
interactions between the generating firms are directly dependent on the
operational constraints and conditions. The market clearing price is determined
in terms of nodal prices to represent both the energy price and the short-term
transmission costs. The network constraints considered include the active and
reactive power flow equations accounting for flows through transmission line
and transformer branches, the bus voltage limits, the MVA transmission capacity
limits and transmission losses for both transmission line and transformer
branches, the transformer tap-ratio control to represent on-load tap-changing
transformers, and the active and reactive generation capacity limits. The power
load demand is price-responsive and represented by both active and reactive
components, which are interrelated by means of the power factor angle. In
addition, modelling of grid-connected solar PV systems that accounts for both
PV active and reactive generation has been undertaken, considering the effect of
the intensity of the applied solar irradiance. The model for the operation of the
PV systems is based on real PV output performance data recorded in an
experimental PV park. The purpose of the implementation of such a complicated
network model, apart of enhancing the accuracy and realism of the market
results, is aiming to investigate the effects of the individual network constraints
and different system operational conditions on the market equilibrium. Several of
these features, such as the transformer representation, the optimisation of the tap-
ratios, the price-responsive reactive load demand, and the representation of PV
systems in the electricity market equilibrium model, have not been addressed in
the literature so far.
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The implemented market model accounts only for supply-side bidding, while it
considers competitive loads, for the following reasons. The study in [109]
discusses that strategic demand-side bidding may result in instability due to the
absence of pure strategy equilibria with low prices, or in market prices that are
much higher than the marginal costs, being in agreement with [164], which
examines a different market structure. Furthermore, the numerical results in
[115] have shown that strategic bidding by the consumers lowers the economic
efficiency and conceals market signalling of the need for new transmission
investment, as already discussed in Chapter 2. Since the strategic demand-side
bidding exhibits these adverse effects on the electricity market, it is not
considered in this investigation. However, note that the competitive load demand
function in this model is price-responsive.
The bi-level problem is formulated in a similar manner as in [134,137], where
the 1st order KKT conditions of the lower level (ISO problem) are incorporated
into the upper level to give a combined problem for the market equilibrium
solution. The associated complementarity constraints of certain KKT condition
equations are transformed into nonlinear mathematical expressions using the
Fischer-Burmeister merit function in order to avoid possible complications due to
ill-conditioning problems. Such modelling techniques are expected to be robust
and applicable for large systems and, in addition, the analysis in [116] has shown
that the resulting Nash stationary equilibria from such formulations are in fact
local Nash equilibria. This finding further enhances the realism of the market
model, since local equilibria are possible to be observed in practice.
In order to implement a market algorithm that involves the aforementioned
network and market features, a numerical approach that is able to tackle
successfully the associated mathematical complexity is required. In the past,
formulations using the nonlinear primal-dual interior point method have been
used to solve a wide variety of large scale OPF problems, while this method is
also applicable to problems of bi-level nature, such as the bid-based electricity
pool market equilibrium problem. This method has been chosen for the
investigation that takes place in this Thesis, because it can easily handle the
nonlinearities of the AC model and the inequality constraints required for the
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representation of the network operation. Such iterative processes, based on the
primal-dual interior point method, converge within a reasonable number of
iterations, which is expected to enhance the computational performance. A
comprehensive review of the mathematical theory and the advantages of the
primal-dual interior point method is provided in Section 3.2.
The mathematical formulation for the power flow equations, the representation
of the losses for the transmission lines and transformer branches, the bus
voltages, and the complex power components is derived using rectangular
coordinates instead of employing the polar representation. By using this
technique, advantages that enhance the computational efficiency of the algorithm
arise due to the fact that the resulting objective functions and the constraints of
the bi-level market problem will appear in quadratic form. A quadratic function
has the desirable properties of constant Hessian (2nd derivatives of the objective
function and the power flow equations), Taylor series expansion that terminates
at the 2nd order term without truncation error, and easy evaluation of the higher
order term. These features allow for an attractive matrix setup and reduce the
number of iterations for the convergence of the primal-dual interior point
algorithm [165]. Furthermore, no trigonometric functions are incorporated in the
primary formulations as in the case of the polar coordinates representation. More
information about the rectangular coordinates representation is given in
subsequent sections.
Major contributions of this Thesis:
The major contributions of the work presented in this Thesis include the
following:
a) Implementation of a nonlinear primal-dual interior point algorithm to
solve the bi-level electricity market equilibrium problem based on
linear SFE theory and considering advanced AC network modelling.
b) Achievement of superior computational performance of the electricity
market algorithm in providing SFE solutions for complicated realistic
systems in the presence of binding functional constraints.
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c) Modelling of the transformer in the equilibrium market algorithm and
investigation of the impact of the transformer tap-ratio control on the
electricity market equilibrium.
d) Determination of the impact of reactive power control on the
electricity market equilibrium, in terms of voltage control, limitations
on the reactive power generation and absorption, and power factor
adjustments.
e) Analysis of the effects of a new generating unit’s location for a new
entry in the electricity market, on the interactions between the
strategic firms and the market outcome.
f) Modelling of grid-connected PV generating units in the electricity
market algorithm, with representation of the economic and technical
aspects based on PV output performance data recorded from an
outdoor experimental PV park.
g) Investigation of the effects of introducing PV generation in the
electricity market with respect to the applied solar irradiance, and
determination of the impact of representing the nonlinear PV reactive
power generation in the electricity market model.
h) Implementation of the four different parameterization methods in the
linear SFE market model and investigation of the respective market
equilibrium solutions.
i) Determination of the interrelation between network congestion and
the individual network components, such as the transformer tap-ratio
control and the PV generating units, and the different linear SFE
parameterization methods.
3.2 The primal-dual interior point method
Even though the interior point method has been studied by Fiacco and
McCormick [166] during the 1960s in the context of nonlinear programming, it
did not receive widespread attention until 1984 when Karmarkar [167] presented
a novel algorithmic procedure for solving linear programming problems. The
process of the Karmarkar’s algorithm was following a path through the interior
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of the problem’s constraints directly towards the optimal solution, rather than
following a series of points that were on the boundary of the constraints as
frequently suggested by other applicable methods. The solution path always
remained within the interior of the constraints’ boundaries and the current
solution was positioned as the centre of the space in order to find a better
direction for the next step. The major advantage of this methodology is the
highly reduced computational effort of the algorithm convergence. It has been
reported that the speed advantage gained for large systems by the reduction of
the number of iterations is as much as 50:1 when compared to other methods
available at the time [154].
As this approach became very popular, the analysis in [168] has shown the
relationship between Karmarkar’s algorithm and the Logarithmic Barrier
function that was already investigated by Fiacco and McCormick [166]. It was
shown that a method based on Fiacco and McCormick’s analysis is equivalent to
Karmarkar’s algorithm for solving linear programming problems. Based on this
finding, the study in [169] analyses the crucial building blocks that comprise the
methodology for the interior point method. These blocks are the Fiacco-
McCormick Logarithmic Barrier method for optimisation with inequality
constraints [166], the Lagrange method for optimisation with equality constraints
[170], and Newton’s method for solving nonlinear equations for unconstrained
optimisation [171]. Using these three techniques, the primal-dual interior point
method was constructed and applied to solve linear programming problems. It is
shown in [169] that the number of required iterations for convergence when
using the interior point method is very insensitive to the size of the problem
because it increases with the logarithm of the number of variables involved. The
primal-dual interior point method has found numerous applications in linear
programming, including [172-175]. A simple mathematical illustration of this
method follows.
Consider an optimisation problem with the following structure:




where f is the objective function of the problem, x is the set of the associated
variables, and h is the set of the n inequality constraints, which can be of linear or
nonlinear form.
The first step of the primal-dual interior point method is to transform each
inequality constraint from the set )(xhn into an equality constraint by introducing
a nonnegative slack variable ns . Using the Fiacco-McCormick logarithmic
barrier method, the above optimisation problem with inequality constraints is











nsxf )log()(  (3.3)
subject to:
0)(  nn sxh (3.4)
where μ is the barrier parameter, and 0ns is the slack variable associated with
the inequality constraint n. The logarithmic term )log( ns forces the solution
procedure to begin from a point well within the feasible region bounded by the
inequality constraints of the problem, in order to accommodate for a solution
path characterised by strictly feasible iterates. Hence, a path along the
constraints’ boundaries is avoided, resulting in less computational effort. The
logarithmic term maintains the objective function well above the value that
corresponds to the limits of the constraints when the values of )(xhn approach
zero. The role of the barrier parameter μ is to minimise the logarithmic term
introduced in (3.3) as the iterative process progresses, in order for the objective
function of the equivalent problem from the Fiacco-McCormick barrier method
to equal the objective function of the original optimisation problem at the final
solution. The value of μ is minimised as the iterative procedure of the algorithm
progresses and it approximately equals zero at the final solution.
The second step for the implementation of the primal-dual interior point method
is to transform the optimisation problem with equality constraints (3.3)-(3.4) into
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an unconstrained optimisation problem by applying the Lagrange method. The
Lagrange function for equalities optimisation for the problem (3.3)-(3.4) can be






n sxhsxfL ])([)log()(  (3.5)
where the Lagrange multipliers n are the dual variables for the problem. In
order to minimise the Lagrange function, the 1st order KKT conditions are
required. These can be obtained by differentiating L with respect to all the
primal (x and s) and dual variables (π), and setting the corresponding derivatives






















































The final step of the primal-dual interior point method is to solve the set of the
KKT condition equations (3.6)-(3.8) using the Newton’s iterative method for
unconstrained optimisation. The general mathematical derivation for this method
is presented here, based on the guidelines in [176]. Consider a matrix equation



































where y and z are N-dimensional vectors, and )( yg is an N-dimensional vector
of functions, with z given. The vector z can be approximated by considering
Taylor series expansion about an operating point
o
y . In the case of OPF
applications with rectangular coordinates, there are no terms in the expansion
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series being higher than the 2nd order, and hence there is no truncation error, as


































The differential term in (3.11) is the NN  square matrix J, called the Jacobian


















































By considering an iterative procedure, the term
o
y in (3.11) can be replaced by
the old value for the variable oldy and the term y by the new value newy .
Therefore, equation (3.11) can be written as:
 )(1 oldoldnew ygzJyy   (3.13).
By considering (3.9), the vector mismatch for the iterative process convergence
can be defined as:
)(ygzz  (3.14)
and the correction vector is defined as:
oldnew yyy  (3.15).
Therefore, from (3.13)-(3.15):
zJy  1 (3.16).
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Since z is known and J can be computed from )( yg , the correction vector y
can be calculated. Then, the next approximation of y in the iterative procedure is
given by:
yyy oldnew  (3.17).
In order for the algorithmic procedure to converge to a satisfactory solution for
the variables in y , the process described above is repeated until a specified
tolerance for Δz is met.
By considering the original optimisation problem (3.1)-(3.2) and the resulting
KKT system (3.6)-(3.8), the vector y corresponds to the set of the primal and





represented by the differential terms L , and the vector z is equal to zero
4.
Therefore, the set of equations (3.6)-(3.8) can be linearized and rearranged into a




































































The direction vector Tsx ][  is called the Newton step and is used to
provide a better approximation for the system variables for every successive
update, using equation (3.17).
3.3 Applications of the primal-dual interior point method
The first application of the primal-dual interior point method on nonlinear and
nonconvex programming problems with nonlinear constraints has taken place in
[177], where the optimal reactive dispatch problem was investigated. Numerical
results on large power systems with thousands of buses have revealed several
4 Note that multiple derivatives correspond to a sum of differential terms. For example, the
expression )( 2 AgL yy   , where
Tbay ],[ and A is a differentiable term, represents two
equations, such that )( AAgL baaaa   and )( AAgL bbabb   .
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advantages, including the robustness of the algorithm and the effectiveness in
dealing with OPF problems that involve ill-conditioned networks. A further
development of the nonlinear primal-dual interior point method is provided in
[178], where two different versions of the model are provided and compared, one
of which incorporated a predictor-corrector scheme according to [174,175]. A
similar study that focuses on the implementation issues of the algorithmic
procedures is described in [179], where the nonlinear OPF problem is linearized
and then successive linear programming is applied.
The applications of the primal-dual interior point method for solving nonlinear
OPF problems in [177-179] employed the polar coordinates representation for
the active and reactive power flow equations and bus voltages. The model of
[165] explains that when nonlinear OPF problems are formulated using
rectangular coordinates representation, they have quadratic objective functions
and quadratic constraints that allow for ease of matrix setup. These features have
the advantages already discussed in the previous section, which improve the
computational performance of the algorithm, as demonstrated by the numerical
tests performed in [165]. Other studies that used rectangular coordinates with
modifications in the mathematical formulation of the interior point problem are
provided in [180,199-201].
Numerous publications for solving OPF problems based on the primal-dual
interior point method have appeared since. A classification of the major
publications and software codes that employ interior point methods is provided
in [181]. Primal-dual interior point studies related to the analysis of nonlinear
electricity market problems were also undertaken. The model in [182]
investigates the decomposition of spot prices for active and reactive power by
solving a constrained nonlinear optimisation problem. The OPF model in [183]
minimises the generation costs in the presence of constraints for transmission,
spinning reserve, load curtailment, and price dependent load. A similar
investigation [184] on the OPF dispatch problem that incorporates transformer
representation accomplishes reductions in the computational time, while the
study in [185] investigates the properties of this algorithm. A modified version of
the primal-dual interior point OPF with AC modelling is provided in [186],
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where the computational challenges introduced by the deregulation of the
electricity market structure related to algorithm convergence and accuracy are
discussed. Interior point methods were also applied for electricity market
equilibrium solutions. The primal-dual interior point method has been used for
the SFE models of [132,137], while a software package based on this method has
solved the market equilibrium problem in [135]. Furthermore, another variant of
the interior point method, called the penalty interior point algorithm [187], has
been used for the implementation of a model that calculates Cournot equilibria
[59] and for an SFE model that is based on the MPEC approach [87].
3.4 Introduction to the implemented market equilibrium
algorithm
A primal-dual nonlinear interior point algorithm has been implemented for the
investigation of bid-based pool markets, based on linear SFE theory. The AC
power flow analysis has been employed to represent the electrical network, in
order to add realism to the proposed market equilibrium model and provide
useful information about the effects of the individual network components on the
electricity market equilibrium solution. The following operational aspects of the
power system network have been taken into account:
- active and reactive power generation capacity limits,
- active and reactive price-responsive variable load demand,
- bus voltage limits,
- active and reactive power flows and losses for transmission lines and
transformer branches,
- transmission line and transformer branches MVA capacity constraints,
- transformer tap-ratio control.
Furthermore, the operational and economic aspects for grid-connected PV
systems have been modelled in the equilibrium algorithm, but this will be
presented in Chapter 7.
The subsequent sections of this chapter outline the modelling of the individual
components for the power system operation, the market considerations for the
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implementation of the proposed algorithm, and the features of the primal-dual
interior point method required for the function of the algorithmic procedure. The
formulation provided in this section corresponds to supply function bids that are
modelled using the kF-parameterization, while the modelling for all the other
available parameterization methods will be presented in Chapter 8. The reason
for choosing the kF-parameterization for illustrating the formulation of the
market algorithm is that this method is desirable to be employed in the market
analysis that takes place in Chapters 4 to 7, since the equilibrium kF parameters
are a relative measure that relates to the marginal cost of generation. By
observing the kF bidding parameters from the market equilibrium numerical
results, the strategic behaviour of the generating firms can be easily interpreted
without the requirement of referring to the actual generating costs.
3.5 Modelling of the electricity network
For the implementation of the proposed algorithm, rectangular coordinates have
been employed for the modelling of voltages, admittances and power
components in the electricity network. Guidelines for the derivation of the power
flow equations using rectangular coordinates can be found in [188]. The
following rectangular coordinates equations are considered in the subsequent
formulations:
 iii jfeV  represents the voltage at bus i,
 ijijij jbgy  represents the admittance of a transmission branch i-j,
 ijijij jQPS  represents the complex power flow from bus i to bus j
through a transmission branch i-j.
3.5.1 Representation of the transmission line branch
The transmission line branch is modelled by the π-equivalent circuit










Figure 5: Π-equivalent circuit for modelling the transmission line branch. 
The following expressions hold for the currents flowing in the circuit:
ioiji III  (3.19)
)( jiijij VVyI  (3.20)
icio VjBI  (3.21)
where iV and jV are the voltages at buses i and j respectively, and Bc is the shunt
susceptance of the transmission line.
Substituting (3.20) and (3.21), into (3.19), and decomposing the voltages and
admittances to their real and imaginary parts, gives:
jijijicijiji VjbgVBbjgI )()]([  (3.22).
Similarly, by considering current jI , on the other side of the transmission
branch:
jcijijiijijj VBbjgVjbgI )]([)(  (3.23).




































































where the Y elements represent the admittance matrix of the transmission line
branch i-j.
The complex power flow through the transmission line branch i-j, as defined in









ij IVjQPS  (3.25).
By substituting voltage iV by its rectangular components and multiplying with
the conjugate of current iI through the transmission line branch, the complex
power flow is calculated as:
   











By decomposing the complex power into the active and reactive power
components, the active and reactive power flows through the transmission line
branch i-j are:
   jijjijicijiijijijjijicijiiji
LINE
ij fgebeBbfgffbegfBbegeP  )()(
   jijjijicijiijijijjijicijiiji
LINE
ij fbegfBbegffgebeBbfgeQ  )()(
(3.27).
The complex power flowing through branch i-j can also be defined as flowing








ji IVjQPS  (3.28)
and applying similar substitutions as above, the active and reactive power flows
from bus j to bus i are:
   iijiijjcijjijjiijiijjcijjijj
LINE
ji fgebeBbfgffbegfBbegeP  )()(
   iijiijjcijjijjiijiijjcijjijj
LINE
ji fbegfBbegffgebeBbfgeQ  )()(
(3.29).
3.5.2 Representation of the transformer
The modelling for the transformer considered in this formulation includes
modelling of the transformer tap-ratio control, such as in the case of on-load tap-
changing transformers, and representation of the admittance elements and
transmission losses of the transformer branch. A power transformer with on-load
tap-changing mechanism has the ability to regulate the network voltages (see
Section 4.1). The physical meaning of the tap-changing mechanism is that it can
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adjust the turns ratio between the primary and secondary coils of the transformer.
The single-line diagram for the transformer branch is shown in Figure 6. An
auxiliary intermediate bus, with apparent voltage /iV , is used to separate the turns
ratio mechanism part, from the admittance of the transformer. The admittance








Bus i Bus j
1:
Figure 6: The single-line diagram for the transformer.
For the transformer tap-ratio control located at the i-side of the branch, the tap-











The following expressions hold for the currents flowing through the transformer
branch:
/
ii tII  (3.31)
)( // jiti VVyI  (3.32).
By substituting (3.32) into (3.31), and the voltage of the intermediate bus with
ii tVV 
/ , the current flowing in the direction i to j is given by:
jtiti VtyVytI 
2 (3.33).
By similar considerations, the current flowing in the direction j to i is given by:
jtitj VyVtyI  (3.34).


































































where the Y elements represent the admittance matrix of the transformer branch
i-j. Note that the transformer branch admittance matrix is dependent on the
variable tap-ratio term.
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By observing the transformer matrix equation (3.35) and considering simple
network analysis [176], the transformer equivalent circuit, for the case where the






Figure 7: The equivalent circuit for the transformer.
The complex power flow through the transformer branch in the equivalent circuit








ij IVjQPS  (3.36).
By substituting voltage iV by its rectangular components and multiplying with
the conjugate of current iI through the transformer branch, the complex power
flow is calculated as:
   













By decomposing the complex power into the active and reactive power
components, the active and reactive power flows through the transformer branch
in the direction from bus i to bus j, for tap-ratio control located at i-side, are:
   )()()()( 22 jijjijiiiiiiijijjijiiiiiii
TR
ij fgebtfgebtffbegtfbegteP 




By similar considerations, the complex power flow through the transformer








ji IVjQPS  (3.39).
89
By substituting voltage jV by its rectangular components and multiplying with
the conjugate of current jI through the transformer branch, the complex power
flow is calculated as:
   











By decomposing the complex power into the active and reactive power
components, the active and reactive power flows through the transformer branch
in the direction from bus j to bus i, for tap-ratio control located at i-side, are:
   )()()()( jjjjjjiijiijjjjjjjjiijiijj
TR
ji fgebebfgtffbegfbegteP 




3.5.3 Formulation of the power flow and power mismatch equations
The power flow equations for a particular node in the electrical network
represent the power injections from all the branches connected to that node. The










where the summation over j represents all the buses that are connected through
transmission branches to bus i. The expression for LINEijS is given in (3.26). The
term TRijS have been calculated in (3.37) for the transformer tap-ratio control
located at the bus under examination (bus i), or in (3.40) for the tap-ratio control
located at the other side of the branch connected to the bus under examination
(bus j). By decomposing the complex power injection into its real and imaginary
















The analytical expressions for the active and reactive power injections in
rectangular coordinates are shown in equations (3.27) for the transmission line
components, and in equations (3.38) for the transformer tap-ratio control located
at bus i, or in equations (3.41), for the transformer tap-ratio control located at bus
j, for the transformer branch components.
The power mismatch equations required for the modelling of the power balance
constraints in the electricity market algorithm are derived from the energy
conservation rule, such that the power generation at a bus must be equal to the
sum of the power injection and the power load demand at that bus. The active
and reactive power balance equations at bus i are:
iii PdPPg  (3.45)
iii QdQQg  (3.46)
where g denotes the power generation and d the load demand. In order for the
algorithm to converge by satisfying these two constraints, the power mismatch
equations ΔP and ΔQ are defined as:
0 iiii PdPPgP (3.47)
0 iiii QdQQgQ (3.48).
The Δ-terms are required to be approximately equal to zero at the end of the 
iterative process in order for the algorithm to provide a satisfactory solution.
3.6 Electricity market assumptions and ISO obligations
The proposed algorithm is used to calculate the Nash equilibrium for wholesale
bid-based electricity pool markets, by applying linear SFE theory, as discussed
above. The market players are considered to be individual strategic firms that are
profit-maximisers and no collusion or coalition exists between them, as in a non-
cooperative game. For every bidding time interval, each strategic generating firm
F submits a linear supply function bid for all of its generating units to the ISO,
where NFF ...,2,1 is the number of the firm. Each firm chooses strategy by
anticipating the profit-maximising actions of its rivals and this holds for all
individual firms. For the formulation in this section, the supply function bids are
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assumed to be proportional to the marginal cost of generation and therefore the
kF-parameterization method is employed.





PgPgC   (3.49)
where
iFPg is the active power generation of unit of firm F at bus i, iF and iF
are the linear and quadratic generation cost coefficients of that unit, respectively,
for NGi ...,2,1 , where NG is the number of generation buses in the system. The
marginal cost of generation
iFPg
MC is given by the first derivative of the













It is likely that the supply function bids submitted do not represent the actual
marginal costs, since the firms will attempt to favour their individual profits by
raising the market clearing price at the expense of other players or the
consumers; this act may result in deadweight loss and hence in a social welfare
lower than that of the perfect competition market [137]. The supply function bid
for the generating unit Fi is given by:
)(
iiiiiFii FFFFPgFF
PgkMCkSB   (3.51)
where
iFk is the bidding parameter for this unit, considered to be the strategic
variable for the firms as in [120,134]. The components )(
ii FFk  and )( ii FFk 
are the intercept and the gradient of the linear supply function bid, respectively.
It is assumed that the market participants are long-term players and have learned
about their rivals’ generating cost functions, such as in a complete information
game. However, the ISO does not know the true generation cost function for the
market participants, as will be discussed later. The decision of the strategic firms
for the choice of the bid depends on the perception that a firm has about the rival
firms’ behaviour. If it is assumed that the bidding strategies for all the firms are
responses to the other players’ profit-maximising strategic actions, the resulting
market solution will describe a Nash equilibrium state.
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iiiiPd PdPdD i   (3.52)
where iPd is the active load demand at bus i, and i and i are the linear and
quadratic load cost coefficients at that bus, respectively, for NLi ...,2,1 , where
NL is the number of the system buses that have load demand. Therefore, the
linear inverse load demand function given by the first derivative of (3.52) with
respect to the active load demand is:
iiiPd PdMD i   (3.53).
Strategic demand-side bidding is not considered.
The primary objective of the ISO is to maximise the social welfare for the
consumers, for each time interval. Once the firms submit the supply function bids
for their generating units and the bidding process is closed, the ISO clears the
market by balancing the power supply and demand and determines the market
clearing price, while maximising the social welfare. During this process, the ISO
adjusts the power levels across the network to those most favourable for the
social welfare by determining the transformer tap-ratio settings and the voltage
levels at each bus, while abiding by the network and supply-demand balance
constraints. While doing so, the strategic actions of the generating firms, i.e. the
submitted bids, are taken into account.
After the ISO balances the market, the market clearing price is obtained in terms
of nodal prices for the active power supplied to the system, for one time interval.
By repeating this process, the nodal prices are continuously readjusted over each
time interval, depending on the amount of the energy delivered. The pool
operator pays the firms according to the nodal prices at the buses where their
generating units are connected, for the active power supplied to the pool. It is
assumed that the generators produce an amount of active power equal to that of
the ISO schedule, which is entirely sold to the power pool. For the scope of this
research it is assumed that the reactive power provision does not account for any
profit since the wholesale market model is only for active power, but it is
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mandatory that the firms provide the required reactive power generation or
absorption to support the voltage levels determined by the ISO.
The end-users (loads) pay the pool according to the nodal prices at their buses for
the active power provided. This payment includes both the price of the energy
supplied and the short-term transmission costs. The difference of the nodal prices
at the different buses of the system corresponds to the energy transmission
expenses from the generation site to the consumption point. These expenses
include the costs for the network congestion and for the power losses in the
transmission lines and transformer branches. The congestion cost is the cost of
achieving system security by redispatching the power in the network in a
different way to that of the economic dispatch in order to confine the power
flows within the allowable transmission limits by shifting power generation from
one unit to another that may correspond to higher generation costs, resulting in
transmission congestion in the network. The cost of the power losses in the
system depends on the physical characteristics of the transmission lines and
transformers, but it is predictable and not as high as the congestion cost. The
level of nodal prices depends on the properties of the constrained network, as the
physical laws take precedence over the market laws. According to equation
(2.10), the sum of the product of the nodal price and the power delivered at each
load bus minus the sum of the product of the nodal price and the power supplied
at each generation bus is the congestion rent and merchandising surplus collected
by the transmission rights owner, which is assumed to be the ISO.
A depiction of the ISO process is shown in the block diagram of Figure 8.
Figure 8: The ISO market process for one time interval.
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3.7 The optimisation problem of the ISO
The formulation for the optimisation problem of the ISO considers the objective
of social welfare maximisation, while it is subject to the AC network operational
constraints. Since the ISO receives only the strategic bids from the firms and
does not know the actual generating costs, the objective function ISO that is
going to be maximised is represented by the quasi social welfare function that
depends on the strategic bids of the market players. This is defined as the
consumers’ benefit minus the generating costs reflected by the submitted bids.

























0),,(  tfePPdPgP iiFi i (3.55)
0),,(  tfeQQdQgQ iiFi i (3.56)
222
ijijij SQP  (3.57)
maxmin
iii FFF PgPgPg  (3.58)
maxmin
iii FFF QgQgQg  (3.59)
max22min
iiii VfeV  (3.60)
maxmin ttt i  (3.61)
0iPd (3.62)
where ],,,,[ iFFii tQgPgfex ii for Ni ,...,2,1 is the system variables vector,
the subscript ‘i’ stands for the relevant bus for each case, iP and iQ are the
active and reactive power mismatches,
iFPg and iFQg are the active and
reactive power generations (or reactive power absorption) by a unit of firm F at
bus i, iPd and iQd are the active and reactive power load demands, iP and iQ
are the active and reactive power injections, ijP and ijQ are the power flows
through transmission line or transformer branch i-j in the direction i to j with
maximum transmission limit ijS formulated in rectangular coordinates, ei and fi
are the real and imaginary components of the bus voltage in rectangular
coordinates, minV and maxV are the minimum and maximum voltage magnitude
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limits squared, and ti is the transformer tap-ratio for tap-ratio control located at
bus i-side of the transformer branch i-j. The reactive load demand is set to:
iii PdQd tan (3.63)
where i is the load angle of bus i, assumed to be constant for each bus over one
time interval. Since the active load demand is variable and responds to changes
in the market price, the reactive load demand is also price-responsive.
3.8 The optimisation problem of the generating firms
The aim of a utility maximiser participating in the game is to achieve the highest
profit possible. Therefore, the primary objective of each of the strategic firms in
the electricity market is to maximise the profits of their individual generating
units, given by the sales income minus the true generating costs. The



















iii FFF kkk  (3.65)




iFk are the lower and upper limits for
the bidding parameter, and ip represents the nodal price at bus i [182]. Note
that the inequality constraint for the submitted bid may be different from the one
shown in (3.65), depending on the choice of the parameterization method for the
linear supply function bid. This will be elaborated in Chapter 8 where the
formulations for the different parameterization methods are provided.
3.9 The solution for the SFE market problem
In order to solve the SFE problem and obtain the Nash equilibrium point for the
electricity market, all the constraints and the optimisation of the objectives from
the ISO and the generating firms’ problems must be satisfied. To do so, each firm
should recognise the best bidding strategy for profit maximisation, by taking into
account that all the other firms will behave in a similar manner, and the ISO
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should clear the market while maximising the social welfare by considering the
strategic bids from the firms. In order to represent this, the original bi-level
optimisation problem will be transformed into a single combined problem that
satisfies both optimisation objectives and constraints. The implemented primal-
dual interior point algorithm will solve iteratively the resulting combined
optimisation problem and converge to the SFE point for the electricity market.
This market equilibrium solution can be characterised by the equilibrium set of
variables, which consists of the nodal prices, the firm’s bidding factors and
profits, the social welfare, the voltages across the system, the transformer tap-
ratio settings and the power distribution in the network.
3.9.1 Reformulation of the ISO optimisation problem
The first step for the reformulation of the bi-level SFE problem is to transform
the ISO maximisation problem with equality and inequality constraints, into an
equivalent minimisation problem with equality constraints only. This is done by
introducing the slack variables sl and su for the lower and upper bounds of the
inequality constraints, respectively, with the application of the Fiacco-
McCormick Logarithmic Barrier method. By grouping the inequalities (3.57)-
(3.61) into the following inequality vector:
maxmin )( nnn hxhh  (3.66)
















0)( min  nnn hslxh (3.70)
0)( max  nnn hsuxh (3.71)
where 0 is the barrier parameter, n is the number of inequality constraints of
the ISO problem, and 0nsl and 0nsu are the slack variables for the n
inequality constraints. The inequality for the active load demand (3.62) is not
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included in (3.66) because it will be incorporated in the formulation in a later
stage as an equivalent complementarity condition.
By employing the Lagrange method for optimisation with equalities the








































where ip , iq , 0nl and 0nu are the Lagrange multipliers (dual
variables) for the equality constraints (3.68)-(3.71) respectively, and N is the
number of total buses in the system.
The optimal solution for the above problem satisfies the 1st order KKT conditions
of (3.72), which can be obtained by differentiating the Lagrange function 1L
with respect to all the primal and dual variables. The set of the KKT condition












iixISOxx uhlhqQpPL  (3.73)
01  ip PLi  (3.74)
01  iq QLi  (3.75)
0)( min1  nnnl hslhLn  (3.76)
0)( max1  nnnu hsuhLn  (3.77)
01  nnsl lslLn  (3.78)










iiPdISOPdPd qQpPL iiii  (3.80).
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The KKT condition equation (3.80) that corresponds to the active load demand
Pd is treated separately from the other conditions, in order to be transformed into
a nonlinear complementarity function. This function will represent the KKT
condition for Pd and, in addition, the non-negativity constraint (3.62). The
analysis is shown in the next section.
3.9.2 Introduction of the complementarity constraint
The nonlinear complementarity method, based on the Fischer-Burmeister merit
function [160], can easily handle complicated complementarity conditions for
optimality. The complementarity conditions must satisfy the following property:
0,0,00),(  abbaba (3.81)
where Ψ is the Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP) function that relates 
the complementarity parameters a and b. This property states that the NCP
function Ψ is equivalent to the complementarity constraint associated with a and
b, and vice versa. The NCP function in this analysis is represented by the
Fischer-Burmeister merit function, as in [189], given by:
22),( bababa  (3.82).
By evaluating the derivatives in the KKT condition equation for the active load
demand (3.80) and then multiplying by Pdi, since the expression is equal to zero,
the following equation can be obtained:
0)tan(  iiiiiii qpPdPd  (3.83).
Since the properties,
0iPd (3.84)
0)tan(  iiiiii qpPd  (3.85)
hold, by setting iPda  and )tan( iiiiii qpPdb   , the KKT
condition equation for the active load demand (3.80) can be replaced by the
following NCP function, and in addition the non-negativity constraint for Pd
(3.62) will be introduced in the formulation. Such mathematical transformations
facilitate reductions in the computational effort of the algorithm, since there will
be no extra computations for slack and dual variables associated with the active
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load demand, and possible ill-conditioning complications due to the
complementarity expressions may be avoided. Therefore, since the














This expression will replace (3.80) in the set of the ISO KKT condition equations
that result from the Lagrange function 1L .
3.9.3 Formulation of the combined optimisation problem for the SFE
solution
In order to obtain a combined problem that represents the overall electricity
market equilibrium problem, the following arguments are brought into attention.
The active power
iFPg and the nodal prices ip present in the firms’
optimisation problem (3.64)-(3.65) that can be expressed as implicit functions of
all generating firms’ strategies, are produced by the nonlinear optimisation
programming problem of the ISO (3.54)-(3.62) [134]. Therefore, the values of
iFPg and ip should satisfy the ISO KKT conditions, which represent the
original ISO optimisation problem. Hence, the ISO KKT conditions can be
incorporated into the strategic firms’ optimisation problem as equality
constraints, to form a combined optimisation problem that can be solved to give
the market SFE point.
By applying the above considerations, the resulting combined optimisation



















iii FFF kkk  (3.88)
KKT condition equations of the ISO problem (3.73)-(3.79), (3.86) (3.89).
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By applying the Fiacco-McCormick Barrier method to the combined problem in
order to eliminate the inequality constraints for the strategic bids, the
maximisation problem in (3.87)-(3.89) is transformed into an equivalent


























KKT condition equations of the ISO problem (3.73)-(3.79), (3.86) (3.93).
Thus, by introducing Lagrange multipliers for each constraint in (3.90)-(3.93),
considering each ISO KKT condition in (3.93) separately, the following

























































































where x , ip , iq , nsl , nsu , nl , nu and  are the Lagrange
multipliers for the KKT condition equations (3.73)-(3.79) and (3.86),
respectively, which were incorporated into the firms’ optimisation problem as




u are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the strategic bids.
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By differentiating the Lagrange function 2L , the 1
st order KKT condition
equations for the combined optimisation problem are obtained as shown below:
)]([)(2 xxL ISOxxxFxx  
])()([ iixxiixxx qQpP   
])()([ nnxxnnxxx uhlh   
  ixqixp QP ii  
0  nxunxl hh nn   (3.95)
02    PdiPdqiPdpPd QPL ii   (3.96)
0)(2   iii pixxFpp PxL   (3.97)
02   ii qixxq QL   (3.98)
02   nslnxxl slhL nn  (3.99)
02   nsunxxu suhL nn  (3.100)
02  nnn lnslsl lL   (3.101)














02  iPLip  (3.104)
02  iQLiq  (3.105)
0][ min2  nnn hslhLnl  (3.106)
0][ max2  nnn hsuhLnu  (3.107)
02  nn lslLnsl  (3.108)
02  nn usuLnsu  (3.109)
02    L (3.110)
0)()(2   iiFiFiFiFiF FkkkISOxxkk kulxL  (3.111)
02  iFiFFik kksl lslL  (3.112)
02  iFiFiFk kksu
usuL  (3.113)
0][ min2  iiFiFiFk Fkkl
kslhL  (3.114)
0][ max2  iiFiFiFk Fkku
ksuhL  (3.115).
The KKT conditions (3.95)-(3.115) obtained from the Lagrange function 2L
represent the overall market equilibrium problem. These are then linearized using
Taylor series expansion with the application of the Newton’s method, in order to
proceed for the solution of the SFE problem.
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3.9.4 Linearization of the market problem’s KKT system
Recalling from equation (3.16) in Section 3.2, the linearization of the above KKT
conditions can be achieved by computing the Jacobian J of each expression g
from (3.95)-(3.115) with respect to all of its variables y, and then setting
gyJ  . Hence the complete set of the linearized equations for the solution
of the market equilibrium problem are obtained as follows:
 ][ 3322 iixiixxFxx qQpPL   
][ 33 nnxnnxx uhlh   
  ixqixp QP ii
22
 
 xhh nxunxl nn  
22
 
  iFxpixx pP i     ][
2
  iixx qQ    ][
2
  nnxx lh    ][
2
  nnxx uh    ][
2
 iixiixISOx qQpP   
222
 xnnxnnx uhlh   
22
 
ipix P  
 







k  2 (3.116)
  PdL PdPd   
2
2 
  iPdp pi     
  iPdq qi     
ip
 
iqi   tan
 
  Pd (3.117)
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ipPd   
  ip pi    
2
  iqp qii    
  xix P  
     ip (3.118)




iqPd   
  iqp pii    
  iq qi    
2
  xix Q  
 

   iq (3.119)
  xhL nxxln  
2
2 
  nsl sln  
  xnxh  
 
nslnsl  (3.120)
  xhL nxxun  
2
2 
  nsu sun  
  xnxh  
 
nsunsu  (3.121)
  nslsl lL nn   2
nl
 
nslnl   (3.122)
  nsusu uL nn   2
nu
 
nsunu   (3.123)
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   iixiixISOx qQpPLx 
222
2
 xuhlh nnxnnx   
22
  iix pP  
  iix qQ  
  nnx lh  




  PdL Pd    2
  ip pi   
  iq qi    (3.125)
  xPL ixip   2
  PdPiPd   (3.126)
  xQL ixiq   2
  PdQiPd   (3.127)
  xhL nxnl   2
nsl (3.128)
  xhL nxnu   2
nsu (3.129)
  nn lslLnsl   2
  nn sll   (3.130)
  nn usuLnsu   2
  nn suu   (3.131)
  xL ISOxxkk iFiF   
2
2
















kksl lslL   2
 
iFiF kk
sll   (3.135)
 
iFiFiFk
kksu usuL   2
 
iFiF kk
suu   (3.136).
The set of the above linearized equations can be solved simultaneously to give
the electricity market equilibrium solution. In order to enhance the efficiency and
robustness of the solution algorithm the linearized equations are rearranged into a
Newton matrix equation by applying sparse matrix techniques. The mathematical
formulation is as follows.
3.9.5 Formulation of the Newton matrix equation
The linearized equations (3.116)-(3.136) that represent the market equilibrium
































































































































































   ,




































































222 )(   ,
GH xx  ,
TQPG ],[ ,
Tqp ],[   .
The primal and dual variables are represented by px and dx respectively, and
the
iFk
H terms are the contributions of the bidding factor
iFk . In order to reduce
the computational effort of the algorithm during the iterative procedure, the slack
and dual variables associated with the bidding parameter
iFk , which are
contained into the
iFk
H sub-matrices, have been eliminated from the Newton
step vector using Gaussian elimination, as proposed in [190] and applied in the
formulation of the nonlinear primal-dual interior point OPF in [177] and [165].




su from the Newton
step vector, equations (3.135) and (3.136) are rewritten with respect to their Δ-
terms, such that:
iFiFiFiFkiF
kkkslk llslLsl  /][ 2  (3.138)
iFiFiFiFkiF
kkksuk uusuLsu  /][ 2  (3.139).
These equations are then substituted into the linearized equations for the dual
variables of the bidding parameter (3.133) and (3.134), such that:
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iFiFiFiFkiiFk
kkkslFl llslLkL  /][ 22  (3.140)
iFiFiFiFkiiFk
kkksuFu uusuLkL  /][ 22  (3.141).





u terms from the right-hand vector in the Newton matrix equation
(3.137) denoted by ‘*’:
iFiFiFiiFk
kkkFl llslkL  /]*[ 2  (3.142)
iFiFiFiiFk
kkkFu uusukL  /]*[ 2  (3.143)
where the revised right-hand parts in (3.142)-(3.143) are equal to:
iFiFkiFkiFk
kslll lLLL  /]*[ 222  (3.144)
iFiFkiFkiFk
ksuuu uLLL  /]*[ 222  (3.145).
By this elimination of the right-hand parts that correspond to equations (3.135)
and (3.136) from the Newton matrix equation, there will be less computational





su can be retrieved using (3.138) and (3.139).




u associated with the dual variables. To do so, rearrange equations (3.142)
and (3.143), such that:
 
iFiFiiFkiF
kkFlk sllkLl /*][ 2    (3.146)
 
iFiFiiFkiF
kkFuk suukLu /*][ 2    (3.147).
By substituting these equations into (3.132) and defining a revised right-hand
term for the linearized equation of the bidding parameter
iFk :














where the revised right-hand part for the
iFk term is:
iFiFiFkiFiFiFkiFiF
kkukklkk suuLsllLLL /*][/*][]*[ 2222   
(3.149)
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which is the actual right-hand term for
iFk that appears in the final form of the
Newton equation in (3.137).
By observing equation (3.148) it can be seen that there are three elements,
associated with the bidding parameter
iFk , remaining in the Newton matrix after
the elimination. These elements are the nonzero entries in the resulting
iFk
H sub-
matrices that correspond to the rows of ΔPg, Pg and iFk of the Newton step
vector, such that:
iiFiF PgiISOPgPgkk
H    21 (3.150)
iiiISOPgkk PgH iFiF   2 (3.151)
)/()/(3 iFiFiFiFF kkkkk suusllH   (3.152).
In order to further improve the computational efficiency of the implemented
algorithm, sparse matrix techniques are applied for the arrangement of the
individual elements in the Newton matrix (3.137). The desirable configuration of
the Newton matrix, expected to be very efficient, requires the majority of its
elements to attain the same sparse matrix structure as that of the admittance
matrix used in the conventional Newton power flow [190]. In order to preserve
the sparsity of the structure, the matrix elements that correspond to the bus and
branch variables are rearranged into a 4 by 4 block structure, with each block
corresponding to a particular bus or branch. The typical arrangement of the

























































































































































































































The diagonal blocks in the K and H matrices correspond to the bus elements, and
the off-diagonal blocks that contain the subscripts i-j to the branch elements. For
each sub-matrix, the transformer elements were assigned positions adjacent to
the group of these bus and branch blocks on the upper row and left column, while
the generation and load elements were positioned on the lower row and right
column, as shown. The rest of the elements in the W and U sub-matrices in
(3.137) are diagonal matrices that contain the elements associated with the slack
and dual variables of the inequality constraints. The three
FkH vectors in (3.137)
contain the three elements from (3.148) that result from the elimination of the
slack and dual variables associated with
iFk . The aforementioned sparse matrix
techniques that are applied on the Newton matrix enhance the performance of the
algorithm and thus reduce the computational effort needed to reach the solution
of the problem.
3.10 Implementation issues for the primal-dual interior point
algorithm
In order to obtain the solution for the SFE market problem, the Newton matrix
(3.137) is solved iteratively by the primal-dual interior point algorithm. The flow
chart for the solution procedure of the algorithm is presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Flowchart of the solution procedure for the SFE algorithm.
The only requirement for the initialisation of the variables in order to initiate the
iterative process is to assign values to the variables that are interior to the bound
constraints. Hence, the initialisation values are chosen as follows:
- the voltage initial conditions are set for a flat start,
- the generation variables
iFPg and iFQg are set to the average values
between their maximum and minimum limits,
- the transformer tap-ratios ti are set to 1,
- the bidding parameters
iFk are set to 1,




- the dual variables πln and πun are set to nsl/ and nsu/ respectively,
- the dual variables ip and iq are set to iFPgMC and zero respectively,
- all the auxiliary dual variables ω are set equal to zero.
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After choosing initial values for the system variables, the algorithm obtains
values for the Δ-terms in the Newton step vector from (3.137) for each iteration, 
and the primal and dual variables are updated by using modified versions of
expression (3.17) that include step-length parameters. These parameters, also
called step-sizes, are incorporated in the formulation in order to control the
Newton step, and hence the speed and convergence capabilities of the
algorithmic procedure, in order to avoid divergence problems or slow iterative
processes. Furthermore, the step-lengths can be multiplied by a factor that is
slightly less than 1, in order to prevent them from hitting their boundary.
Therefore, the update of the primal and dual variables, xp and xd respectively, is

















where αp and αd are the primal and dual step-lengths parameters respectively, the
factor σ is in the domain [0.995 – 0.99995], and k is the iteration count. The step-
lengths are determined based on the values of the slack and dual variables and
their associated Newton step elements, as follows:
]1),/min(),/min(min[ sususlslp  (3.157)
]1),/min(),/min(min[ uulld   (3.158)
for those 0sl , 0su , 0 l and 0 u .
The error function in the analysis of the primal-dual interior point method can be
defined as the complementary gap Cgap, which represents the difference
between the primal and dual objective functions [178]. This gap must be zero at
the optimum solution and it can be determined for each iteration by:
 
n
nnnn usulslCgap )(  (3.159).
The relationship between the complementary gap and the barrier parameter is
implicit in the KKT condition equations associated with the slack and dual
variables (3.99)-(3.102), (3.112)-(3.115). Hence, the barrier parameter μ that was
introduced with the slack variables in the objective function of the original
optimisation problem can be reduced based on a predicted decrease of the
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where β is the centering parameter chosen from the domain [0.01 – 0.2], and M is
the number of single-sided inequalities in the system constraints. The centering
parameter β represents the expected cut in the complementary gap for the next
iteration and it is used to manipulate the direction of the Newton step in order to
improve the centrality of the solution within the interior of the constraints’
boundaries.
The break point for the algorithm convergence is defined by specified tolerances
imposed on the levels of the power mismatches (3.55)-(3.56) and the
complementary gap (3.159), which in turn reduces the barrier parameter μ as in
(3.160). The tolerances used for the work in this Thesis were set to 5×10-4 for the
reduction of the complementary gap and to 1×10-4 p.u. for minimisation of the
absolute bus active and reactive power mismatch equations. When the gap and
the power mismatches become less than the specified tolerances as the iterative
process progresses, the algorithm converges to the optimum solution for the
market problem that is a Nash equilibrium point.
3.11 Conclusions for Chapter 3
This chapter has provided a layout of the work presented in this Thesis and has
described in detail the methodology employed for the implementation of the
electricity market SFE algorithm. The reasons for choosing the linear SFE model
over the other oligopolistic equilibrium methods have been explained, while the
advantages of employing the AC model for the power network over the
linearized DC approach have been outlined. The electricity market algorithm has
been implemented using the nonlinear primal-dual interior point method, which
is able to accommodate the bi-level market problem and deal with the
mathematical complexity involved, in order to enhance the computational
efficiency of the model. The detailed mathematical formulation of the market
problem, which incorporates the AC power flow representation for meshed
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networks, has been presented along with the implementation issues of the interior
point algorithm.
By incorporating several AC network features in the market model, the accuracy
and realism of the acquired market predictions have been enhanced, enabling the
investigation in the subsequent chapters of this Thesis of the impact of individual
network constraints and system operational conditions on the electricity market
equilibrium for non-trivial systems. The contributions of the work presented in
this Thesis include, apart of investigations of several market conditions under AC
modelling, aspects of research on the electricity market equilibrium that have not
been addressed in the literature so far, such as the representation of on-load tap-
changing transformers and grid-connected PV systems.
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Chapter 4:
The impact of transformer tap-ratio control
on the electricity market equilibrium
4.1 Introduction to transformer control
Transformer components serve as the link between generators and transmission
lines in a power system, as well as between lines of different voltage levels. A
transformer can regulate the voltage between the network buses and control the
flow of active and reactive power in the system [202]. In the case where voltage
adjustments are required under varying load conditions, on-load tap-changing
transformer arrangements are applicable. The tapping arrangement of the
transformer windings provides the necessary voltage regulation without
interrupting the service by detecting voltage or reactive power variations across
and through the transformer. An automatic tap-changing operation is initiated by
small adjustments on the turns ratio to result in the desired voltage levels and
facilitate the varying system conditions [203,204].
In the case of the electricity market operation, the system operator may utilise the
function of such regulating transformer mechanisms to aid the social welfare
maximisation process. Since the levels of the voltages across the system dictate
whether there is transmission congestion present or not, and the firms’ strategies
and market prices are affected by network congestion, the application of on-load
tap-changing transformers can regulate the voltages and power flows in such a
way that the market clearing price is reduced to a value close to the marginal cost
of generation and the social welfare is maximised. Hence, the importance of the
application of transformer tap-ratio control is not only associated with assisting
the operation of the power system, but also with the facilitation of a proper
function of the electricity market.
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The optimal power flow study in [205] shows that the incorporation of
transformer tap-ratio control in the network model and the representation of the
transformer branch have a noticeable effect on the voltage and power flow
profiles of the system. If modelling of the electricity market is considered, the
omission of representing the transformer, in terms of power flows through the
transformer branch and tap-ratio control, may have undesirable effects on the
resulting market predictions with deviations from the real solution due to false
evaluation of the voltage and power flow levels in the network. The
incorporation of transformer modelling into the market model will result in a
more realistic market solution, as it will account for the voltage and power flow
adjustments expected to take place in practice.
The remainder of this chapter provides an advanced review of the mathematical
formulation associated with the transformer modelling in the electricity market
equilibrium analysis and an extensive study of the impact of transformer tap-ratio
control on the electricity market equilibrium based on numerical results. The
expressions provided for the mathematical formulation are determined by
following the mathematical derivation of the Newton matrix outlined in Chapter
3, focusing only on the terms associated with the transformer modelling. The
numerical results investigate cases with and without transformer tap-ratio
control, while the interrelation of tap-ratio control and network congestion is
analysed.
4.2 Modelling of the transformer control in the electricity
market equilibrium analysis
Before illustrating the impact of transformer tap-ratio control on the electricity
market equilibrium by numerical results, the contribution of the transformer
formulation to the electricity market equilibrium model is reviewed. From
equations (3.137) and (3.153)-(3.154), the contribution of the incorporation of
the transformer formulation in the primal-dual interior point algorithm to the
Newton matrix, is twofold. Elements associated with the transformer component
accruing from modelling the power transmission and losses of the transformer
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branches, which incorporate the tap-ratio factor, appear in the bus and branch
blocks Kxx, Kλx, Hxx, Hλx in the K and H sub-matrices (see (3.137)). The
transformer elements that result from inequality (3.61) for the modelling of the
transformer tap-ratio control appear in the diagonal matrix elements associated
with the slack and dual variables sl, su, πl, πu, ωsl, ωsu, ωπl, ωπu (the identity
matrix elements for the latter two), and in the ][ hx blocks, in sub-matrices W
and U in (3.137). These contributions can be clearly seen by isolating the
transformer-related parts of the Lagrange function 2L for the combined market
problem (3.94) and of the resulting linearized KKT condition equations that














































][][ maxmin tttutttl hsuhhslh tt    (4.1)
where NT is the number of transformers in the system, and TRiP and
TR
iQ are
the parts of the active and reactive power mismatch equations (3.55)-(3.56)











i QQ , which can be derived using (3.38) and (3.41). Only these
power flow terms are shown here, since the formulation presented corresponds
only to the contribution from modelling the transformer component.
The parts of the linearized KKT equations (3.116)-(3.131) that result from the
transformer branch modelling are:
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ixtt qQ   (4.3)




ixttp PxPLi   2 (4.4)




ixttq QxQLi   2 (4.5)
- from (3.124): xQqPpL TRixti
TR





it qQpP   
tttttt uhlh   (4.6)
- from (3.126): tPL TRitpi   2 (4.7)
- from (3.127): tQL TRitqi   2 (4.8)
and those resulting from the modelling of the transformer tap-ratio control are:
- from (3.120):
ttt sltttttsll slhslL   2 (4.9)
- from (3.121):
ttt sutttttsuu suhsuL   2 (4.10)
- from (3.122):
tttt sltltslsl llL    2 (4.11)
- from (3.123):
tttt sututsusu uuL    2 (4.12)
- from (3.128): ttt slthLtl   2 (4.13)
- from (3.129): ttt suthLtu   2 (4.14)
- from (3.130): tttt slllslLtsl   2 (4.15)
- from (3.131): tttt suuusuLtsu   2 (4.16).
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Note that the transformer contribution extends to Kxx and Kλx elements other than
the Kxt and Kλt, i.e. outside the first row and column of the K matrix (3.153), as
can be seen from (4.3)-(4.5). This is owing to the fact that all the bus variables (e,
f, λp, λq) are associated with the transmission flows through the transformer
branches. By observing the 2L  and Δ-terms of equations (4.2)-(4.16), the 
individual elements of the Newton matrix equation (3.137) that result from the
transformer contribution can be derived. These elements are presented in
Appendix I and the evaluation of their derivative terms is given in Appendix II.
The 3rd order derivative terms contained in the K matrix from expressions (4.2)-
(4.3) stem from the bi-level nature of the market equilibrium problem. Such
terms would have not been encountered in a primal-dual interior point OPF
formulation that incorporates only a single objective function. This holds for the
transmission line modelling as well. The appearance of the K matrix, which
corresponds to the ISO KKT system that was incorporated into the firms’
optimisation problem, results in twice as many Newton matrix elements for the
model, which are also of higher complexity, compared to a typical OPF problem.
By similar considerations as for equations (4.2)-(4.8), the contribution from
modelling the transmission line power flows and losses can be obtained using the
linearized KKT equations (3.116)-(3.131). Furthermore, the Newton matrix
elements that result from the other network inequality constraints (3.57)-(3.60)
can be straightforwardly acquired in a similar manner as (4.9)-(4.16). The
contribution for the MVA transmission constraint (3.57), which is a complex
functional inequality, requires more computations than the other constraints in
order to calculate the associated 2nd and 3rd order derivative terms.
4.3 Introduction to the analysis of the impact of transformer
tap-ratio control on the electricity market equilibrium
Several test cases were performed for the investigation of the effects from
optimising the transformer tap-ratio on the electricity market outcome, using the
primal-dual interior point algorithm that utilises the kF-parameterization for the
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linear SFE formulation. The subsequent sections provide numerical tests on a 5-
bus and the IEEE 30-bus systems. Each transformer in the test systems is
assumed to be equipped with an on-load tap-changing mechanism that allows the
tap-ratio setting to take values between specified limits. Cases that correspond to
different operating aspects that involve binding limits on power generation and
transmission power flows are examined for two different tap-ratio control modes.
The first mode corresponds to a fixed tap-ratio at the value of 1.0 for all
transformers in the system. For the second mode, the values of the tap-ratios are
optimised within a ±10% interval from the value of 1.0. i.e. in the domain 0.9 to
1.1. The limits for the bidding parameter kF were set to 0min Fk and 10
max
Fk
as in [134]. The values for the tap-ratios presented correspond to κ, as defined in
(3.30). The results for the social welfare correspond to the true social welfare as
in (2.9) and not the quasi function from (3.54). All the power quantities are
calculated using the per-unit (p.u.) measuring system. The results for the
equilibrium market outcome with discussions for each case are given below.
4.4 Numerical results on the 5-bus test system
The 5-bus test system used for Cases 1 to 8 outlined in this section consists of 5
buses with load demand, which are interconnected together with a series of 3
transmission lines and 2 transformer branches TR1 and TR2, and 2 generating
units, as shown in Figure 10. The transmission lines and the transformers have
impedances equal to )1.001.0(/1 jyz t  p.u. The generating unit connected
to bus 1 is owned by generating firm F1 and that at bus 2 by generating firm F2.
The marginal cost of generation at buses 1 and 2 are taken to be
1009.00.111 PgMCPg  £/MWh and 2010.08.102 PgMCPg  £/MWh
respectively. The linear inverse load demand functions are equal at all buses,
being iPd PdD i 060.040 £/MWh. (Note that the linear inverse load demand
function from this point onwards will be indicated by DPd rather than MD.) The
load power factor of the system is set to 0.90 to simulate normal operating
conditions. The results for test Cases 1 to 8 are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1 shows the values of nodal prices, bidding parameters
iFk , firms’
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profits, and social welfare, while the network parameters are presented in Table
4.2.
Figure 10: The 5-bus test system.
TABLE 4.1
CASES 1 TO 8 FOR THE 5-BUS TEST SYSTEM:
NODAL PRICES, BIDDING PARAMETERS, FIRMS’ PROFITS AND SOCIAL WELFARE















1 Fixed 30.2 29.5 31.4 32.6 31.9 2.416 1.959 3085 7057 13640
2
None
±10% 31.0 30.2 31.7 32.7 32.4 2.481 1.923 3175 8357 14820
3 Fixed 31.3 30.7 32.3 33.3 32.7 2.536 1.608 2948 7141 12940
4
0.4max2 Pg p.u. ±10% 33.3 32.6 33.7 34.3 34.2 2.751 1.788 2662 7924 12460




12  SS p.u. ±10% 26.9 31.0 34.6 37.9 41.1 1.944 2.449 4573 3580 11480
7 Fixed 29.6 25.8 41.8 38.1 34.1 2.246 1.928 4256 3548 11180
8
25.0max1 TRS p.u. ±10% 30.0 26.2 43.7 39.2 34.6 2.277 1.960 4369 3597 11230
TABLE 4.2


















1 Fixed 1.67 4.26 1.73 1.66 5.87 2.84 1.000 1.000
2
None
±10% 1.65 4.92 2.32 1.83 6.47 3.13 0.900 0.973
3 Fixed 1.50 4.00 1.62 1.54 5.45 2.64 1.000 1.000
4
0.4max2 Pg p.u. ±10% 1.22 4.00 1.77 1.45 5.15 2.49 0.900 0.974




12  SS p.u. ±10% 3.16 1.86 1.17 1.45 4.99 2.42 0.900 1.020
7 Fixed 2.43 2.59 1.53 0.98 5.01 2.42 1.000 1.000
8
25.0max1 TRS p.u. ±10% 2.44 2.55 1.40 1.11 4.98 2.41 1.100 1.030
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- Cases 1 and 2: No binding constraints:
The first two test cases have been examined in order to demonstrate the effect of
transformer tap-ratio control on the electricity market equilibrium under normal
operating conditions with no network congestion present. In Case 1 it is assumed
that there is no tap-ratio control, in which the tap-ratio value is set to 1.0. In Case
2, the tap-ratio control is active and it can be seen in Table 4.2 that both tap-
ratios are optimised to a value below 1.0, resulting in a large increase in
production. Although the change in nodal prices between Cases 1 and 2 is small,
the transformer tap-ratio control has produced a significant increase in the active
and reactive power generation in Case 2. This resulted in larger profits for both
firms, especially for firm F2, even though it has decreased slightly its bidding
parameter. Also, when the tap-ratio control is active, the load demand and the
social welfare are increased.
- Cases 3 and 4: Generation capacity constraint:
This is another typical example which is considered in order to examine the
effect of tap-ratio control in the presence of generation capacity constraints.
Generation capacity limit has been imposed to the generating unit of firm F2,
such that 0.4max2 Pg p.u. and is binding for both Cases 3 and 4 as shown in
Table 4.2. In Case 4, in which tap-ratio is optimised, higher bidding factors are
observed for both firms when compared with Case 3 where tap-ratio control is
inactive. This action results in higher nodal prices as can be seen in Table 4.1.
Although firm F2 has capacity availability limitation, the increase in nodal prices
is sufficient in order to produce higher profits in Case 4. On the other hand, the
increase in nodal prices is not sufficient to increase the profits of firm F1, which
withholds its capacity, thus there is lower profit for this firm at this time. From
this example, it is concluded that the presence of tap-ratio control gives enough
incentives to the strategic firms to exercise market power in a different way than
in the uncontrolled case, resulting in a different market outcome.
- Cases 5 and 6: Transmission line capacity constraint:
Further cases were examined for investigating the impact of transformer tap-ratio
control on the electricity market under stressed operating conditions in the power
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network. In order to do so, the transmission capacity limits of the lines between
buses 1-2 and 1-5 were set to 5.0max15
max
12  SS p.u. and are binding for both
cases. When operating the system at these extreme conditions, the impact of
transformer tap-ratio control on the electricity market is more intense. In Case 6,
in which the tap-ratio control is optimised, the bidding factors
iFk of both firms
have been altered significantly resulting in a considerable variation in the nodal
prices, if compared with Case 5 where the tap-ratio is fixed to 1.0. The nodal
prices at buses 2, 3, 4 and 5 are significantly increased, whilst the nodal price at
bus 1 is slightly decreased. This variation of nodal prices resulted in lower social
welfare in Case 6 compared with Case 5.
In Case 6, the presence of transformer tap-ratio control has given enough
incentives to the generating firms to change their bidding strategies. Firm F1 has
decreased its bidding factor whilst firm F2 has significantly increased its own.
The generating unit of firm F1 situated at bus 1 has submitted a lower bid and
managed to generate an increased amount of active power, despite the fact that
this generating unit is isolated due to transmission congestion from both sides. In
Case 5, a large proportion of the demand at bus 1 is supplied by the unit at bus 2.
In Case 6, since firm F1 has submitted a lower bid, all the demand at bus 1 is
supplied by its unit that is situated at bus 1. Hence, there is increased production
of power for firm F1 and subsequently higher profits. Note that in Case 6 the
power flows from bus 1 to bus 2, unlike Case 5 where power flows from bus 2 to
bus 1. On the other hand, this resulted in much lower generation for firm F2, thus
lower profits. By considering this example it is concluded that, from the
preliminary results, the impact of transformer tap-ratio control on the electricity
market outcome in the presence of binding network constraints is crucial.
- Cases 7 and 8: Transformer capacity constraint:
These test cases have been performed in order to examine the effect of tap-ratio
control when the transformer power capacity is congested. The power capacity
limit of transformer TR1 has been set equal to 25.0max1 TRS p.u. For Cases 7 and 8
for which the two different tap-ratio control modes are applied, the total
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generation is at the same level, but the bidding factors
iFk of both firms have
been increased slightly resulting in higher nodal prices. Consequently, there is
slightly larger profit for both firms. In Case 8, the values of tap-ratio for both
transformers have been increased above the value of 1.0, while if compared with
Case 2 in which there is no active constraint, the tap-ratio values have been
decreased below 1.0. Thus, using this example it is found that the transformer
tap-ratio adjustment has a significant impact on the market outcome, even when
the generation is at the same levels for both the controlled and the uncontrolled
case.
4.5 Numerical results on the IEEE 30-bus system
Further test cases were examined using the IEEE 30-bus system to show the
effects of transformer tap-ratio control on larger systems. The IEEE 30-bus
system consists of 30 buses, 37 transmission lines, 6 generators, 21 load demand
nodes and 4 on-load tap-changing transformers. Diagrams for the IEEE test
systems can be found in [191]. The generating units at buses 1, 2, 5, 8, 11 and 13
are owned by firms F1 to F6 respectively. For this system, two cases were
examined. Similarly to the previous examples, in Case 9, the tap-ratio control is
considered to be inactive, hence it is set to the fixed value of 1.0 for all
transformers, whereas in Case 10 the values of tap-ratios are optimised within
±10% interval from the value of 1.0. The results for the bidding parameters
iFk ,
firms’ profits, power distribution in the network and social welfare are presented
in Table 4.3. The results for the nodal prices ip for both Cases 9 and 10 are
presented in Table 4.4 in adjacent columns allowing direct comparison of the
price outcome for each bus. The firms situated at the generation buses are
indicated in the first column of Table 4.4 within parentheses.
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TABLE 4.3
CASES 9 TO 10 FOR THE IEEE 30-BUS SYSTEM:
BIDDING PARAMETERS, FIRMS’ PROFITS, POWER DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Bidding Strategies Generating Firm’s Profit(£/hour)CaseNo.
Tap-Ratio
Control












9 Fixed 2.805 3.424 2.009 1.922 1.678 1.690 797 448 4825 1835 845 834 5.62 2.53 5.55 2.50 11990
10 ±10% 2.618 1.274 2.011 1.881 1.667 1.622 1141 2218 4278 1781 703 722 6.80 3.20 6.71 3.01 13830
TABLE 4.4
CASES 9 TO 10 FOR THE IEEE 30-BUS SYSTEM: COMPARISON OF NODAL PRICES (£/MWHOUR)
Bus No.
(firm)
Case 9: Nodal Prices
without
Tap-Ratio Control
Case 10: Nodal Prices
with ±10%
Tap-Ratio Control
1 (F1) 35.9 34.0
2 (F2) 35.8 33.8
3 37.5 36.3
4 37.5 36.4
5 (F3) 30.4 29.9
6 37.5 36.4
7 38.3 37.2
8 (F4) 35.5 34.7
9 37.2 36.3
10 38.0 37.3
11 (F5) 36.2 35.8
12 37.7 37.0


















- Cases 9 and 10: Results for the larger system:
By observing the results of Cases 9 and 10 in Table 4.3, it can be seen that the
bidding strategies
iFk were significantly affected by the introduction of
transformer tap-ratio control. For example, the value of
iFk for the unit at bus 2
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was reduced from 3.424 to 1.274. The total production and load demand levels
were also affected. The active and reactive power generations in the system are
increased when the tap-ratio is optimised, and, as a result, the nodal prices ip
are reduced at all buses, up to decrements of 2.0 £/MWh. This results in a
variation in the distribution of profits among the generating firms, affecting also
the social welfare, which is favoured by the operation of the tap-ratio control. By
comparing Cases 9 and 10 it is found that the transformer tap-ratio control
significantly affects the market outcome in larger scale systems, so that it cannot
be neglected from the electricity market equilibrium models.
4.6 Discussion on the impact of transformer tap-ratio control
based on the numerical results of Cases 1 to 10
The presence of transformer tap-ratio control gives enough incentives to the
strategic generating firms to exercise market power in a different way than the
uncontrolled case, resulting in a different market outcome. The existence of tap-
ratio control that causes the different strategic actions by the firms, results in a
different market outcome in terms of nodal prices, profits and social welfare. In
the presence of binding network constraints the impact of transformer tap-ratio
control is more intense on the electricity market. Hence, from the preliminary
results presented above, it is concluded that the incorporation of transformer tap-
ratio control in the electricity market equilibrium models is necessary for
achieving more realistic results. In order to do so, the implementation of the AC
power flow model for the formulation of the electricity network is required.
Since the tests presented above have shown that the effects of the transformer
tap-ratio control are more intense when transmission congestion is present in the
electricity network, further cases, for which the congestion is gradually
increased, are performed on the 5-bus test system.
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4.7 Investigation of the impact of transformer tap-ratio control
in congested transmission networks
This section aims to demonstrate the impact of the operation of tap-ratio control
in conjunction with the presence of transmission congestion in the network, on
the electricity market. In order to model the strategic interactions of the
generating firms in the interesting situation of network transmission congestion
further cases are performed on the 5-bus test system. The system description is
the same as in Section 4.4 and Figure 10. Cases 11 to 16 are performed by
gradually increasing the transmission congestion in the system, in order to show
that the impact of tap-ratio control on the market outcome is dependent on the
level of congestion. Furthermore, Cases 17 and 18 show that, apart of the
dependency of the effects of tap-ratio control on the congestion, the presence of
these two factors in the system may give the opportunity to the strategic firms to
interfere with the decisions of the ISO for their benefit, in such a way that the
ISO is forced to impose transmission congestion in the network. In Cases 11, 13,
15 and 17 the tap-ratio control is inactive, i.e. the tap-ratio value is fixed to 1.0,
while in Cases 12, 14, 16 and 18 the tap-ratio setting of each transformer can be
optimised within the limits of ±10% from the value of 1.0. Cases 11 and 12 are
identical to Cases 1 and 2 in Section 4.4 and are used as a benchmark. The results
for the market outcome, the system parameters and the power distribution in the
network are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 for Cases 11 to 16, and in Table 4.7
for Cases 17 and 18.
TABLE 4.5
CASES 11 TO 16 FOR THE 5-BUS TEST SYSTEM:
NODAL PRICES, BIDDING PARAMETERS, FIRMS’ PROFITS AND SOCIAL WELFARE















11 Fixed 30.2 29.5 31.4 32.6 31.9 2.416 1.959 3085 7057 13640
12
None
±10% 31.0 30.2 31.7 32.7 32.4 2.481 1.923 3175 8357 14820
13 Fixed 29.3 29.3 31.8 33.6 34.1 2.422 1.881 2150 7638 13440
14
0.1max15 S p.u. ±10% 31.8 31.1 32.8 34.1 34.4 2.746 1.243 1299 8913 12850




12  SS p.u. ±10% 32.8 33.3 35.4 37.1 38.5 2.717 2.516 2547 5284 9258
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TABLE 4.6


















11 Fixed 1.67 4.26 1.73 1.66 5.87 2.84 1.000 1.000
12
None
±10% 1.65 4.92 2.32 1.83 6.47 3.13 0.900 0.973
13 Fixed 1.21 4.75 1.72 1.74 5.90 2.86 1.000 1.000
14
0.1max15 S p.u. ±10% 0.63 5.00 1.57 1.99 5.55 2.69 0.900 0.989




12  SS p.u. ±10% 1.20 2.49 0.59 1.37 3.66 1.77 0.900 1.000
TABLE 4.7
CASES 17 TO 18 FOR THE 5-BUS TEST SYSTEM: MARKET OUTCOME AND SYSTEM PARAMETERS
























17 Fixed 30.2 29.5 31.4 32.6 31.9 2.416 1.959 3083 7058 13640 5.93 3.39 5.87 2.84 1.000 1.000
18 ±10% 32.2 31.3 33.3 33.7 33.3 2.600 2.062 3118 8001 13700 5.89 3.66 5.81 2.81 0.900 0.957
- Cases 11 and 12: No congestion:
In Cases 11 and 12 there is no transmission line congestion and their only
difference is the applied tap-ratio control mode, which is optimised only in Case
12. The nodal prices in Case 12 show an increase when compared with those of
Case 11, with a maximum price deviation of 0.8 £/MWh at bus 1. In Case 12, the
profits of firm F2 are significantly increased due to the increased active
production that resulted from the submission of a smaller bidding parameter.
Firm F1, which has submitted a higher bidding parameter, shows a slight
decrease in active production in Case 12, but manages to receive higher profit
than in Case 11 due to the higher nodal price at its bus. However, by observing
the bidding parameters of the two firms, it can be seen that the firms have not
altered their strategic actions significantly. The social welfare and load demand
are higher in Case 12 where the transformer tap-ratio control is in operation.
- Cases 13 and 14: Low level transmission congestion:
In Cases 13 and 14 a transmission line capacity limit has been imposed in the
line between buses 1 and 5, such that 0.1max15 S p.u. Comparing the nodal prices
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resulting from the operation with the two different tap-ratio control modes it can
be observed that, once again, all prices have been increased for the case where
the tap-ratio setting is allowed to vary within certain limits. The price deviation
has a wider range than that of Cases 11 and 12, up to a maximum price
difference of 2.5 £/MWh at bus 1. When observing the bidding parameters of the
two firms, it can be seen that they have both significantly altered their bidding
strategies. The production of firm F1 in Case 14 has been decreased by a half due
to the fact that the power flow from its generator bus to the load buses 5 and 4 is
less than that of Case 13, thus, even though the bidding parameter of firm F1 has
been increased by about 13% and the nodal price at its bus has the highest
increment, its profit has shown a reduction of 40%. Since firm F2 is able in Case
14 to provide more power to bus 4 via transformer branch TR1, which has
optimised its tap-ratio setting to the minimum value, avoiding the congested
branch, it has decreased its bidding parameter by 34% compared to Case 13. This
resulted in increased active production in Case 14 and, in conjunction with the
higher nodal price at its bus, firm F2 gains a much higher profit compared to
Case 13. The lower active production as switching from Case 13 to Case 14
resulted in lower load demand and hence lower social welfare. The optimisation
of the transformer tap-ratio has an adverse effect on the social welfare in the
presence of transmission congestion in Cases 13 and 14, which is exactly the
opposite of that observed in Cases 11 and 12 under normal operating network
conditions.
- Cases 15 and 16: Heavily transmission congestion conditions:
In Cases 15 and 16, the transmission network is operated in highly stressed
conditions by setting the maximum capacity limits for lines 1-2 and 1-5 equal to
0.4 p.u. When comparing the nodal prices for the different tap-ratio control
modes in Cases 15 and 16, it can be seen that the price deviation for each bus
differs from one another. The highest price deviation, observed at bus 1, is 5.3
£/MWh, which is much larger than the deviations in Cases 11 to 14. Both firms
have significantly increased their bidding parameters in Case 16, while their
active production has been reduced. In Case 15, the power produced by firm F1
flows in the direction from bus 1 towards buses 5, 4 and 3. In Case 16, its active
production is equal to the load demand of bus 1 and the power flows in and out
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of bus 1 are equal. This resulted in a much lower profit for firm F1 even though
that its bidding parameter and the nodal price at its bus have considerably
increased. Consequently, the optimisation of the transformer tap-ratio settings in
Case 16 has given the opportunity to firm F2 to supply power equal to that of the
load demand at buses 2 to 5. Therefore, despite the fact that its active power
production in Case 16 is much less than that of Case 15, firm F2 attains a slightly
higher profit due to the increased nodal prices. For these cases, where the
transmission congestion is more intense, the optimisation of the transformer tap-
ratio in Case 16 resulted in a much lower social welfare compared to Case 15,
due to the enormous reduction in active load demand. This reduction in the price-
responsive active load demand is caused by the drop of the active production,
which is a result of the different equilibrium strategies chosen by the generating
firms that correspond to the different tap-ratio control modes.
- Cases 17 and 18: Tap-ratio control imposes congestion:
One situation that can be of particular interest is investigated in test Cases 17 and
18. For these two cases the capacity limit of transformer branch TR1 has been set
to 0.2max1 TRS p.u. In Case 17, where the tap-ratio control is inactive, the power
S23 transmitted through branch TR1 is equal to 1.59p.u. Therefore, there is no
congestion in the network branches and the results are identical to those of Case
11. In Case 18, in which the tap-ratio control is activated, it is observed that the
capacity constraint of transformer branch TR1 is binding and hence congestion
exists in the system. The power flow S23 has changed from 1.59p.u. (in Case 17)
to 2.00p.u. (in Case 18). By observing the results for these two cases in Table
4.7, it can be seen that in Case 18 both firms have increased their bidding
parameters resulting in increased nodal prices, with a maximum price difference
of 2.0 £/MWh, and consequently higher profits, since the power generation is
maintained basically at the same levels. The transformer tap-ratio control gives
enough incentives to the strategic firms to alter their bidding strategies in such a
way to interfere with the ISO decisions in order to cause transmission congestion
in the network, and consequently to force the nodal prices to increase. This
results in higher profits for the firms, but keeps the generation production at the
same levels as in the case in which the tap-ratio control is inactive. The social
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welfare in Case 18 is higher than in Case 17 (mainly due to the higher surplus for
the producers since the active load demand is maintained at the same level with a
minor decrement), but it is still lower than Case 12, which is comparable to Case
18 and there is no transmission congestion in the network.
4.8 Discussion on the impact of transformer tap-ratio control
in congested transmission networks based on the numerical
results of Cases 11 to 18
The results obtained from test Cases 11 to 16 have shown that the effect of the
tap-ratio control on the electricity market outcome becomes more perceptible as
the transmission congestion in the network is more intense. The operation of the
transformer tap-ratio control is found to be in favour of the social welfare in the
absence of congestion, while it has adverse effects when congestion is present.
As seen from the analysis of the results in Cases 17 and 18, the introduction of
transformer tap-ratio control in the modelling of the electricity market does not
only have a direct effect on the individual market parameters but also the
consequent alterations of the generating firms’ strategies force the ISO to
interfere with the electrical operation of the system. The equilibrium decisions of
the ISO on the tap-ratio settings might impose congestion in the network giving a
totally different market outcome. This leads to the need for reconsidering the
primal system design parameters. The impact of the strategic behaviour of the
market participants on the operation of the electricity network should be taken
into consideration in the network design process in order to avoid causing
operational problems such as transmission congestion, thus securing the smooth
operation of the electricity network. A sophisticated market equilibrium
simulation algorithm with AC network modelling, taking into account all
operational aspects including variable control methods, such transformer tap-
ratio control, is required for the efficient design of modern power systems. Such
considerations will help to avoid undesired incidents, such as the occurrence of
transmission congestion, and will allow the network control functions to fully
exploit the system abilities.
131
4.9 Conclusions for Chapter 4
In this chapter, the modelling of transformer tap-ratio control has been
successfully implemented in the primal-dual nonlinear interior point algorithm,
for the calculation of the SFE point in the electricity market. The algorithm has
been used to show the importance of considering the transformer tap-ratio
control in the electricity market equilibrium analysis. Preliminary numerical
results have indicated that the presence of transformer tap-ratio control gives
enough incentives to the strategic generating firms to exercise market power in a
different way than in the uncontrolled case. This action results in different
market outcome and different power distribution in the network. The regulation
provided by the tap-ratio control can significantly affect the outcome of the
equilibrium analysis with a direct impact on the nodal prices, firms’ profits and
social welfare. In the light of the above, it is concluded that the transformer tap-
ratio control has a significant impact on the electricity market outcome and
should not be neglected from the electricity market equilibrium models.
The numerical results performed in congested transmission networks have shown
that the effect of the transformer tap-ratio control on the market equilibrium is
more significant as the congestion in the transmission lines becomes more
intense. It was observed that the operation of the tap-ratio control results in
higher social welfare in the absence of transmission congestion, while it has
adverse effects when congestion exists in the system. The operation of the tap-
ratio control in conjunction with the presence of transmission line congestion in
the network encourages the generating firms to alter their strategic actions and
exercise market power in a different manner. Furthermore, in certain cases, the
optimisation of the tap-ratio gives the opportunity to the strategic firms to alter
their bidding strategies in order to interfere with the ISO decisions on the tap-
ratio control settings to favour their benefits, in such a way to impose
transmission network congestion in the system with the consequence of higher
nodal prices and withheld generation. Therefore, the resulting effects from the
market power exercised by the strategic firms must be taken into account during
the system design. This will prevent undesired operational problems such as the
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induction of congestion in the network and the performance of the system can be
enhanced with the aid of the available network control functions. The direct and
evident impact of the interrelation between the operation of transformer tap-ratio
control and transmission congestion on the prices, profits, social welfare and
power distribution in the network, shows the dependency of the market
equilibrium outcome on the modelling of the network constraints and controls.
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Chapter 5:
The impact of reactive power and voltage
control on the electricity market equilibrium
5.1 Introduction to the analysis of reactive power control in the
electricity market equilibrium model
As it has already been shown that the MVA transmission limits that depend on
the reactive power flows have a great effect on the equilibrium point [133,120],
the modelling of transmission capacity constraints using the AC network
representation in the market equilibrium algorithms should be regarded as a
necessity. The implementation of the AC network model in the proposed market
equilibrium algorithm in this Thesis provides the ability to investigate the effect
of reactive power, in terms of control functions, on the electricity market.
Following the discussions in Section 2.9 about the possible influence of reactive
power on the interactions between the strategic firms and the electricity market
outcome, the impact of reactive power control in power flow market analysis is
examined in this chapter.
The reactive power in an electrical power system is directly related to the
voltages across the network (e.g. see equations in Section 3.5.1), to the operation
of the generating units (in terms of reactive power generation and absorption),
and to the load power factor, which is directly dependent on the reactive load
demand. By considering these three factors, the impact of the following aspects
on the electricity market equilibrium, is examined:
- different voltage control modes for generator buses,
- variation of the reactive power generation and absorption limits of the
generating units in the system,
- load power factor adjustments.
For each of these three investigations, test cases are performed on a 3-bus system
to show the direct effects on small networks, and on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-
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bus systems to show the market behaviour on larger and more realistic networks.
The simulations are performed using the kF-parameterization SFE algorithm as
discussed in Chapter 3, with the limits of the bidding parameter kF set to 0min Fk
and 10max Fk . For the test systems with transformers in this study, the tap-ratio
control settings are optimised within a range of 0.9 to 1.1. The results for the
social welfare correspond to the true social welfare and all the power quantities
are calculated in p.u.
5.2 Investigation of the voltage control on generator buses
In order to examine the effects of the application of voltage control on the
generation buses on the market equilibrium outcome, two different voltage
regulation control modes are employed. Mode 1 corresponds to network
operation with the voltages of all the buses across the system to be optimised
within a range of ±5% or ±10% from the rated value of 1.0 p.u. Mode 2 applies
voltage control to the generation buses, for which the voltages are controlled and
held constant to the fixed value of 1 p.u.
5.2.1 Voltage control: 3-bus system results
The 3-bus test system used for this analysis consists of 3 buses connected to each
other by 3 transmission lines, as shown in Figure 11. Generation exists at buses 1
and 2 and load demand at buses 1 and 3. The marginal cost function of the
generating unit at bus 1, owned by firm F1, is 1008.0181 PgMCPg  £/MWh,
and that of the unit at bus 2, owned by firm F2, is 2010.0152 PgMCPg 
£/MWh. The linear inverse load demand functions for buses 1 and 3 are
108.0401 PdDPd  £/MWh and 306.0403 PdDPd  £/MWh respectively. The
load power factor was set to 0.7 at all buses to simulate conditions with high
reactive power demand. Four test cases are performed on this system. Cases 1
and 2 correspond to operation with no network congestion, while Cases 3 and 4
are performed by setting a tight transmission capacity limit on one of the
transmission line branches in the network. Cases 1 and 3 correspond to voltage
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regulation Mode 1 and are performed using voltage optimisation of ±5%, while
Cases 2 and 4 correspond to Mode 2 and voltage control is applied on the
generation buses. The numerical results for the nodal prices, firms’ profits,
bidding strategies, and social welfare are presented in Table 5.1, while The
power distribution in the network is presented in Table 5.2, where a minus sign
on the value of Qgi indicates reactive power absorption from the generating unit
at bus i.
Figure 11: The 3-bus test system.
TABLE 5.1
CASES 1 TO 4 FOR THE 3-BUS TEST SYSTEM:



















1 1 29.4 29.4 29.4 1.561 1.720 1117 2775 5539
2
None
2 33.1 33.1 33.1 1.772 2.070 1213 1702 3601
3 1 33.1 28.9 37.3 1.768 1.869 1316 605 2667
4
3.0max23 S p.u. 2 31.6 28.8 34.4 1.672 1.878 1439 460 2714
TABLE 5.2








Pg1 Pg2 Qg1 Qg2 Pd1 Pd3 Qd1 Qd3
1 1 1.02 2.08 2.45 1.16 1.33 1.77 1.36 1.81
2
None
2 0.82 0.97 1.40 0.54 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.94
3 1 0.89 0.44 1.91 -0.48 0.86 0.47 0.88 0.48
4
3.0max23 S p.u. 2 1.10 0.34 1.31 0.17 1.06 0.38 1.08 0.39
- Cases 1 and 2: No binding transmission limit:
Cases 1 and 2 are identical in terms of network parameters, with the only
difference being the applied voltage control mode. In Case 1 the voltages at the
generator buses are optimised within the limits of 0.95 and 1.05 p.u. (Mode 1),
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while in Case 2, they are fixed to 1 p.u. (Mode 2). The adjustment of the voltage
control mode has a significant effect on the equilibrium point, as shown in Tables
5.1 and 5.2. The results show that by controlling the generation voltages the
generating firms withhold their active generation by submitting higher bidding
parameters. This results in significantly larger nodal prices in Case 2 compared
with Case 1, and the reduced active generation has the consequence of much
lower active load demand. These effects cause the social welfare in Case 2 to be
reduced by 35% compared to Case 1. Even though the active generation of firm
F1 is decreased by 20%, it manages to raise its profit due to the high increase of
the nodal price at its bus. On the other hand, the increase in nodal prices in Case
2 was not adequate to cover the reduction in the production of firm F2, which
was decreased to less than half compared with Case 1, thus its profit is
significantly reduced.
- Cases 3 and 4: Binding transmission limit:
Cases 3 and 4 are performed by setting the transmission line capacity limit of
branch 2-3 to 3.0max23 S p.u. in order to impose transmission congestion in the
network and investigate the impact of voltage control on the market equilibrium
under stressed network conditions. With Case 1 being the benchmark, the
introduction of the binding transmission limit in Case 3 seriously affects the
production of firm F2, which does not have load demand on its bus, resulting in
an enormous decrease in its profit. By comparing Cases 3 and 4, it can be
observed that there is a reduction in the nodal prices and a small increase in
social welfare when controlling the generation voltages. This is in contrast with
the comparison of Cases 1 and 2, for which there is no transmission congestion
in the system and the introduction of regulation Mode 2 resulted in higher nodal
prices and lower social welfare. The impact on the profits of the generating firms
is similar as that between Cases 1 and 2, but the production of firm F1 is
increased and that of firm F2 is significantly decreased in Case 4 compared with
Case 3. The tests performed with the binding transmission limit have shown that
the effect of the voltage control on the electricity market equilibrium depends on
the network operating conditions.
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5.2.2 Voltage control: IEEE 14-bus system results
The IEEE 14-bus system [191] used for this analysis consists of 14 buses of
which 11 have load demand, 20 transmission lines and 5 generators owned by
strategic generating firms entitled F1 to F5 respectively. Case 5 is performed
using voltage optimisation of ±5% for Mode 1 and Case 6 using voltage control
as in Mode 2. The results for the firms’ profits, bidding strategies, power
distribution in the network and social welfare are presented in Table 5.3, while
the nodal prices are given in Table 5.4 allowing direct comparison for the two
cases. In Table 5.4, the generation buses are indicated by the firms’ title in the
parentheses next to the bus number in the first column.
TABLE 5.3
CASES 5 TO 6 FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM:
BIDDING PARAMETERS, FIRMS’ PROFITS, POWER DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Bidding Strategies Generating Firm’s Profit(£/hour)CaseNo.
Voltage
Regulation
Mode kF1 kF2 kF3 kF4 kF5 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5




5 1 1.738 2.262 1.850 1.748 1.785 3704 ~0 1730 4112 1907 6.83 0.14 6.63 4.48 14310
6 2 1.847 1.860 0.897 1.748 2.053 3613 467 1746 4212 1428 6.30 -0.11 6.13 2.37 13360
TABLE 5.4
CASES 5 TO 6 FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM: COMPARISON OF NODAL PRICES (£/MWHOUR)
Bus No.
(firm)
Case 5: Nodal Prices
for Voltage Mode 1
Case 6: Nodal Prices
for Voltage Mode 2
1 (F1) 30.6 31.9
2 (F2) 32.5 33.9
3 (F3) 32.8 33.0
4 33.5 34.6
5 33.3 34.4
6 (F4) 32.4 32.9
7 33.9 35.3








- Cases 5 and 6: Results for the IEEE 14-bus system:
When voltage control is applied for Case 6, the generating firms alter their
strategic offers as can be seen in Table 5.3. A significant variation is observed in
the bidding parameters of the firms, which are seriously affected at the
equilibrium point that corresponds to the application of voltage control, such as
for the unit at bus 3 for which the value of
3Fk is reduced from 1.850 to 0.897.
The change in strategies in Case 6 results in a small decrease in the level of
power production compared to Case 5. However, the nodal prices at all buses are
rising, up to increments of 4.2 £/MWh, and there is a significant variation in the
distribution of the profits among the generating firms. Firms F1 and F5, which
submitted higher bidding parameters in Case 6, face reductions in profit, while
the profit of the other three firms rises. For example, firm F2 receives a zero
profit in Case 5, while by reducing its bidding parameter by about 20% when
voltage control was introduced in Case 6, it receives a noticeable profit. The
small reduction in active production, and hence active load demand, between
Cases 5 and 6 resulted in a small reduction in the social welfare.
5.2.3 Voltage control: IEEE 118-bus system results
The IEEE 118-bus system [191] consists of 118 buses with load demand, 170
transmission lines, 9 on-load tap-changing transformers, and 54 generators
owned by individual strategic firms. Case 7 is performed using voltage
optimisation of ±10% for voltage Mode 1, i.e. in the domain of 0.9 to 1.1 p.u.,
and Case 8 corresponds to voltage control for Mode 2. Results summarising the
range of the nodal prices, firms’ profits and bidding strategies are provided in
Table 5.5, while the results for the power distribution in the network and social
welfare are shown in Table 5.6.
TABLE 5.5
CASES 7 TO 8 FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM: RESULTS FOR COMPARISON







(£/MWh) max min average max min average
7 1 32.76 14770 1037 3115 1.795 0.929 1.232
8 2 33.26 13750 ~0 2831 5.047 0.100 1.414
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TABLE 5.6















7 1 137.70 35.08 -1.35 135.62 37.18 226600
8 2 117.46 27.18 -2.73 115.97 28.91 222000
- Cases 7 and 8: Results for the IEEE 118-bus system:
The application of voltage control on the large IEEE 118-bus system has a
considerable effect on the electricity market equilibrium. The results show
significant differences on the average firms’ profits and bidding parameters
between Cases 7 and 8, indicating that the generating firms have incentives to
perceptibly alter their strategic actions depending on the applied voltage
regulation mode. The power distribution in the network exhibits large differences
between the two cases, as the introduction of Mode 2 results in reduced active
and reactive generation, and increased reactive power absorption, with the
consequence of higher average nodal price and lower social welfare. The
numerical results on this more realistic system have demonstrated the evident
impact of voltage control on the electricity market outcome.
5.2.4 Discussion on the impact of voltage control based on the numerical
results of Cases 1 to 8
The employment of different voltage regulation modes on the generation buses,
which is directly related to the reactive power generation and hence to the overall
power distribution in the network, has shown by examining a variety of test
systems that the voltage control greatly affects the market equilibrium point.
Depending on the allowable limits on the voltage at the generation buses, a
significant variation on the bidding parameters of the strategic offers has been
observed, showing that the generating firms alter their strategies in order to
favour their profit. Apart from the consequent redistribution of the profits among
the firms, these actions have an impact on the nodal prices, social welfare, and
power distribution in the network, resulting in a different market equilibrium for
both the small and the large systems tested. The voltage control of the generation
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buses results in higher nodal prices and lower social welfare under normal
operating conditions, while it reduces the high prices that exist in the presence of
transmission congestion being in favour of the social welfare.
This investigation has shown that the strategic firms have the ability to exploit
the network features, such as the voltages and reactive power in the system, in
order to exercise market power and increase their profits in the presence or
absence of network congestion. The impact of voltage control in the case where
transmission congestion exists in the network is different of that for normal
operating conditions. The incorporation of reactive power modelling and bus
voltage constraints in the electricity market equilibrium model has given the
opportunity to investigate the interactions between the strategic firms for
different voltage regulation modes and obtain a more realistic prediction for the
market outcome.
5.3 Investigation of the reactive power generation and
absorption limits
The modelling of the generating units in the electricity market algorithm that
takes place in Chapter 3 includes representation of the reactive power generation
and the reactive power absorption limits. The following analysis examines the
impact of limitations on the reactive power generation and absorption from the
generating units on the electricity market outcome. It should be recalled that the
market model considers that the reactive services from the generating units do
not account for any profit but it is mandatory for the generating firms to provide
the required reactive power generation or absorption as it is scheduled by the ISO
in the market clearing process. The reactive generation of each generating unit in
the mathematical formulation of the algorithm is taken as a positive quantity,
while reactive absorption is indicated by a negative sign. Similarly, the inductive
loads connected to the network, which absorb reactive power from the system,
correspond to positive reactive load demand, while the capacitive loads, which
generate reactive power, are represented by negative reactive load demand. In
order to counterbalance the loads’ effects, the generating units are required to
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generate reactive power in the presence of inductive loads or to absorb reactive
power in order to dispose the reactive power generated from capacitive loads.
5.3.1 Reactive power generation limits: 3-bus system results
The 3-bus system is of the same structure as in Figure 11, but load demand exists
at all buses. The marginal cost function of the generating unit at bus 1, owned by
firm F1, is 1009.0111 PgMCPg  £/MWh, and that of the unit at bus 2, owned
by firm F2, is 2010.08.102 PgMCPg  £/MWh. The linear inverse load demand
function is the same for all buses and is equal to iPd PdD i 06.040 £/MWh.
The voltages at the generation buses are controlled to 1 p.u. and the load power
factor is set to 0.9 at all buses to simulate normal operating conditions. Case 9 is
performed with no binding limits, while the reactive power generation limit of
the unit at bus 2 is set to 8.0max2 Qg p.u. for Case 10. The results are shown in
Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
TABLE 5.7
CASES 9 TO 10 FOR THE 3-BUS TEST SYSTEM:
















9 None 29.2 28.9 29.9 2.311 2.041 3201 5541 11667
10 8.0max1 Qg p.u. 32.3 31.7 32.6 2.708 2.397 2169 4771 8495
TABLE 5.8




Constraints Pg1 Pg2 Qg1 Qg2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd3 Qd1 Qd2 Qd3
9 None 1.84 3.37 1.40 1.32 1.79 1.85 1.55 0.87 0.89 0.75
10 8.0max1 Qg p.u. 1.04 2.42 0.80 0.97 1.00 1.38 1.07 0.48 0.67 0.52
- Cases 9 and 10: Results for the 3-bus system:
By observing the results of Cases 9 and 10, it can be seen that restricting the
reactive power generation has a perceptible impact on the market equilibrium
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outcome. The strategic firms in Case 10 increase their bidding parameters and
produce lower active power, resulting in higher nodal prices and reduced social
welfare compared to Case 9. This comparison resembles that between Cases 1
and 2 for the introduction of voltage control, since for both situations the
generating units are not allowed to fully utilise their reactive capabilities.
However, in Cases 9 and 10 the increase in nodal prices was not enough to
sustain the profits of the generating firms, which undergo high reductions due to
the lower active production.
5.3.2 Reactive power generation and absorption limits: IEEE 14-bus
system results
The IEEE 14-bus system [191] used in this section consists of 14 buses with load
demand, 17 transmission lines, 3 on-load tap-changing transformers and 5
generators located at buses 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8, owned by strategic generating firms
entitled F1 to F5 respectively. The voltages at all buses can be optimised by the
ISO within the range of 0.9 to 1.1 p.u. Cases 11 to 13 examine the impact of
reactive power generation and Cases 14 to 15 the impact of reactive power
absorption. The numerical results for the generating firms and social welfare are
presented in Table 5.9 and the power distribution in the network is shown in
Table 5.10. The nodal prices are given in Table 5.11, where the location of each
generating firm is indicated, to allow direct comparison between the cases.
- Cases 11 to 13: Reactive power generation limits:
The reactive load demand in Cases 11 to 13 is of inductive nature at all buses and
therefore all the generating units generate reactive power. The reactive
capabilities of the generating units in Case 11 are sufficient to satisfy the reactive
load demand in the system without reaching the maximum operating limits for
the reactive power generation. For Case 12, the maximum reactive power limit of
the generating unit at bus 6 was reduced to 25.0max6 Qg p.u. confining its
reactive power generation at that value. It can be observed from Table 5.11 that
all the nodal prices have been increased compared with Case 11. The highest
increment is 0.9£/MWh observed at buses 2 and 6, for which the generating units
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TABLE 5.9
CASES 11 TO 15 FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM:
FIRMS’ PROFITS, BIDDING PARAMETERS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Generating Firms’ Profit (£/hour) Bidding StrategiesCase




11 None(Inductive Pd only) 1329 3651 2968 2215 1755 1.626 1.481 1.508 1.297 1.244 17030




1750 1447 2431 1206 563 1.819 1.883 1.801 1.528 1.446 8958
14 None(Inductive and Capacitive Pd) 1335 3727 2971 2203 1669 1.623 1.475 1.507 1.299 1.249 17010
15 10.0min2 Qg p.u. 1355 3392 3197 1953 1549 1.655 1.519 1.502 1.338 1.284 15980
TABLE 5.10









11 None(Inductive Pd only) 1.10 3.24 2.63 2.54 2.25 0.08 1.43 0.52 2.38 1.21 11.47 4.30 0




1.12 0.88 1.54 0.94 0.49 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 4.88 1.62 0
14 None(Inductive and Capacitive Pd) 1.11 3.32 2.64 2.52 2.13 ~0 -1.64 0.04 2.45 1.33 11.42 3.38 -2.55
15 10.0min2 Qg p.u. 1.08 2.89 2.82 2.09 1.82 ~0 -0.10 ~0 1.31 1.44 10.36 3.18 -1.98
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TABLE 5.11
CASES 11 TO 15 FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM: COMPARISON OF NODAL PRICES (£/MWHOUR)
Nodal Prices λpiBus No.
(firm) Case 11 Case 12 Case 13 Case 14 Case 15
1 (F1) 30.1 30.8 33.7 30.0 30.6
2 (F2) 30.2 31.1 34.4 30.2 30.5
3 (F3) 30.0 30.7 34.0 29.9 30.1
4 33.5 34.1 36.4 33.5 34.0
5 33.2 33.8 36.1 33.2 33.7
6 (F4) 32.5 33.4 35.8 32.5 32.9
7 34.1 34.8 37.0 34.1 34.5
8 (F5) 33.9 34.5 36.9 33.9 34.4
9 34.6 35.3 37.2 34.6 34.9
10 35.6 36.0 37.4 35.6 36.0
11 35.5 36.0 37.2 35.5 35.9
12 36.0 36.6 37.6 36.0 36.5
13 35.3 35.9 37.2 35.3 35.8
14 36.8 37.2 37.9 36.8 37.2
suffer higher active power reductions than the other units. The active production
of the unit with the limited reactive generation at bus 6 is reduced by more than
40%. The other generating units in Case 12 have increased their reactive
generation so that the system is compensated for the reactive limitations of the
generator at bus 6, but the total reactive generation and demand are reduced by
more than 20% compared with those of Case 11.
In Case 12 all units have submitted higher bidding parameters than those in Case
11, as an attempt to maintain their profits. None of the firms, except firm F1, can
achieve this due to the noticeable reduction in their active production. The profit
of firm F4 in Case 12 is reduced by more than 30% compared with Case 11. Firm
F1, which maintains a similar active production as that of Case 11, is favoured by
the increase in nodal prices and gains a slightly higher profit. The social welfare
has been decreased by about 14%, due to the lower active load demand.
In Case 13, strict reactive power generation limits have been imposed at all
generators in the system, resulting in a limitation of the total reactive power
generation. The limits for buses 1 and 8 were set to 50.0max8,1 Qg p.u. and for
buses 2, 3 and 6 to 25.0max6,3,2 Qg p.u. and they are all binding. The observations
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on the changes of the results for the market outcome and power distribution are
similar to those of the comparison between Cases 11 and 12, but much more
intense, with the exception that the active power generation at bus 1 is slightly
increased. The nodal prices have been further increased, with incremental
deviations between Cases 12 and 13 up to a range of 3.3£/MWh, and all the firms
have submitted higher bidding parameters. In Case 13, all the firms, except firm
F1, receive much lower profits due to the high reductions in their active power
generation. Firm F1, which has increased its active production, is favoured by the
higher nodal prices, and in conjunction with its higher submitted bid, it receives a
much higher profit compared with Cases 11 and 12. Nevertheless, the total active
and reactive generation and load demand in the system have been decreased by
half compared with Case 12, resulting in a significant reduction in the social
welfare (by about 40%).
- Cases 14 to 15: Reactive power absorption limits:
For the test Cases 14 and 15, capacitive reactive load demand has been assigned
at buses 2 to 5. The results for Case 14 are similar to those of Case 11, with the
exception that the generator at bus 2 is absorbing reactive power from the
network and the consequent redistribution of reactive generation among the other
units. The same unit is producing the highest active power generation, thus firm
F2 gains the highest profit as in Case 11. In Case 15, the generator at bus 2 is
confined to operate with a limit on its reactive absorption capabilities, such that
10.0min2 Qg p.u. This has a consequence on the reactive load demand, on both
the inductive and capacitive components, which are decreased compared with
Case 14. The capacitive reactive demand is satisfied mainly by reactive power
absorption from the inductive loads in the network since the generator at bus 2
can cover only 5% of it.
The nodal prices in Case 15 have shown a small increase compared with those of
Case 14. The generating units that submitted higher bidding parameters than
those of Case 14 produce lower active power, while the unit at bus 3 that
submitted a slightly lower bidding parameter has achieved a higher active
generation. The profit of firm F1 was slightly increased due to the increased
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bidding parameter in conjunction with the higher nodal price at bus 1, while the
profits of firms F2, F4 and F5 show a decrease of 7% to 11% as a consequence of
the perceptible lower active productions. Firm F3 receives a higher profit than
that in Case 14 since its active production is increased, benefited by the reduction
in the active power of the rival generating units. The active load demand in Case
15 has been decreased by about 9% compared with Case 14, resulting in a
reduction of 6% in the social welfare.
5.3.3 Reactive power generation limits: IEEE 118-bus system results
The description of the IEEE 118-bus system [191] is similar to that in Section
5.2.3, with the bus voltages optimised within the range of ±10% from the value
of 1 p.u. Case 16 is performed with no binding limits on the reactive power
generation, while strict reactive power generation limits in the range of 0.05 to
2.0 p.u. are imposed on 26 out of the 54 generating units of the system, such that
the availability of the system’s reactive generation capacity is reduced by 38.6%,
in Case 17. The availability for the reactive absorption capacity in the system is
the same for both cases and the reactive load demand is of inductive nature at all
buses. Results for the nodal prices, firms’ profits and bidding strategies are
provided in Table 5.12, while the results for the power distribution in the
network and social welfare are given in Table 5.13.
TABLE 5.12
CASES 16 TO 17 FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM: RESULTS FOR COMPARISON






(£/MWh) max min average max min average
16 No 32.78 14700 1309 3193 1.764 0.824 1.148
17 Yes 32.84 14420 893 3072 1.824 0.015 1.229
TABLE 5.13









 iPd  iQd
Social Welfare
(£/hour)
16 No 141.76 40.16 -4.68 139.67 39.30 231300
17 Yes 133.95 32.99 -1.07 131.92 35.69 222200
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- Cases 16 and 17: Results for the IEEE 118-bus system:
From Table 5.13 it can be seen that when limitations on the reactive power
generation are imposed on the generating units for Case 17, all the overall power
quantities in the system are decreased compared to Case 16. Therefore, the
average profit for the generating firms has been decreased, as a consequence of
the reduced active production. The reactive power generation, which is the
variable that has been deliberately confined, is reduced by 18%, while the
reactive power absorption has been reduced by almost 80%.
The maximum profit for both cases corresponds to the same generating unit and
is slightly decreased (by only 2%), supported by the nodal price increment at that
bus, which partially counterbalances the reduction in its active power generation.
The minimum profit has been reduced considerably (by 32%). The maximum
and average values for the bidding parameters are higher in Case 17, as the
generating firms attempt to compensate for their loss in profit due to the reduced
active power generation. The average nodal price is higher in Case 17 than in
Case 16, being in agreement with the observations in the smaller systems.
5.3.4 Discussion on the impact of limitations on the reactive power
generation and absorption based on the numerical results of Cases 9 to 17
The numerical results in test Cases 9 to 17 have shown that the variation of the
limits of the generating units’ reactive capabilities have a significant impact on
the electricity market outcome. The simulations on the 3-bus and the IEEE 14-
bus systems have shown that when a limitation is imposed on either the reactive
generation or absorption of the generating units, the active and reactive power
generations and load demands are reduced, resulting in increased nodal prices
across the system and lower social welfare, depending on the level of
confinement of the reactive power limits. As anticipated, the generating firms
alter their bidding strategies in order to favour their profits, which are in general
reduced due to the reductions in active power generation. It has also been shown
that the impact of limiting the reactive power generation is more intense than that
of confining the reactive power absorption. The observations for the test cases
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performed on the IEEE 118-bus system are in good agreement with those on the
smaller systems.
5.4 Investigation of the load power factor adjustments
Variations of the load power factor, which is defined as
)]/(cos[tancosp.f. 1 PdQd  , are expected to affect the market outcome,
since they will result in different values for the equilibrium price-responsive
active and reactive load demand. Test cases have been performed for a range of
lagging load power factors, i.e. all loads are of inductive nature, with the
benchmark corresponding to zero reactive load demand, i.e. to unity load power
factor. The load power factor for the 3-bus and IEEE 14-bus systems is equal at
all buses, for each case.
5.4.1 Load power factor adjustments: 3-bus system results
The 3-bus system used for Cases 18 to 21 is identical to that in Section 5.2.1.
Case 18 corresponds to unity load power factor and Cases 19 to 21 are performed
by successively reducing the power factor by steps of 0.1. The numerical results
for the market outcome are provided in Table 5.14. Note that Case 21 with power
factor of 0.7 is the same as Case 2.
TABLE 5.14













λp1 λp2 λp3 kF1 kF2 F1 F2




18 1.0 28.9 28.9 28.9 1.513 1.715 1430 2407 3.24 0.23 3.24 0 5634
19 0.9 29.2 29.2 29.2 1.545 1.718 1221 2656 3.14 1.83 3.14 1.52 5573
20 0.8 32.6 32.6 32.6 1.746 2.000 1209 2216 2.15 1.78 2.15 1.62 4222
21 0.7 33.1 33.1 33.1 1.772 2.070 1213 1702 1.79 1.94 1.79 1.83 3601
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- Cases 18 and 21: Results for the 3-bus system:
By comparing the four test cases on the 3-bus system, it can be seen that as the
value of power factor decreases the nodal prices increase and the social welfare
decreases, as a consequence of the higher bidding parameters submitted by the
strategic firms. Lower load power factors entail higher reactive and lower active
load demand, hence the reactive generation is increasing towards lower values of
the power factor, but the active generation is decreasing. Thus, despite the higher
nodal prices in Cases 20 and 21, the generating firms receive less profit than in
Cases 18 and 19 due to the much lower active production.
5.4.2 Load power factor adjustments: IEEE 14-bus system results
The description of the IEEE 14-bus system is the same as in Section 5.3.2. The
linear inverse load demand functions at the system buses were set to
iPd PdD i 060.040  £/MWh for 5to1i , iPd PdD i 065.040  £/MWh for
9to6i , and iPd PdD i 080.040  £/MWh for 14to10i . Cases 22 to 24
correspond to load power factors of 1.0, 0.9 and 0.8 respectively. The results for
the generating firms and the social welfare are provided in Table 5.15 and the
power distribution is shown in Table 5.16. The nodal prices are graphically
presented in Figure 12, allowing direct comparison between the test cases.
TABLE 5.15
CASES 22 TO 24 FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM:
FIRMS’ PROFITS, BIDDING PARAMETERS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Generating Firms’ Profit (£/hour) Bidding StrategiesCase
No.
Load
Power Factor F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 kF1 kF2 kF3 kF4 kF5
Social Welfare
(£/hour)
22 1.0 3187 3750 3026 2197 1920 1.496 1.470 1.497 1.292 1.164 20210
23 0.9 3159 3401 2894 1786 1329 1.557 1.559 1.576 1.369 1.311 17210
24 0.8 3231 2713 2767 1575 915 1.611 1.673 1.651 1.409 1.361 14710
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TABLE 5.16









22 1.0 2.84 3.36 2.72 2.56 2.50 -0.03 0.23 0.06 0.82 0.43 13.66 0 0
23 0.9 2.59 2.74 2.35 1.81 1.48 0.88 1.49 1.07 1.50 1.15 10.75 5.21 0
24 0.8 2.46 1.96 2.05 1.49 0.93 1.44 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.15 8.73 6.55 0
Figure 12: Nodal prices for Cases 22 to 24.
- Cases 22 and 24: Results for the IEEE 14-bus system:
As the power factor moves away from the value of 1.0 in Cases 22 to 24, the
generators in the system are required to produce more reactive power to cover
the increasing reactive load demand, and as a consequence the active production
and total active load demand decrease. The nodal prices in the part of the system
where the generators are situated (buses 1 to 9) show considerable increments as
the active generation is reduced, as can be seen in Figure 12. On the contrary, the
prices at buses 10 to 14, which are remote from the generating units, increase for
the first step-down of the power factor, while they show a small decrease for the
second step-down, despite the fact that these buses have higher demand functions
than buses 1 to 9. The social welfare is successively reduced by equal shares of
15% as the power factor decreases by steps of 0.1, since the active load demand
decreases accordingly to the power factor as the reactive demand is increasing.
For each subsequent decrement of the power factor all the generating firms are
increasing their bidding parameters in order to maintain their profits, as a
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reaction to the reduction in the active production requirements. None of the
firms, except firm F1, succeeds in this, since the higher bidding parameters and
the increased nodal prices were not sufficient to compensate for the loss in profit
due to the reduction in active power. Indeed, firm F5, which suffers the largest
active generation reduction (63%) between Cases 22 and 24, receives a profit
reduced by 52%. Firm F1 that suffers the lowest reduction in active production
has only a small reduction in profit for the first step-down of the power factor,
while for the second one it receives higher profit even compared with the unity
power factor case. The low reduction in its active power production stems from
the fact that, in Case 22, unlike the other units that were producing noticeable
amounts of reactive power, the unit of firm F1 was absorbing only a very small
amount of reactive power from the network. Therefore, the increased reactive
generation of that unit had only a small impact on the active production, and
when it submitted a higher bidding parameter in Case 24, in conjunction with the
higher nodal price at bus 1, it received a higher profit than in Cases 22 and 23.
5.4.3 Load power factor adjustments: IEEE 118-bus system results
The IEEE 118-bus system is investigated to show the impact of adjusting the
load power factor at all the buses of a large system to the value of 1.0, when
previously it was operated with different power factors at each bus. The system
description is the same as in Section 5.3.3. In Case 25, the system buses have
different values of lagging load power factors, ranging from 0.766 to 0.986, and
four buses have unity power factors. The average load power factor for the
system, calculated by considering the values of the individual power factors at
each bus separately, is 0.906. In Case 26 the reactive load demand in the system
is set to zero, for unity load power factor. The results for maximum, minimum
and average values for nodal prices, firms’ profits and bidding parameters are
presented in Table 5.17, while the power distribution in the network and social
welfare are shown in Table 5.18.
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TABLE 5.17
CASES 25 TO 26 FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM: RESULTS FOR COMPARISON






(£/MWh) max min average max min average
25 No 33.45 9441 495 2886 2.405 0.731 1.348
26 Yes 33.53 9758 1299 3024 2.411 0.084 1.127
TABLE 5.18









 iPd  iQd
Social Welfare
(£/hour)
25 No 121.44 43.62 -0.22 120.19 53.00 202400
26 Yes 128.15 0.64 -11.38 127.01 0 210900
- Cases 25 and 26: Results for the IEEE 118-bus system:
In Case 25 where the system load power factor is lagging, being less than 1.0, the
reactive power absorption by the generating units is almost negligible compared
with the reactive power generation, as shown in Table 5.18. In Case 26, where
the reactive load demand is removed from all buses in the system, the reactive
power generation has been reduced substantially (by 98.5%), since there is no
reactive load demand to be satisfied. On the other hand, the reactive power
absorption has been greatly increased. The overall active power generation has
been increased by about 6% in the unity power factor case, since the active load
demand has been increased as the reactive load demand was set to zero.
Therefore, the social welfare is larger for the unity power factor case, being in
agreement with the observations in the tests on the smaller systems.
The average bidding parameter submitted by the firms has been decreased by
about 16% in Case 26, since the overall active power generation is increased. In
addition, the shares of the active power and of the level of bidding parameters on
the firms’ profits were readjusted. Note that, in Case 26, the minimum bidding
parameter appears to be about 10 times smaller than that of Case 25. The average
profit in Case 26 has been increased by about 5% compared to Case 25, as the
generating firms were benefited by the increased active production and the
higher nodal prices. The maximum profit, which corresponds to the same
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generating unit for both cases, has been slightly increased (by 3%), while the
minimum profit has been substantially increased by 160%.
5.4.4 Discussion on the impact of load power factor adjustments based on
the numerical results of Cases 18 to 26
The results obtained by performing load power factor adjustments show that as
the power factor is decreasing, thus the reactive load demand is increasing, the
active power generation and load demand in the system are considerably
reduced, resulting in higher nodal prices and lower social welfare. As a reaction
to the reduced active production requirements, the firms alter their strategies in
order to maintain their profits. This cannot always be the case, due to the high
reductions in active power that result in much lower profits for most firms.
The large changes observed on the minimum values of the profits and bidding
parameters in the IEEE 118-bus system test cases, resulting from the power
factor variations, show that vast alterations can occur at particular buses or areas
in the system, which will result in an evident effect on certain firms’ profits. The
nodal prices have been found to be increased or decreased as the system load
power factor varies, depending on the position of each bus and the reduction in
active power generation in the surrounding area.
Comparing the cases for the examined systems, it can be observed that a larger
system requires much more reactive power absorption by the generating units for
unity power factor operation, than that required by smaller systems (absorption
normalised to the corresponding active power generation). If strict reactive
power absorption limits were required to be imposed on the generating units of a
large system, as performed in Case 15 in Section 5.3.2, during the unity power
factor operation, a definite effect is expected on the overall market outcome.
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5.5 Conclusions for Chapter 5
Three different control methods related to the reactive power in the system have
been examined in order to determine their impact on the strategic behaviour of
the generating firms and the resulting effects on the electricity market
equilibrium. Each of the investigations has provided evidence that the presence
of reactive power in the network has a significant impact on the interactions
between the strategic firms and on the electricity market outcome. The strategies
of the firms are dependent on the variation of the system’s reactive power and on
the relative location of the individual generating units. The alterations in the
strategic offers result in different nodal prices and therefore in different social
welfare and redistribution of the profits among the generating firms.
Depending on the employed voltage regulation mode on the generation buses of
the system, the firms change their strategies since the required generation levels,
and hence the load demand, are directly affected. The application of voltage
control on the generation buses results in higher nodal prices and lower social
welfare under normal operating conditions compared to the uncontrolled case.
On the contrary, in the presence of transmission congestion, the voltage control
may reduce the high nodal prices caused by the congestion in the network being
in favour of the social welfare.
The variations on the reactive power generation and absorption limits have a
major impact on the power distribution in the network as a result of the reduced
reactive capabilities of the generating units. Such limitations have the effect of
considerable reductions in active and reactive generation, with the consequence
of lower active and reactive load demand due to their price responsiveness, and
the strategic firms anticipate this by submitting higher bids as an attempt to
increase or maintain their profits. The impact on the market outcome in such
circumstances is higher nodal prices and lower social welfare due to the
considerable reductions in active production and load demand. These effects
become greater as the limits grow tighter, with the impact of confining reactive
generation being more severe than that of reactive absorption. In addition, it has
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been shown that the change in the firms’ profits is also dependable on the
proximity of the generating units to the limited reactive capabilities areas.
As the load power factor is decreasing from the value of 1.0, the reactive load
demand increases and the active load demand is expected to be reduced.
Therefore, this has a direct impact on the active and reactive power generation,
resulting in lower active production requirements for all the generating firms.
The firms will then change their strategies in order to favour their profits by
increasing their bids. The higher bidding parameters in conjunction with the
lower active generation and load demand result in higher nodal prices and hence
lower social welfare. However, the numerical results performed with load power
factor step reductions of 0.1 and on the large system have shown that the increase
in the market price is not sufficient to cover the loss due to the high reductions in
active production, resulting in lower producers’ surplus.
The aforementioned observations on the variation of the market outcome due to
the reactive power control methods have proven the importance of representing
the reactive power and voltage constraints in the electricity market equilibrium
models. The reactive power modelling, in terms of power flows, generation and
load demand, reveals the diverse manner in which the strategic firms exercise
market power by exploiting the AC nonlinearities in realistic systems, which
cannot be disclosed by examining models with DC linearized systems. The
strategic behaviour of the generating firms is found to be dependent on the
voltage regulation employed on the generation buses, the limitations on the
reactive capabilities of the generating units and the allocated load power factors
across the network. Hence, by considering these factors in the electricity market
equilibrium model, a more realistic prediction for the electricity market outcome
and a better interpretation of the interactions between the strategic firms can be
obtained. The observations for the impact of the three different reactive power
control methods on the electricity market are found to have several similarities,
but the conclusions drawn are subject to the topology of the network, since
reactive power is of zonal nature.
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Chapter 6:
Choosing the location for the generating unit
of a new entry in the electricity market
6.1 Introduction to the investigation of the locations of new
entries in the electricity market
The liberalisation of the electricity sector has introduced competition at the
generation level in order to give incentives to new generating firms to attempt to
enter the electricity market. However, only a small number of independent
generating firms have endeavoured to compete with the well-established state
owned utility companies. This is the result of the distinctive characteristics and
operational complexities of generating, transmitting and distributing the
electrical power, which lead to economic implications that act as an entry barrier
in the market for potential players, as already discussed in Chapter 1. The unique
nature of the electricity market compels any potential generating firms to
investigate several issues before attempting to enter the game. Most of these
issues do not usually apply to markets of other commodities, but their
consideration in the case of the electrical power pool trade will help the new
generating firms to plan an efficient future strategy. Some features that the new
firms may find essential to consider primarily are the ability of the existing firms
to exercise market power for profit-maximisation, the available transmission
capacities, the expected congestion conditions in the network, and the presence
and levels of reactive power in the system. Furthermore, it may be important to
obtain predictions for the capabilities and marginal costs of the generating units
of the rival firms, and for the ISO obligations on maximising the social welfare,
while an investigation on all the possible locations for situating their new
generating units should be conducted.
The existing literature on the investigation of the new entries in the electricity
market is mainly concerned with the entry barriers that exist due to the high
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investment costs and predatory pricing, the facilitation of ease of entry, and the
increase in capacity availability due to the additional generation investment after
a new firm successfully enters the market. Such analyses and discussions can be
found in [33,35,7,8,81,100,17,192]. However, to the best of my knowledge the
choice of the best location for installing a new generating unit in the system,
based on meshed AC network modelling, has not been examined in the existing
literature. The following study raises the suspicion that by performing an
investigation to obtain the optimum location for a new generating unit based on
profit-maximising or other relevant criteria, the choice of the location may
prevail over the existing entry barriers and a potential firm may overcome the
hesitation of entering the market, motivated by the level of the expected future
profits.
The research presented in this chapter shows that the choice of the location for a
new firm to install new generating units is a crucial consideration. The
investigation is concerned with how a potential generating firm can choose the
best location to situate a new generating unit in order to achieve the highest profit
possible. The analysis focuses on the effect of the location of the new unit on the
profits of both the new firm and the existing companies, while the impact on the
social welfare, nodal prices and bidding strategies is also discussed. Such
analysis is made possible by the implementation of AC-network constrained
market models, such as the one presented in this Thesis, which is able to handle
large nonlinear systems with asymmetric firms and considers the operational
aspects of the system.
6.2 Numerical results: the choice for the best location of a new
entry’s generating unit
The investigation for the choice of a new entry’s location for new generating
units takes place on the IEEE 14-bus system using the kF-parameterization
algorithm. The system structure is similar as in Section 5.3.2, but the version of
the system used is presented in Figure 13 [191] for a more comprehensive
interpretation of the numerical results. Each of the 5 generating units corresponds
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to an existing firm, with a subscript corresponding to its bus number, e.g. F8 for
the firm that owns the unit at bus 8, for the ease of the market outcome
comparison. The new entry will be represented by adding another generating unit
in the system.
Figure 13: The modified IEEE 14-bus system.
The marginal cost functions of the generating units are:
iPg PgMC i 009.05.17  £/MWh for 3,2,1i (6.1)
6010.05.226 PgMCPg  £/MWh (6.2)
8010.00.258 PgMCPg  £/MWh (6.3)
newPg PgMC new 010.00.17  £/MWh (6.4).
The maximum active power generation capacities for the units in the system are
set to:
0.4maxmax3,2,1  newPgPg p.u. (6.5)
5.3max6 Pg p.u. (6.6)
5.2max8 Pg p.u. (6.7).
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The system is separated into two load demand zones. Zone 1 that includes buses
1 to 9 corresponds to lower quadratic load demand coefficient compared to Zone
2, which consists of buses 10 to 14. Hence, the load demand in Zone 1 has higher
price responsiveness than Zone 2. Their linear inverse load demand functions are
given by iPd PdD Zone 06.0401  £/MWh for 9to1i (Zone 1), and
jPd PdD Zone 08.0402  £/MWh for 14to10j (Zone 2).
The test case performed for the initial electricity market structure before any
potential player enters the game, where only the original five generators are
connected on the system, is termed as the Base Case. Further tests, Cases 1 to 8,
were performed by adding a new generator at different buses of the system
successively, to simulate the effects of the new entry on the market. All the
possible locations were examined but since, for some buses, the conclusions
drawn were similar as those for adjacent buses, some cases have been omitted to
avoid repeated discussions. The power distribution in the network is given in
Table 6.1, where the results for the reactive power are also shown to emphasise
the employment of the AC power network representation. The results for the
firms’ profits, bidding parameters and social welfare are presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.3 provides information about the nodal prices on selected buses (see
Section 6.2.3). All the power terms are calculated in p.u.
TABLE 6.1
NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE POWER DISTRIBUTION IN THE NETWORK
Case Location ofnew entry 1
Pg 2Pg 3Pg 6Pg 8Pg newPg 1Qg 2Qg 3Qg 6Qg 8Qg newQg  iPd  iQd
Base -- 2.76 3.22 2.63 2.55 2.26 -- 1.09 1.43 0.52 2.38 1.21 -- 13.13 5.31
1 Bus 1 1.20 3.30 2.64 2.55 2.26 1.58 0.24 1.45 0.53 2.40 1.22 0.86 13.24 5.35
2 Bus 2 2.88 1.75 2.39 2.44 2.15 2.07 1.17 0.63 0.61 2.44 1.21 0.82 13.36 5.42
3 Bus 3 2.77 3.03 1.35 2.52 2.21 1.72 1.10 1.52 0.26 2.41 1.21 0.21 13.28 5.34
4 Bus 5 2.71 2.31 2.44 1.08 1.79 3.99 0.77 1.15 0.43 1.98 1.22 2.24 14.06 5.66
5 Bus 6 2.76 2.88 2.52 0.01 2.19 4.00 1.07 1.45 0.52 1.67 1.22 0.97 14.03 5.67
6 Bus 9 2.76 3.18 2.62 2.67 ~0 4.00 0.95 0.94 0.21 2.01 1.06 2.24 14.97 6.11
7 Bus 10 2.81 3.07 2.58 2.43 1.35 3.48 1.01 1.22 0.38 2.22 1.15 1.45 15.38 6.45
8 Bus 12 2.85 3.11 2.61 1.81 2.25 1.97 1.07 1.44 0.50 2.21 1.33 0.36 14.30 5.66
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TABLE 6.2
NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE FIRMS’ PROFITS, BIDDING STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Generating Firms’ Profit (£/hour) Bidding Strategies




Base -- 3125 3640 2968 2220 1758 -- 1.505 1.482 1.508 1.297 1.244 -- 19640
1 Bus 1 1431 3678 2956 2210 1750 1924 1.613 1.472 1.503 1.295 1.242 1.613 19980
2 Bus 2 3111 1996 2731 2130 1677 2419 1.474 1.558 1.526 1.301 1.247 1.558 20320
3 Bus 3 3123 3430 1520 2194 1718 1973 1.502 1.493 1.569 1.298 1.245 1.569 20100
4 Bus 5 3036 2738 2810 982 1323 5085 1.500 1.551 1.530 1.361 1.243 1.512 22370
5 Bus 6 3062 3266 2842 6 1701 4652 1.494 1.499 1.514 1.361 1.245 1.315 22180
6 Bus 9 3051 3504 2890 2336 ~0 5500 1.491 1.472 1.495 1.294 3.350 1.102 24010
7 Bus 10 3106 3428 2870 2121 1009 3961 1.489 1.483 1.503 1.302 1.257 1.471 23810
8 Bus 12 3182 3516 2939 1573 1748 2255 1.493 1.488 1.509 1.320 1.244 1.551 21930
TABLE 6.3
SELECTED NODAL PRICES (£/MWHOUR)







5 Bus 6 Bus 6 32.5 30.6 1.9
6 Bus 9 Bus 9 34.6 32.7 1.9
7 Bus 10 Bus 10 35.6 30.1 5.5
7 Bus 10 Bus 11 35.5 33.3 2.2
8 Bus 12 Bus 12 36.0 29.4 6.6
6.2.1 The interactions between the new firm and the existing firms
The entrance of the new firm in the market by installing a new generating unit on
the network results in a significant change on the profits of the existing firms,
while they alter their bidding strategies as an attempt to favour their benefits. By
observing test Cases 1 to 8 in Table 6.2, it can be seen that, for all cases, the
existing generator located at the bus where the new generating unit is connected
submits higher bidding factor and generates lower active power than those of the
other cases, and receives its lowest profit among all the test cases.
Firms F6 in Case 5 and F8 in Case 6 produce negligible amounts of active power
and consequently receive almost zero profits. For both cases, the ISO has chosen
to assign almost the entire active production needed to satisfy the active load
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demand for the particular areas to the new firm’s generating unit, which is
reaching its maximum active generation limit. This decision of the ISO is based
on the fact that the new generator’s marginal cost is lower than those of the
existing units at buses 6 and 8, as can be seen in (6.2)-(6.4), which are reflected
on the submitted bids. Therefore, by preferring the new generator, the pool can
assure the required active power and favour the social welfare at the same time,
according to (3.54). Since the rival firms, F6 in Case 5 and F8 in Case 6, produce
an approximately zero active production, their profits are not satisfactory, leading
to economic failure. Compared with the Base Case, these firms have both
increased their bidding parameter as an effort to raise the market clearing price
and achieve acceptable profits, but this strategic action was not sufficient to
confront the economic threat introduced by the generator of the new entrant with
the lower marginal cost.
Comparing the marginal costs of the existing generating units at buses 1, 2 and 3
with that of the new generator, given in (6.1) and (6.4) respectively, it can be
seen that one of the cost coefficients is slightly larger and the other is slightly
lower. Therefore, in Cases 1, 2 and 3, the new unit does not supplant the existing
unit situated at the same bus but the active production assigned to each generator
is determined from the market equilibrium, in order to satisfy the optimisation
conditions.
6.2.2 The choice for the best location for the new generating unit
By considering the above observations regarding the effects on the profits of the
generating firms when the location of the new entry’s generating unit is varied,
the location that is the most beneficial for the new firm can be determined. If the
only criterion considered is the maximisation of the new entrant’s profit, then the
best location is at bus 9, as in Case 6. If the fact that the presence of the new firm
forces an existing company to economic failure raises political issues and the
new entrant is concerned that it may be difficult to obtain a permit for building a
power plant, Cases 5 and 6 should be rejected. Therefore, considering the
existing results, the new company should choose to install the new generating
unit at bus 5, as in Case 4, for facilitating a more convenient entry process.
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The choice for the location of the new entry may also be affected by other
factors, for instance, the price responsiveness of the load demand at particular
areas of the system. If the new firm decides to install its generator in Zone 2, for
which the load demand has lower price responsiveness, the choice for the best
location will be at bus 10. This will result in the highest profit in Zone 2
compared with the other four locations and the new firm will not monopolise in
the surrounding area. If the options are confined within Zone 1, then the selection
for the location of the new unit should be either at bus 9, or bus 5 to avoid
possible complications from political issues, as discussed above.
6.2.3 The effects of the new entry on the nodal prices and the social welfare
After the new entry connects its generating unit on the system, the market
clearing price is changing compared with that of the Base Case and the nodal
prices at several buses show substantial reductions. The largest reductions always
occur at the vicinity of the new generator as expected. The nodal prices results
for these cases are shown in Table 6.3, where the examined bus and the number
of the case that is compared with that of the Base Case are indicated. For Cases 5
and 6 the nodal price reduction is 1.9 £/MWh, while for Cases 7 and 8 the
reductions are 5.5 and 6.6 £/MWh respectively, at the buses where the new
generator is located. Also in Case 7, the nodal price reduction of the bus adjacent
to the new generator’s bus is also high, being 2.2 £/MWh. In view of the above,
it can be observed that the nodal price reductions in the adjacent area of the bus
where the new generator is situated are more intense if the new entry is located at
the buses with the lower price responsiveness load demand (Zone 2) rather than
in Zone 1.
From the results for the social welfare in Table 6.2, it can be seen that after the
new entry installs a new generator in the network the social welfare is always
higher than that of the Base Case, independent of the location of the new unit.
This is accompanied by the fact that after the new firm enters the market, the
active load demand in the system is always higher than that of the Base Case, as
shown in Table 6.1.
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6.3 Conclusions for Chapter 6
A new entry in the electricity market seriously affects the profits and bidding
strategies of the existing firms, while the social welfare increases independent of
the new entry’s location, as the active load demand rises, and substantial
reductions on the nodal prices occur at the area where the new generating unit is
installed. The increments for the social welfare observed on the examined system
are as high as 22%, while nodal price reductions of the level of 18% have
occurred. The highest nodal price reductions have been observed for the cases
where the new unit is situated within the zone with the lower price-
responsiveness load demand.
The location of the new generator dictates the alterations in the firms’ profits,
social welfare, nodal prices and power distribution in the network. It has been
shown that the generators owned by existing firms in the system located at the
vicinity of the new unit will undergo severe reductions in their active power
production and profits, and under certain circumstances the effects of the new
entry may lead an existing company to economic failure. The rescheduling of
active production to different generating units from the ISO after the new entry is
connected to the system, and hence the profits redistribution and after-effects on
the existing firms, depend on the relative difference between the marginal cost
functions of the various units.
The location of the generating unit owned by the new entrant is crucial for its
profit, as well as for that of its rivals. It has been observed from the numerical
results that the new entry receives different profits at different locations in the
network. For example, at buses 1 and 3 it receives less than 2000 £/hour, while at
buses 5 and 9 its profit exceeds the level of 5000 £/hour. This diversity in profits
for the available locations in the system may be an adequate reason for the new
entrant to overcome the possible entry barriers, as a particular location may be
proved profitable enough to deal with them. Based on such thinking, the best
location for the firm that enters the market to install its new generating unit has
been successfully determined for the examined IEEE 14-bus system. The
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decision for choosing the location to connect the new generating unit can be
taken by finding the bus that leaves the highest profit for the new firm, while the
choice may be confined by other factors such as political issues and the
preference of connecting the new unit in different load demand zones in the
system.
The investigation for choosing the best location for a new generating unit has
been successfully conducted using the proposed AC market equilibrium model.
This study has shown that the topology of the network is of critical importance in
the case of electricity market analysis and the implemented market models
should represent the meshed network features of the electric grid and the
associated AC operational constraints. Such models must be versatile and robust,
in order to provide the ability to adapt for the investigation of a wide range of
power systems in terms of size and complexity.
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Chapter 7:
Modelling of grid-connected photovoltaic
systems in the electricity market equilibrium
algorithm
7.1 Introduction to photovoltaic (PV) technology
It is widely accepted that the present levels of dependence on fossil fuels are
unsustainable due to the natural resources depletion, the climate change related to
CO2 emissions and the predicted economic growth of emerging markets. The
expected increase of the world population in accordance with the continuous
economic development of many countries has as a direct consequence an
increase in energy demand. At present, most of the energy supply is directly
acquired using fossil fuel technologies, which are now reaching their limits in
supply and source, while their usage has serious consequences on the
environment. Steps for improvement have been undertaken, especially from the
EU, for the development and large-scale deployment of a range of new and more
sustainable technologies. A number of targets have been set for the integration of
new energy technologies, with an important step being the commitment of the
EU Member States to cover 20% of the total energy needs by utilising the
available indigenous RES by 2020 commencing from the beginning of 2008 [28].
One of the most attractive and potential sources of energy considered to be able
to meet the future energy needs is the sun. Installations of PV cells and modules
around the world have seen a rapid growth in the past years at an average annual
rate of more than 35%. The year-end worldwide cumulative installed capacity of
solar PV systems has been increased from 1200 MW in 2000 to 9200 MW in
2007 [193]. According to the Greenpeace and European Photovoltaic Industry
Association (EPIA) 2008 scenario [193], if adequate support mechanisms are
adopted to make solar electricity competitive and serious commitment is made to
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energy efficiency, the solar power produced globally will satisfy the electric
needs of almost 14% of the world’s population by 2030. Such figures correspond
to a capacity of 281 GW, for which 60% of this would be in the grid-connected
market. The associated grid-connected PV systems are expected to cover the
energy needs of 1.28 billion people.
Even though the generation costs for PV systems are currently higher than other
energy sources, the electricity prices from the impending large-scale PV energy
production are expected to compete with the generation costs of fossil and
nuclear sources, as economies of scale prevail. Such considerations stem from
the fact that the PV generation costs have already been decreased in a trend
expected to accelerate, while the general electricity prices from conventional
sources are steadily rising [193]. As far as the EU electricity markets are
concerned, solar electricity is expected to become cost competitive with
residential electricity prices within the next few years, especially in Southern
Europe; Central Europe is expected to gradually follow by 2020 (see [193], p. 41,
Fig. 4.1). In the light of the above, the impact of grid-connected PV systems in
the energy market needs to be investigated.
In addition to the attractive features in terms of future savings in electricity
prices, supporting measures are employed for the promotion of solar electricity.
The most effective market support mechanism for PV power generation has been
the introduction of feed-in laws, which helps to diminish the present differences
between the high PV installation costs and the operational costs of conventional
generators. These laws oblige the system operator to purchase the power
generated by the PV units at a predetermined feed-in tariff for a specified period
of time (generally 20 years), giving motivation for PV investment and further
expansion of the PV-based power markets. The feed-in tariffs for different
countries vary depending on the resource conditions, such as the level of solar
irradiance, and such support programmes are considered to be necessary until
about 2020 [193].
The following study has been performed in order to examine the new
environment that emerges as the power generation market is shifting from its
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entirely conventional nature to a diverse market able to accommodate grid-
connected PV plants in conjunction with the recent liberalisation of the
electricity sector. The priority in scheduling the RES energy first in
predetermined tariffs is expected to affect the electricity prices in bid-based
markets, while the presence of PV generation, which is dependent on the level of
solar irradiance and subject to the weather conditions, in the pool may further
affect the market and network operational conditions. Furthermore, if the
incumbent generating firms take into consideration the nature of PV generation
and its presence in the electric grid while planning their bidding strategies,
alterations may be observed on the interactions between them, with direct
consequences on the overall market outcome.
7.2 Modelling the economic aspects of grid-connected PV
systems in the electricity market model
The investigation of the integrated electricity market that considers conventional
sources and grid-connected PV systems for power generation is initiated by
modelling the economic aspects of PV generating units and the associated
processes in the market equilibrium algorithm presented in Chapter 3. The
market assumptions for the bid-based pool market, the ISO process and the
behaviour of the strategic firms that own the conventional generating units in the
system are the same as in Section 3.6. The additional considerations for
integrating the PV generation in the model are outlined as follows.
The actual marginal cost of generation MCPV of a PV generating unit is assumed
to be constant, such that:
PVPV aMC  (7.1)
since the PV generation cost does not change when producing different amounts
of power. Note that a major advantage of PV technology is the low operational
cost, which is negligible compared to its capital cost. However, the PV cost
coefficient αPV is much larger than the marginal cost of a conventional generating
unit in operation due to the high capital cost for the PV installation. In the
following market analysis the PV units are considered to have priority in the
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market and they do not behave strategically. Instead, it is assumed that they bid
their entire output to the pool at a predefined bidding function BPV, being equal to
the lowest linear cost coefficient α of the conventional generating units in the
system, rather than revealing their true marginal cost. This is done in order to
resemble competitive behaviour and at the same time avoid a higher market
clearing price due to the extremely high true marginal cost MCPV, as the ISO will
schedule the PV unit’s entire output first (since the BPV function will always be
lower than the marginal costs of the strategic generators in operation). Then, the
PV units are paid the nodal prices at their bus and in addition they receive state
subsidy for the quantity produced. Therefore, the feed-in tariff TPV for the PV
units is defined as:
PVPVPV SST   £/MWh (7.2)
and therefore the profit acquired for the scheduled PV generation PgPV is:
PVPVPVPV PgMCT )(  £/hour (7.3)
where λPV is the nodal price at the bus where the PV unit is located, and SSPV is
the state subsidy for the PV power produced. The state subsidy is not considered
during the calculation of the social welfare in order to avoid deadweight gain
complications as it is an exogenous factor, but it is considered for computing the
profit of the PV units.
7.3 Numerical results using the PV systems economic model
In order to illustrate the effects of representing the economic aspects of grid-
connected PV generating units in the electricity market algorithm before
proceeding to the modelling of the PV operational aspects, numerical results on
the IEEE 14-bus system that take into account the assumptions in Section 7.2 are
presented below. The solar PV power generation units are assumed to generate
active power at rated output value, which is entirely sold to the pool. The PV
reactive power output in this section is considered to be negligible.
The description of the IEEE 14-bus system is the same as in Section 5.2.2. The 5
conventional generators, which are located at buses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 are owned by
individual strategic firms, entitled F1 to F5 respectively. For the test cases that
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incorporate PV power generation 5 solar PV generating units are connected to
the system (located at buses 10 to 14), which are owned by a single firm FPV. The
marginal cost functions of the strategic generating units are:
PgMCMC PgPg 010.01531  (7.4)
PgMCPg 008.0152  (7.5)
PgMCPg 008.0116  (7.6)
PgMCPg 008.0188  (7.7).
The actual marginal cost for each PV generating unit is:
120PVMC £/MWh (7.8).
The bidding function for each PV unit is set to be equal to the constant term of
the cheapest conventional generating unit in the system, thus being:
11PVB £/MWh (7.9).
The state subsidy is assumed to be:
150PVSS £/MWh (7.10)
thus the feed-in tariff for each PV unit is:
)150(  PVPVT  £/MWh (7.11)
and the profit for each PV unit is:
PVPVPV Pg)30(   £/hour (7.12).
Test Cases 1 and 2 correspond to normal operating conditions with no network
constraints binding, while tight limits have been set on two transmission lines in
Cases 3 and 4 in order to impose congestion in the system. The 5 grid-connected
PV generating units owned by firm FPV are introduced in the system in Cases 2
and 4 and the market outcome is compared with Cases 1 and 3, for which the PV
units are disconnected from the network and hence there is no PV generation
present. The PV units in Cases 2 and 4 are assumed to cover 10% of the total
available generation capacity in the system5, while the other 90% corresponds to
the capacity of the conventional generators. The results for the firms’ profits, the
power distribution in the network and the social welfare are provided in Table
5 The 10% figure is used in accordance to the 13% target for share of RES energy in final
consumption set for Cyprus by the EU directive [28]. Solar energy is the main renewable energy
source available in Cyprus throughout the year.
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7.1, the bidding strategies of the conventional generating units in Table 7.2, and
the nodal prices in Table 7.3. The power quantities are calculated in p.u.
TABLE 7.1
CASES 1 TO 4 FOR PV SYSTEMS: FIRMS’ PROFITS, POWER DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL WELFARE





congestion F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 FPV




1 No 1074 3915 3239 4526 1375 -- 8.94 0.52 8.77 3.11 18490
2 Yes
No
641 4073 3243 3215 819 12716 9.55 0.56 9.43 3.38 20870
3 No 1456 1938 1934 5324 1380 -- 5.58 -0.81 5.49 1.93 12600
4 Yes
Yes
1336 1838 1852 4605 1591 13424 6.75 -0.26 6.68 2.36 15590
TABLE 7.2
CASES 1 TO 4 FOR PV SYSTEMS: FIRMS’ BIDDING STRATEGIES





congestion kF1 kF2 kF3 kF4 kF5
1 No 1.949 1.789 1.767 2.410 1.767
2 Yes
No
2.017 1.798 1.780 2.560 1.798
3 No 2.175 2.170 1.413 1.738 1.895
4 Yes
Yes
2.107 1.297 1.404 1.217 1.347
TABLE 7.3
CASES 1 TO 4 FOR PV SYSTEMS: NODAL PRICES









1 (F1) 30.6 31.1 34.3 33.2
2 (F2) 30.7 30.9 34.8 33.8
3 (F3) 30.5 30.7 34.8 34.0
4 32.6 32.7 34.7 34.3
5 32.6 32.8 35.2 34.4
6 (F4) 31.1 31.5 38.4 34.8
7 33.2 33.2 31.6 33.2
8 (F5) 33.1 33.1 35.4 34.3
9 33.8 33.6 42.9 38.1
10 (FPV) 34.8 33.7 42.7 37.9
11 (FPV) 34.6 33.2 41.3 36.9
12 (FPV) 35.6 33.8 40.0 36.7
13 (FPV) 34.3 32.9 40.1 36.4
14 (FPV) 36.3 34.3 41.9 37.7
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- Cases 1 to 2: No binding constraints:
Cases 1 and 2 have been studied in order to examine the effect of solar PV power
generation on the electricity market under normal network operating conditions.
From Table 7.2 it can be observed that in the presence of solar PV generation in
Case 2, the generating firms have increased their bidding parameters affecting
the market equilibrium and the market clearing price. In Case 2, the profits for
firms F1, F4 and F5 have been significantly reduced compared with Case 1,
despite the higher submitted bids and the higher nodal prices. This is a result of
the fact that a portion of the demand in Case 2 is satisfied from the PV power
generation and the scheduled production of the aforementioned firms is reduced.
From Table 7.3 it can be seen that the nodal prices at buses 10 to 14 where PV
generation exists in Case 2 are significantly reduced compared with Case 1,
whereas as moving away from the area of PV generation this is not the case. No
change is observed for the nodal prices at intermediate buses between
conventional and PV generation centres, while slight increments occur in the
vicinity of the conventional generators due to the higher bid offers submitted
from the strategic firms in Case 2. The total active power generation output, and
hence the load demand in the system, have been increased in Case 2 thus the
social welfare is higher compared to Case 1. The much higher profit of firm FPV
compared with the profits of the conventional generating firms in Case 2 occurs
due to the support of the state subsidy.
- Cases 3 to 4: Binding network constraints:
The effect of PV generation on the electricity market when the network is
operated in stressed conditions is examined in Cases 3 and 4. The nodal prices in
Case 3 are much higher compared to Case 1 due to the network congestion. In
Case 4 where the PV units produce electricity and therefore additional
competitive supply exists, all the strategic firms have been forced to decrease
their bidding parameters (especially the units at buses 2, 6 and 8), resulting in
lower profits, except for firm F5 which manages to increase its profit because of
a small increase in its power generation. Reductions in nodal prices are observed
in almost all buses, with the largest decrements, up to 4.8 £/MWh, at the buses
where PV generation exists. In Case 4 the total active generation output has been
increased compared to Case 3, due to the presence of PV generation. Thus the
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social welfare has also been increased. The profit of firm FPV in Case 4 is higher
than that of Case 2 due to the higher nodal prices caused by the network
congestion, which are incorporated in the feed-in tariff function (7.2).
7.4 Discussions on the PV economic model
It has been shown that the introduction of PV generation in the system reduces
the market clearing price, since the firm that owns the PV generating units acts in
a competitive manner. It has been observed that in the presence of network
congestion the existence of PV generation forces the strategic conventional
generating firms to decrease their bidding parameters in order to cope with the
increased availability of supply. In either case, the social welfare is increased
when PV generation is introduced, since the level of the price-responsive load
demand in the system rises. It is important to note that, since the PV power
generation output is entirely dependent on the solar irradiance, which in turn is
dependent on the weather conditions that cannot be accurately forecast, it is
understood that the strategic generating firms can take advantage of the lack of
solar irradiance and hence competitive PV power generation, and act in an
uncompetitive manner to attempt to force the nodal prices to rise at a particular
bidding time interval in order to favour their profits.
Considering that the EU has set ambitious targets regarding the penetration of
RES power generation in the system, it can be anticipated, based on the results
presented above, that the introduction of RES generation, in the form of PV or
other renewable weather-dependent energy sources, may cause problems in
centralised markets as unpredictable price fluctuations may occur. In the case
where the solar irradiance is inadequate for the PV units to generate power and
there is lack of RES availability to satisfy the load demand, the market will be
dependent entirely on conventional generation and with the exercise of market
power from the strategic firms the prices would probably increase. This issue
may be more intense if the network is not well designed for avoiding congestion
that could be favourable for the strategic generating firms during peak demand
intervals. Furthermore, this effect is likely to be more severe in small isolated
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networks in which a large proportion of the generation capacity is expected to be
satisfied by installing grid-connected PV systems in the forthcoming years. Such
examples include the island of Cyprus and other Southern European isolated
regions with no interconnection to the central European grid. A sudden change in
the weather conditions can have a crucial impact on the outcome of the market,
provided that the strategic firms are aware of the potential lack of availability in
RES power supply.
In order to avoid undesired consequences on the market outcome, the weaknesses
of the new diverse electricity market environment must be identified and the
relevant authorities governing the market should take measures to keep the
electricity prices at reasonable levels. Furthermore, the network system operators
may be required to consider the possible strategic actions of the firms during the
system design process, in order to avoid exploitation of a possible lack of
availability in RES power generation that would result in higher nodal prices at
the expense of social welfare. In order to investigate in depth the situation where
the solar irradiance that produces the PV power output varies, the modelling of
the operational aspects of grid-connected PV systems that explicitly represents
the PV active and reactive power generation considering the relevant power
quality issues takes place in the following section.
7.5 Modelling the operational aspects of grid-connected PV
systems in the electricity market model, in terms of active and
reactive PV power output
As more renewable energy systems are employed all over the world in order to
provide alternative sources of electricity production and reduce CO2 emissions
from conventional power plants, certain issues that need to be addressed arise. In
particular, for PV systems connected to the grid, one parameter of critical
importance is the variation of the PV power output with respect to the intensity
of solar irradiance. In order to examine the impact of the active and reactive
power injected to the electric grid by PV generating units, as functions of the
solar irradiance incident to the PV panel, on the electricity market, the following
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model that is incorporated into the electricity market equilibrium algorithm is
implemented based on real-life PV output performance data collected from an
experimental PV park. The material and recorded data presented in Sections
7.5.1 and 7.5.2 have been provided by members of Academic Staff of the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Cyprus,
Nicosia, CY-1678, Cyprus. The information on the experimental PV units is
provided only for reference. The investigation of the properties, specifications
and function of the utilised experimental equipment is far beyond the scope of
this analysis.
7.5.1 Experimental PV equipment
The University of Cyprus maintains an innovative experimental outdoor test
facility for the performance evaluation of the latest PV technologies. The PV
Park consists of 14 grid-connected PV systems of nominal power 1 kWp each,
installed to provide the opportunity for direct performance comparisons under the
climate conditions of Cyprus. For these, the annual irradiation measured by a
pyranometer installed on the PV modules’ plane has been 1997 kWh/m2 with
maximum contribution during the summer period. Twelve of the systems are
mounted on mounting racks at the optimal inclination angle of 27.5° for annual
yield in Cyprus and the other two are 2-axis tracking systems. The installed PV
technologies involve a range from fixed system mono crystalline, multi
crystalline silicon to amorphous thin film silicon, cadmium telluride (CdTe),
CuInGaSe2, HIT-cell and other solar cell technologies from various
manufacturers. A detailed description of the PV technologies available on site
can be found in [194]. The facility is equipped with meteorological instruments,
which are connected to a central data acquisition system. Parameters that are
measured at a resolution of a second include the solar global irradiation, wind
direction and speed, and ambient and module temperature.
7.5.2 Processing the data collected from the experimental PV park
An experiment to record power measurements from the PV units has been
performed according to the European standards EN50160: 1999 [195] and
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EN61727: 1996 [196] in order to investigate the impact of the variation of solar
irradiance on the output of the PV systems. The measurements for the electrical
quantities were recorded using an analyser system, which comprises a central
power quality analyser station, voltage clamps and current transformer sensors.
The device can sample and record data when connected to the phases of a power
system, taking measurements at desirable time intervals. In this evaluation the
sample rate was 5 minutes for a time period of two weeks. The current and
voltage sensors were connected to the three-phase output of the PV installation
and measurements of the active and reactive power generation were taken. For
the purpose of this investigation, the correlation between the power generation
output and the level of solar irradiance was established.
The measurements of the active and reactive PV power generation were
transformed into the per-unit system and normalised over each sampling interval.
Statistical methods were used to construct graphical functions that relate the PV
output to the applied normalised (%) solar irradiance s. The best fit
representation for each power generation component was obtained by applying
the least squares method on the power quality data collected. The model function
used for the active power output pPV is:
smmpPV 21  (7.13)
and for the reactive power output qPV is:
}]/)/[ln(5.0exp{ 26543 mmsmmqPV  (7.14)
where the m terms are the adjustable parameters to be determined. The active
power delivered to the electricity network from the PV system has been found to
vary linearly as the intensity of the applied solar irradiance increases, as shown in
Figure 14, which is in good agreement with the work presented in [197-198]. In
contrast, the reactive power produced by the PV system varies nonlinearly with




















Figure 14: Best fit representation of the PV active power output vs. normalised
solar irradiance.
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Figure 15: Best fit representation of the PV reactive power output vs. normalised
solar irradiance.
7.5.3 Modelling the PV output performance in the electricity market
algorithm
The economic aspects of the PV generating units have been modelled in the
algorithm as in Section 7.2. The PV active and reactive power output is
represented in the electricity market model according to the percentage intensity
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of the solar irradiance chosen to be present for each case scenario. By specifying
an input solar irradiance (%) incident to the PV panel, the level of the p.u. PV
active power generation is determined from the experimental graph shown in
Figure 14 and the corresponding p.u. PV reactive power generation is taken from
the best-fit curve shown in Figure 15.
In order to investigate the effects of each component of the PV power generation
on the electricity market outcome, the examined scenarios in the numerical
results that follow are tested by two different models. The first model considers
only the PV active power generation performance taken from Figure 14, referred
to as “Pg only” model, while the second one considers both the PV active and
reactive output components from Figures 14 and 15, referred to as “Pg and Qg”
model. Note that in the following sections, for the cases where the Qg component
of the PV generation is not modelled, all the other reactive power components of
the system, including reactive power generation from the conventional
generating units, are still present in the model. This is done in order to emphasise
on the effects of the PV reactive generation.
7.6 Numerical results using the economic-operational PV
systems model: the effect of the solar irradiance-dependent PV
active and reactive power generation on the electricity market
Numerical tests were performed on a 5-bus test system in order to show the
effects of the active and also reactive power generation from PV units on the
market outcome, for different intensities of solar irradiance. In addition, test
cases are performed on the larger IEEE 57-bus system, showing the effects of the
PV units under more realistic scenarios. Cases for normal network operation, as
well as under transmission congestion, are presented for both systems to show
how the PV impact on the market is altered under dissimilar system operating
conditions. The transformer tap-ratios for both systems can be optimised within
the range of 0.9 to 1.1 and all the power quantities are calculated in p.u.
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7.6.1 Numerical results on the 5-bus system
The 5-bus test system used for this investigation consists of 5 buses with load
demand, 4 transmission lines, 2 transformer branches with on-load tap-changing
transformers and 2 conventional generating units, as shown in Figure 16 (this
system is different than the 5-bus system used in Chapter 4). The conventional
generators are located at buses 1 and 5 and owned by the strategic firms F1 and
F2 respectively, while the PV generation unit connected at bus 3 is owned by
competitive firm FPV. The bus voltages can be optimised within ±5% from the
rated value of 1 p.u.
Figure 16: The 5-bus test system for the PV analysis.
The rated generation capacity of the PV unit (i.e. at 100% solar irradiance) is
1max PVPg p.u. and covers the 10% of the total generation capacity of the system
6.
The remaining 90% capacity corresponds to the two conventional generating
units, such that 4max1 Pg p.u. and 5
max
5 Pg p.u. The marginal cost functions
for the strategic generating firms F1 and F2 are:
11 009.011 PgMC  £/MWh (7.15)
55 010.08.10 PgMC  £/MWh (7.16).
Therefore, the predefined bidding function for the PV unit is:
8.10PVB £/MWh (7.17).
The actual marginal cost of the PV unit and the state subsidy are set to:




respectively. Hence the feed-in tariff is:
)150( 3PVT £/MWh (7.20).
- Cases 5 to 13: Normal operating conditions:
Test Cases 5 to 13 were performed with normal network operating conditions
and no transmission congestion exists in the system. Case 5 is the reference case
in which the solar irradiance is assumed to be zero. Cases 6 to 9 correspond to
operations for different intensities of solar irradiance, while only the active
power generation of the PV unit is considered in the model. Cases 10 to 13 show
the results for the same intensities but with both the active and reactive PV power
generation components modelled. The numerical results for Cases 5 to 13 are
shown in Figure 17 and Tables 7.4 and 7.5.
From the results for Cases 5 to 9 it can be seen that when the PV unit is
connected to the system the nodal prices at all buses are reduced gradually as the
solar irradiance increases, with the higher decrement of 1.5 £/MWh being at the
bus where the PV unit is situated. The active generation in the system, and hence
the active load demand, become higher as the irradiance increases and, as a
result, there is a significant rise in social welfare with a higher than 10%
increment at full irradiance. Similar effects are observed for Cases 10 to 13
where the reactive generation of the PV unit is also considered, but with slightly








Irradiance Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5
PV
model
5 No PV 29.6 31.0 31.5 31.0 29.7 --
6 25% 28.7 30.1 30.8 30.2 28.7
7 50% 28.5 29.9 30.5 30.0 28.5
8 75% 28.5 29.8 30.2 29.9 28.5
9 100% 28.4 29.7 30.0 29.8 28.5
Pg only
10 25% 28.7 30.1 30.7 30.2 28.7
11 50% 28.6 30.0 30.5 30.1 28.7
12 75% 28.6 29.8 30.3 30.0 28.6
13 100% 28.6 29.7 30.0 29.8 28.6
Pg and Qg
TABLE 7.5











5 No PV 7.41 4.69 7.30 3.53 16412 --
6 25% 7.93 4.90 7.81 3.78 17310
7 50% 8.06 4.89 7.95 3.85 17618
8 75% 8.14 4.86 8.04 3.89 17872
9 100% 8.23 4.84 8.13 3.94 18121
Pg only
10 25% 8.00 4.97 7.88 3.82 17425
11 50% 8.08 4.92 7.98 3.86 17677
12 75% 8.17 4.89 8.07 3.91 17927
13 100% 8.25 4.86 8.16 3.95 18169
Pg and Qg
smaller decrements of the nodal prices at the buses of the two conventional
generators. In addition, the increment of the social welfare for the first step
increase of solar irradiance is lower between Cases 5 and 10 than that between
Cases 5 and 6, since the PV reactive generation is at a high level.
The profits of the strategic firms for Cases 5 to 9 (shown by the dashed lines of
the graph in Figure 17) show an irregular variation as the solar irradiance
increases. The profit of firm F1 (blue dashed line) decreases for all increments of
the irradiance but with a higher change for the second step than for the others.
The profit of firm F2 (red dashed line) decreases for the first increment of the
irradiance, increases for the second, and for the other two is decreasing by the
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same amount. However, the pattern of the profits variation changes when the
reactive power of the PV unit is considered in the model as in Cases 10 to 13
(solid lines in Figure 17). Both profits are decreasing by the same amounts for all
increments of irradiance, except that of firm F2 for the first step that stays the
same. The profit of F1 for Cases 9 and 13 (100% solar irradiance) is found to
differ by more than 130 £/hour due to the modelling of the PV reactive
generation.
- Cases 10 to 18: Network congestion:
The tests for Cases 14 to 22 were performed in the presence of network
congestion. A maximum transmission limit was enforced on branch 1-2, such
that 0.1max12 S p.u., in order to impose transmission congestion in the network.
Case 14 is the reference case with no PV connected at the system. Cases 15 to 18
are performed using the “Pg only” PV model, while Cases 19 to 22 are
performed using the “Pg and Qg” PV model. The market results are shown in
Figure 18 and Tables 7.6 and 7.7.
Case 14 is the benchmark with zero solar irradiance, for which the nodal prices
are much higher than those in Case 5 due to the congestion, except of the price at
bus 1 that is supplied locally by the isolated firm F1. As the solar irradiance
increases, in both PV generation models, the nodal prices at the buses where the
conventional generators are located increase slightly or remain the same as these
firms increase their bids. Significant decrements are observed for the nodal prices
of the other buses with a difference of up to 2.7 £/MWh due to the extra active
Figure 18: Cases 14 to 22 for PV systems: Strategic firms’ profits (congestion).
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TABLE 7.6




Irradiance Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5
PV
model
14 No PV 29.2 35.8 35.2 34.0 30.2 --
15 25% 29.2 35.0 34.5 33.4 30.1
16 50% 29.6 34.3 33.8 33.0 30.3
17 75% 29.7 33.6 33.2 32.6 30.2
18 100% 29.8 33.1 32.7 32.3 30.2
Pg only
19 25% 29.2 35.3 34.7 33.6 30.1
20 50% 29.2 34.4 33.9 33.1 30.0
21 75% 29.7 33.7 33.3 32.7 30.2
22 100% 29.8 33.1 32.7 32.3 30.2
Pg and Qg
TABLE 7.7











14 No PV 5.65 3.20 5.60 2.71 13198 --
15 25% 5.93 3.33 5.88 2.84 13842
16 50% 6.04 3.37 5.99 2.90 14204
17 75% 6.23 3.45 6.18 2.99 14672
18 100% 6.40 3.53 6.36 3.08 15100
Pg only
19 25% 5.90 3.31 5.85 2.83 13803
20 50% 6.17 3.44 6.12 2.96 14421
21 75% 6.26 3.48 6.21 3.01 14738
22 100% 6.43 3.55 6.39 3.09 15166
Pg and Qg
power supplement by the PV unit. The social welfare in Cases 14 to 22, which is
much lower than the corresponding in Cases 5 to 13 due to the congestion, shows
higher increments for each step increase of the irradiance, with a final rise of
almost 15% between Cases 14 and 18 or 22. Note that the social welfare
increment for the “Pg and Qg” PV model is less than that of the model that
disregards PV reactive generation, as the solar irradiance increases to 25%
(where the PV reactive generation is at a high level), in contrast with the
corresponding cases in the uncongested scenario.
The profits of the strategic firms in Cases 14 to 22 (Figure 18) are much lower
than the corresponding for Cases 5 to 13 (Figure 17) due to the transmission
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congestion restrictions that confine the active power generation. In contrast with
the uncongested cases, firm F1 receives lower profit than firm F2 because the
power transmission from its bus is limited. As the solar irradiance increases for
the “Pg only” PV model, the profit of generator F1 next to the congested branch
is steadily decreasing (blue dashed line), while for F2’s profit (red dashed line)
there is an increase as intensity increases to 25% but then it decreases linearly.
When the PV reactive generation is considered in the model, the profits of the
strategic firms (solid lines) increase or decrease irregularly when PV reactive
generation is at high levels (i.e. at low irradiance), while they decrease smoothly
for increments at solar intensities higher than 50%.
7.6.2 Numerical results on the IEEE 57-bus system
In order to illustrate further the effects of introducing PV modelling in the
electricity market algorithm, test cases were performed under more realistic
conditions on the larger IEEE 57-bus system [191]. This system consists of 57
buses of which 42 have load demand, 63 transmission lines, 17 transformer
branches with on-load tap-changing transformers and 7 conventional generators,
each forming an individual firm. Three PV generating units, each of rated
capacity 1 p.u., with a total rated PV generation corresponding to 10% of the
total generation capacity of the system, are connected at buses 21, 22 and 23 and
owned by firm FPV, which acts competitively. Again, 125PVMC £/MWh and
150PVSS £/MWh, and the bus voltages can be optimised within the range of
±10% from 1.0 p.u. Scenarios for two different operational conditions (with and
without network congestion) have been performed. For each one, test cases are
provided for zero, low (25%), and rated (100%) solar irradiance, examining both
PV reactive generation models. For the transmission congestion scenario, the
flow through two of the transmission lines of the system (8-9 and 12-13) is
confined to 1.75 p.u. The results for normal operating conditions (Cases 23 to 27)
are shown in Table 7.8 and those for the cases with transmission congestion
(Cases 28 to 32) in Table 7.9.
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TABLE 7.8














23 No PV 20.67 6.88 20.13 5.41 33470 -- 42297 --
24 25% 20.20 6.78 19.70 5.46 33130 4630 42385
25 100% 21.50 6.73 20.99 5.54 30980 16980 45690
Pg only
26 25% 21.39 7.19 20.87 5.73 33537 4633 44143
27 100% 21.75 6.90 21.24 5.66 31362 17100 46165
Pg and Qg
TABLE 7.9














28 No PV 19.92 6.65 19.45 5.50 32612 -- 40279 --
29 25% 20.66 6.82 20.20 5.67 32426 4618 42114
30 100% 20.81 6.67 20.32 5.59 30532 17150 44236
Pg only
31 25% 20.79 7.10 20.32 5.82 32869 4645 42506
32 100% 21.30 6.99 20.80 5.81 30974 17240 44980
Pg and Qg
- Cases 23 to 32: Results for the IEEE 57-bus system:
From the results on the larger system it can be seen that the introduction of the
PV units eventuates in higher active load demand and favours the social welfare,
especially for the cases with transmission congestion. Furthermore, as the solar
irradiance increases from 25% to 100% between Cases 29-30 and 31-32, the
power flow through the congested line 12-13 falls to a level lower than the limit
relieving the congestion, and hence lowering the nodal prices contributing to the
rise of social welfare. The introduction of PV reactive generation in the model
further increases the social welfare, with the highest increment being 12%
between Cases 28 and 32.
On the other hand, such changes have adverse effects on the strategic producers’
surplus, which decreases in all cases, except those when the PV reactive
generation is considered and the solar irradiance is at low levels (Cases 26 and
31). For these cases the PV units produce relatively high reactive power and the
strategic firms change their strategies to benefit a small increase in their surplus.
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However, at full irradiance there are high producers’ surplus decrements for all
cases and for both PV models, up to about 2500 £/hour, with the reductions for
the “Pg and Qg” PV model being lower than the corresponding for the “Pg only”
model. Once again it can be seen that the introduction of the PV reactive power
generation in the model affects the profits of the strategic firms, resulting in
increments at low solar irradiance rather than decrements (which is the case in
the absence of PV reactive generation), and in smaller reductions than for the
“Pg only” PV model at rated solar irradiance. The profit of firm FPV increases
with the solar irradiance as it is proportional to its active production. These
results are in good agreement with those for the 5-bus system, showing that the
model is applicable to a variety of power systems.
7.6.3 Discussion on the impact of solar irradiance on the electricity market
equilibrium and the significance of PV reactive power modelling
In all scenarios where the PV reactive generation is not modelled, the strategic
producers’ surplus is reduced by the introduction of the PV unit on the system
since alternative competitive active power becomes available. However, when
PV reactive power is considered, small increments in producers’ surplus are
observed at low solar irradiance as a consequence of the alteration in the
equilibrium strategies that results from the higher reactive power levels of the PV
unit. By comparing the two PV reactive models, the producers’ surplus for the
cases with irradiance levels above 50% is always higher when the PV reactive
generation is incorporated in the model, as the presence of the PV reactive
generation enables different equilibrium strategies in both congested and
uncongested scenarios.
The social welfare is raised when the PV generating unit is connected to the
system for all test cases and is increasing with the intensity of solar irradiance.
By comparing the two PV reactive models it can be seen that, for all cases, the
social welfare at rated irradiance is higher when the PV reactive generation is
considered due to the higher load demand. For low intensities of solar irradiance
the social welfare is higher for the “Pg and Qg” model only under normal
operating conditions. At the presence of network congestion, the extra PV
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reactive power due to its nonlinear characteristic in the “Pg and Qg” model
contributes to the congestion, since reactive power flows congest the system at
the same extent as active transmission, and the resulting price-responsive load
demand is lower than expected (since congestion raises the nodal prices; e.g.
compare Cases 15 and 19 in Table 7.6). Hence, the social welfare at low solar
irradiance is slightly less or at a similar level to that of the “Pg only” model.
The profit of the firm that owns the PV generating units is not directly dependent
on the alterations of the strategic actions of the conventional generating firms,
since PV generation is scheduled prior to the conventional active generation in
the market clearing process, but it is affected by the nodal price at the PV unit’s
bus, which is incorporated into the feed-in tariff. Hence, the PV profit increases
with the applied solar irradiance that dictates its active production and is
expected to be higher in the presence of network congestion where the nodal
prices are raised.
7.7 Conclusions for Chapter 7
The model of grid-connected PV systems, in terms of economic and operational
considerations, has been successfully integrated into the electricity market
equilibrium algorithm in order to investigate the effects of introducing PV
generating units in the electric grid on the electricity market outcome. The PV
power output that is directly dependent on the intensity of the applied solar
irradiance has been explicitly represented based on statistical analysis on output
performance data recorded in an outdoor experimental PV facility. The
experimental data have shown that the PV active generation varies linearly with
the intensity of solar irradiance, while the PV reactive generation follows a
nonlinear relationship with higher VAR levels at low intensities. The PV
economic model and two versions of the PV economic-operational model have
been examined by obtaining numerical results on a variety of power systems.
The two versions of the latter PV model correspond to different representations
of the PV power output, in which either only the PV active generation is
modelled, or both the active and reactive components of the PV output power are
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modelled for a more realistic reflection of the PV unit operation. Comparisons of
the different PV models are provided and the evident effects of introducing grid-
connected PV generating units in the electricity market, considering the
dependency of the PV output on the solar irradiance, have been demonstrated.
The numerical results obtained from the PV economic model have shown that
when competitive PV active power is available at normal operating conditions,
the strategic firms increase their bids as an attempt to raise the nodal prices and
counterbalance the profit reductions due to the decreased scheduled conventional
power production. In contrast, at the presence of network congestion, the
strategic firms decrease their already high bids in order to increase their
scheduled production and maintain their profits, with the consequence of lower
nodal prices. The introduction of competitive PV generation results in higher
social welfare for all cases.
The consideration of the intensity of the solar irradiance applied to the PV panel
as an input to the electricity market model has shown that, if the strategic firms
are aware of the operational aspects of the PV systems, the variations of the
weather-dependent PV output will have significant effects on the electricity
market outcome. Taking into account the expected growth in PV generation
density in the electricity markets of the EU Member States, such variations of the
PV output performance may be exploited by the strategic conventional
generating firms in order to exercise market power as an attempt to increase their
profits with the consequence of higher nodal prices and lower social welfare at
low-level solar irradiance, especially in small isolated networks.
The comparison of the numerical results of the “Pg only” and “Pg and Qg” PV
models has shown that the representation of the PV reactive generation in the
market model is important. By disregarding the modelling of PV reactive
generation, lower estimations for the producers’ surplus and social welfare at
rated irradiance may be obtained, while the social welfare may be overestimated
at low irradiance in the presence of congestion. Furthermore, the variation
pattern of the strategic firms’ profits with respect to the solar irradiance changes
significantly at low irradiance levels, if the PV reactive generation is considered
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in the model. However, the social welfare is always higher when a PV unit is
connected to the system independent of the consideration and the level of PV
reactive power.
The impact of grid-connected PV systems on the electricity market equilibrium is
found to be significant as the strategic conventional generating firms are able to
take advantage of a possible shortage of the weather-dependent competitive PV
generation and attempt to raise the market prices in order to favour their profits.
The entities that will undertake the expected large-scale diffusion of the RES
technologies required by the EU Member States should further investigate this
issue by careful consideration of all the associated economic and operational
aspects. In particular for the PV systems, the power quality characteristics of the
PV output performance and their interrelation with the intensity of the applied
solar irradiance should be explicitly addressed, while the equivalent concerns
over the range of the available RES should also be examined.
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Chapter 8:
Parameterization of supply functions in AC
electricity market equilibrium models
8.1 Introduction to the comparison of the different SFE
parameterization methods
The analysis that takes place in this chapter follows the discussions provided in
Section 2.7 on the parameterization methods employed in the existing literature
for the construction of the supply function bid. The numerical results that follow
examine the relation between the equilibrium solutions resulting from the four
different parameterization methods in the presence of AC network modelling.
Since there has been no investigation of the impact of the parameterization
chosen on the equilibrium solution, in applications with AC meshed networks or
large systems, the proposed market equilibrium algorithm is used to examine
several case studies that involve a variety of test systems under different network
operational conditions, to further contribute to the subject.
The investigation follows the analysis of [113] and illustrates how the
introduction of AC network constraints can affect the market results for the four
parameterization methods and the relationships between them. The analysis of
the numerical results emphasises the following: (a) comparison of the SFE
market outcomes from the four different parameterization methods and
investigation of their interrelation; (b) examination of the change of the
parameterizations’ impact on the solution when subject to different levels of
network congestion; and (c) discrimination between the effects on small test
systems and on larger more complex networks. Furthermore, comparison of the
convergence characteristics of the SFE algorithm for the different
parameterization methods is provided in the next chapter.
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8.2 Description of the SFE electricity market algorithm for the
different parameterization methods
The formulation of the proposed algorithm that takes place in Chapter 3 uses the
kF-parameterization method to construct the supply function bid offer. In order to
have a clear picture on how the parameterization method employed affects the
formulation of the proposed SFE market algorithm, and hence the resulting SFE
solution, the mathematical derivation for the Newton matrix equation that is
solved iteratively is briefly described here by considering all the different
parameterization types.
The network modelling and the electricity market assumptions are as outlined in
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively, with the equation for the supply function bid
(3.51) to be adjusted accordingly depending on the parameterization method
chosen. Hence, the bid may take one of the following forms that correspond to
the α-, β-, kF- and (α, β)-parameterizations respectively:
iiii FFFF PgSB   ˆ (8.1)
iiii FFFF PgSB 
ˆ (8.2)
)(
iiiii FFFFF PgkSB   (8.3)
iiii FFFF PgSB 
ˆˆ  (8.4)
where
iFˆ and iFˆ are the parameterized terms that dictate the strategic
behaviour of the generating firms for the α-, β-, and (α, β)-parameterizations,
which correspond to the true cost coefficients α and β from the marginal cost
function.
The quasi-social welfare function used for the optimisation problem of the ISO in


























for the (α, β)-parameterization formulation, or the ˆ or ˆ terms in (8.5) may be
substituted by the true cost coefficients to represent the β- or α-parameterizations
respectively.
The inequality for the restrictions on the strategic bids used in the optimisation
problem of the generating firms in Section 3.8, equation (3.65) that corresponds
to the kF-parameterized supply function bid is replaced with:
maxmin
iii FFF bbb  (8.6)
where
iFb is the set of strategic bidding variables depending on the
parameterisation method, i.e. the set of all
iFˆ , or all iFˆ , or all iFk , or all iFˆ
and all





terms are the limits for the strategic variables present.
The formulation of the market algorithm follows the procedure described in
Section 3.9. Depending on the parameterization method chosen, the Lagrange
function (3.72) and the resulting KKT condition for the system variables (3.73)
for the reformulation of the ISO problem will be different, since they include the
quasi-social welfare term ISO that depends on the bidding variables iFb . By
proceeding to the formulation of the combined market problem for the
equilibrium solution, the optimisation function (3.90) and the equality constraints
resulting from the Fiacco-McCormick barrier method (3.91)-(3.92) may require
modifications and additional slack variables depending on the bidding variables
present. Hence, the Lagrange function (3.94) for the combined problem, which


















































where ],[ ul   , ],[ susls  , and ],[ maxmin hhhm  . The resulting KKT


































F iii GL   (8.9)




nxx shL nn  (8.10)
02  nnn nss L   (8.11)
0][2   
i n
nnxiixISOx hGLx  (8.12)
02  iGLi  (8.13)
0][2 
m
nnn hshLn  (8.14)
02  nnsLns  (8.15)












where ],[ maxmin bbbm  .
The expressions (8.8)-(8.19) represent the market equilibrium problem. It can be
observed that equations (8.8), (8.12) and (8.17) include the term ISO and
equations (8.17)-(8.19) depend on the bidding variables
iFb . Therefore,
depending on the parameterization method chosen, the resulting market
equilibrium solutions for the four methods are expected to differ from each other.
By linearizing the above equations, the Newton matrix equation (3.137) can be
re-written with respect to the bidding variables
































































































where the H terms correspond to the contribution of the slack variables and the
Lagrange multipliers π and ω; the X terms to the contribution of the system
variables x and the Lagrange multipliers λ; and the B terms to the contribution of
the strategic variables
iFb and their associated slack and dual variables. The
detailed element structure for the H and X elements (depending on the type of
parameterization if they contain the ISO term) can be determined using the
guidelines from Chapter 3. The slack and dual variables associated with the
bidding variables
iFb , which would be present in the B sub-matrices, are
eliminated from the Newton step vector using Gaussian elimination following the
same procedure as in Section 3.9.5 that was applied on the
iFk -related terms.
The nonzero entries in the resulting B sub-matrices for the (α, β)-
parameterization (being analogous to equations (3.150)-(3.152) for the kF-
parameterization) that correspond to the rows of ΔPg, Pg and ii FF   / of
the Newton step vector are:
][-1 ii PgiF PgB   (8.21)












As the Newton matrix equation given in (8.20) depends on the type of
parameterization chosen, two different algorithms were coded based on the
above mathematical derivations. The first algorithm corresponds to the (α, β)-
parameterization and the second one to the kF-parameterization; the latter is the
one used for the market analysis in Chapters 4 to 7. Using the (α, β)-algorithm,
the α- and β-parameterization methods can be implemented by adjusting the
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limits of the β or α parameters respectively, to force them to equal the true cost
coefficient values from the marginal cost functions.
8.3 Introduction to the analysis of the market solution
behaviour for the different SFE parameterization methods
In order to examine the behaviour of the market solution under the four different
types of parameterization for the supply function bid, numerical results were
performed in test systems ranging from 3 to 57 buses. The test systems involve
cases with and without transmission congestion, as well as different bus voltage
modes, in order to show the interrelations of the network operating conditions to
the effects of the different parameterization methods on the market outcome.
The maximum and minimum limits for the parameterized terms in the strategic
bids were set to 0min  , 200max  , 5min 10 , 6max  , according to
[116]. The limits for the bidding parameters kF were set to 0min Fk and
10max Fk as in [134]. It has been checked that varying the limits within a
reasonable domain does not affect the equilibrium solution. The nodal prices and
α coefficients are measured in £/MWh; the profits, social welfare and β
coefficients in £/hour; the kF parameter is dimensionless; and all the power
quantities are calculated in p.u. The transformer tap-ratio can be optimized by the
ISO within the range of 0.9 and 1.1. The results for the firms’ profits are
indicated in the Tables by the firm’s title, e.g. F1. The results for the social
welfare (S.W.) correspond to the true social welfare and not the quasi function
from (3.54) or (8.5).
8.4 Numerical results on the 3-bus test system
The investigation begins with tests on the small 3-bus system shown in Figure
19, which consists of 3 buses with load demand, 3 transmission lines and 2
generators owned by firms F1 and F2. The inverse load demand functions are
11 06.040 PdD  £/MWh and ii PdD 065.040  £/MWh, for 3,2i and the
195
marginal costs of generation are shown in the system diagram. Three different
case scenarios have been simulated (Cases 1 to 3) using all the available
parameterization methods and the numerical results for the market solution are
shown in Table 8.1.
Figure 19: The 3-bus test system for the parameterization analysis.
TABLE 8.1
RESULTS FOR THE 3-BUS SYSTEM: MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR CASES 1 TO 3
Case 1: No Congestion and |V|±10%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 F1 F2 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 27.1 26.9 27.5 3344 5525 6.10 3.19 6.07 2.94 12834 α1=25.15 α2=22.96
β- 27.1 26.8 27.5 3343 5526 6.10 3.19 6.08 2.94 12840 β1=0.073 β2=0.041
kF 27.1 26.9 27.5 3344 5525 6.10 3.19 6.07 2.94 12834 kF1=2.089 kF2=1.841
Case 2: max S2-3 = 0.8 p.u. and |V|±10%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 F1 F2 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W. Bid1 Bid2





α- 32.2 32.0 32.5 2780 4677 3.68 1.86 3.67 1.78 8927 α1=31.00 α2=29.63
β- 29.7 28.0 31.5 3349 4706 4.86 2.48 4.83 2.34 10974 β1=0.100 β2=0.058
kF 32.2 32.0 32.5 2776 4679 3.67 1.86 3.67 1.77 8922 kF1=2.638 kF2=2.453
Case 3: max S2-3 = 0.8 p.u. and |V|±3%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 F1 F2 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 29.9 28.4 31.5 3334 4709 4.74 2.44 4.73 2.29 10807 α1=28.21 α2=25.53
β- 29.7 28.0 31.5 3330 4704 4.84 2.48 4.82 2.33 10953 β1=0.100 β2=0.058
kF 29.7 28.2 31.4 3355 4700 4.81 2.47 4.80 2.32 10923 kF1=2.342 kF2=2.065
Case 1 corresponds to normal operating conditions and no congestion exists in
the network, while the bus voltages can be optimized by the ISO within a wide
domain of ±10% from the rated value of 1 p.u. The results for the α-, β-, and kF-
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parameterizations are identical, while those for the (α, β)-method show slight
differences but still are very close to the others. For the α-, β-, and kF-
parameterizations the bids submitted from both firms are much higher than their
marginal costs. On the other hand, the â bid coefficients for the (α, β)-
parameterization are much smaller than the true values, hence the bids are much
smaller than the marginal cost.
Case 2 has the same input data as Case 1, but the MVA transmission limit for
line 2-3 is set to 8.0max23 S p.u., which is binding for all parameterizations.
Therefore, Case 2 has higher nodal prices, reduced active and reactive
generation, and lower social welfare compared with Case 1. However, the
purpose of this investigation is not the comparison of the different network
operations (as is the case for Chapters 4 to 7) but of the different
parameterization types, for which the deviation of their corresponding solutions
seems to be dependent on the network conditions. As can be seen in Table 8.1,
the results for Case 2 are similar for the (α, β)-, α-, and kF-parameterizations,
while those for β-parameterization differ. Again, the results of the (α, β)-
parameterization have small deviations from the others and the (α, β)-bids are
much smaller than the corresponding marginal costs.
For Case 3, the bus voltage limits were lowered to ±3% from 1 p.u. while the line
congestion was still present to show that the level of the restrictions on the bus
voltages further affects the deviation between the solutions of the different
parameterizations. (Note that a case for which the voltage limits were set to ±3%
from 1 p.u. and no congestion was present was also performed, but apart from
the effects of the voltage mode there were no appreciable differences between the
solutions of the four parameterizations, as happened in Case 1.) From the results
for Case 3 in Table 8.1 it can be seen that, unlike Case 2, the solution of the β-
parameterization has become very similar with those of the α- and kF-methods,
while the results for the (α, β)-parameterization differ from those by a noticeable
deviation.
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The above results lead to the conclusion that the four parameterizations behave in
a different manner in the presence of transmission line congestion and that this
impact depends on the bus voltage limits. Under normal operating conditions all
methods give similar or identical solutions. When transmission congestion is
introduced the β-parameterization gives different market solution from the other
three methods, while when the voltage limits are narrowed in the presence of
congestion the α-, β- and kF-solutions become similar, and differ from the (α, β)-
solution. For all tests the (α, β)-parameterization has at least a slight deviation
from the other methods. In order to back these illations and examine a possible
pattern for the observations, further cases are carried out on a 5-bus system.
8.5 Numerical results on the 5-bus test system
The 5-bus system consists of 5 buses with load demand, 3 transmission lines, 2
on-load tap-changing transformer branches and 2 generators owned by firms F1
and F2, as shown in Figure 20. The inverse load demand functions are
ii PdD 065.040  £/MWh for 2,1i and jj PdD 06.040  £/MWh for
5,4,3j . The numerical results for the 5-bus system are provided in Tables 8.2
and 8.3.
Figure 20: The 5-bus test system for the parameterization analysis.
The tests on the 5-bus system begin with the benchmark Case 4, for which there
is no transmission congestion in the network and the bus voltage limits are set to
±5% from 1 p.u. Similarly to Case 1 of the smaller system, the market solutions
from the α-, β- and kF-parameterizations are very similar and there are small
differences for the (α, β)-solution, as shown in Table 8.2.
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TABLE 8.2
RESULTS FOR THE 5-BUS SYSTEM: MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR CASES 4 TO 6 ( |V|±5% )
Case 4: No Congestion and |V|±5%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 λp4 λp5 F1 F2 S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 31.1 30.4 31.8 32.8 32.4 2920 8124 14134 α1=29.76 α2=25.61
β- 31.1 30.4 31.8 32.8 32.4 3032 8040 14157 β1=0.131 β2=0.041
kF 31.1 30.4 31.8 32.8 32.4 2921 8124 14134 kF1=2.562 kF2=1.926
Case 5: max 2S p.u. (branch 2-3 binding) and |V|±5%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 λp4 λp5 F1 F2 S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 29.7 28.3 32.7 32.9 31.8 3118 7204 14583 α1=28.11 α2=23.47
β- 32.7 32.0 33.2 33.8 33.6 2698 7949 12785 β1=0.173 β2=0.050
kF 29.7 28.3 32.7 32.9 31.8 3119 7204 14584 kF1=2.402 kF2=1.787
Case 6: max 1S p.u. (branches 1-5 and 2-3 binding) and |V|±5%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 λp4 λp5 F1 F2 S.W. Bid1 Bid2





α- 29.6 29.4 35.1 35.3 34.8 4205 4486 11846 α1=27.49 α2=26.79
β- 29.5 29.5 35.0 35.3 34.9 4390 4319 11863 β1=0.075 β2=0.074
kF 29.6 29.4 35.1 35.3 34.8 4194 4495 11845 kF1=2.293 kF2=2.157
TABLE 8.3
RESULTS FOR THE 5-BUS SYSTEM: MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR CASES 7 TO 8 ( |V|±3% )
Case 7: No Congestion and |V|±3%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 λp4 λp5 F1 F2 S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 35.1 34.5 35.4 35.8 35.7 1956 6339 9280 α1=34.32 α2=31.67
β- 29.6 29.1 30.9 32.2 31.7 2993 6547 13086 β1=0.113 β2=0.045
kF 35.1 34.5 35.4 35.8 35.7 1956 6339 9280 kF1=3.038 kF2=2.490
Case 8: max 1S p.u. (branch 2-3 binding) and |V|±3%
b λp1 λp2 λp3 λp4 λp5 F1 F2 S.W. Bid1 Bid2




α- 30.7 28.8 35.7 35.0 33.4 2846 5460 11435 α1=29.34 α2=25.43
β- 30.7 28.8 35.7 35.0 33.4 2888 5435 11449 β1=0.132 β2=0.053
kF 30.7 28.8 35.7 35.0 33.4 2848 5459 11436 kF1=2.527 kF2=2.003
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For the next two Cases, the transmission capacity limits of the entire system are
gradually reduced to 2 p.u. and 1 p.u. respectively, to examine low and more
intense transmission congestion conditions. When the system transmission limits
are reduced to 2 p.u. for Case 5, transmission congestion exists in the transformer
branch TR1 between buses 2-3. Again, as in Case 2, the results from the β-
parameterization are considerably different from those of the other methods, and
the results for the α- and kF-methods are identical, and differ by a small deviation
from those of the (α, β)-parameterization. For Case 6 where the transmission
limits are further reduced to 1 p.u., congestion exists in the transformer branch
TR1 and in line branch 1-5. The results of the β-parameterization are now very
close to those of the α- and kF-methods, while the market outcome of the (α, β)-
parameterization shows a significant deviation. This behaviour resembles Case 3
where the voltage limits are reduced in the presence of congestion.
In order to examine the interrelation between the similar observations for Case 3
that has reduced voltage limits and those for Case 6 that has intense transmission
congestion, two more cases are examined on the 5-bus system for tighter bus
voltage limits of ±3% from 1 p.u. These are Cases 7 and 8, which are performed
with no congestion and under intense transmission congestion respectively, as
shown in Table 8.3. By comparing Case 7 with Case 4, for which the voltage
range has been reduced from ±5% to ±3% from 1 p.u., it can be seen that, unlike
Case 4, the solution of the β-parameterization in Case 7 differs from the others,
as in the cases where low transmission congestion was present (Cases 2 and 5).
However, here there is no transmission congestion.
When the voltage range is reduced from Case 6 to Case 8 where the transmission
limits in the network are set to 1 p.u., the overall power generation is reduced due
to the voltage restrictions and, since less power is required to be transmitted in
the network, one of the two congested lines is relieved. Therefore, there is only
one transmission branch congested (TR1) in Case 8, but the deviation that
existed in Case 6 between the solution of the (α, β)-parameterization and the
other methods was sustained. The observations for Cases 6 and 8 are compatible
with those for Case 3, where only the (α, β)-solutions show significant difference
from those of the other parameterization methods.
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8.6 Discussion on the different market solutions from the four
parameterization methods based on the numerical results of
Cases 1 to 8
The numerical results from the test cases on the 3-bus and the 5-bus systems are
in good agreement and have shown that the market solutions from the different
parameterization methods can be similar or have large deviations, depending on
the presence and intensity of transmission congestion in conjunction with the
level of the bus voltage limits. The α- and kF-parameterization methods have
been found to give very similar or identical solutions for all test cases
independent of the operating network conditions. The solution of the β-
parameterization is different from the other three when there is transmission
congestion up to a certain level, or, in the absence of congestion, when there are
tight limits for the bus voltages. The (α, β)-parameterization method gives
solutions with significant differences from the other three methods if the
transmission congestion is intense, or if there is congestion in the presence of
tight bus voltage limits. Nonetheless, the market solution from the (α, β)-
parameterization always has at least a small deviation from those of the other
three methods.
According to the above observations it can be concluded that the presence and
level of limitations associated with the power transmission and the bus voltages
affect the market solution obtained from the four different supply function
parameterization methods. Low level restrictions result in deviations on the
solution of the β-parameterization and tighter restrictions affect the solution of
the (α, β)-parameterization. It can also be seen that the effect of transmission
congestion is more intense than that of voltage restrictions.
In contrast to the observations on the unconstrained and linearized systems in
[113,104,114], the producers’ surplus in all the (α, β)-test cases for the AC
systems examined here is found to be lower than those of the other three
parameterization methods. This may be explained as follows. Even though the
outcome of any of the α-, β- and kF-methods can be obtained using the (α, β)-
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parameterization, it may not be an equilibrium point since a player may be able
to implement another (α, β)-strategy that will result in higher profit (if the
strategies of its rivals remain constant). The rivals will then anticipate this action
and sequentially alter their strategies for their benefit, always subject to the
network and market constraints present. Hence, the resulting equilibrium point,
at which no firm will be able to further increase its profit, may correspond to a
lower surplus for all the producers.
The investigations in [113] and [104] show that the (α, β)-profits in
unconstrained systems equal those of the Cournot solution and quote the concept
of focal equilibrium, which is mutually beneficial and preferred by all players.
However, the introduction of the AC network modelling in the current study
prevented such results, giving contradictory effects. Another observation is that
an equilibrium (α, β)-strategy in the context of AC network modelling may
require a bid that is much lower than the corresponding marginal cost function,
as the particular player will gain profit due to the level of market price, which
depends on several factors related to the nonlinear nature of the AC network and
not only on the firms’ strategies.
Furthermore, by observing the cases with moderate limitations on power
transmission and bus voltages for which the β-parameterization gives different
market solutions than the other three methods (Cases 2, 5 and 7), it can be seen
that the producers’ surplus for β-parameterization is always higher than that of
the other methods. This is in agreement with the observations in [118], where
market solutions for parameterizations of slopes and intercepts are compared for
a 4-bus linearized DC system with transmission limits for active power. The
authors of [118] postulate that by using the β-parameterization method the
resulting equilibria resemble Cournot market outcomes, which might be the case
under certain restrictions. This also holds for the results in [104], where the slope
manipulation results in higher profits than the intercept-parameterization in an
unconstrained system.
In addition to the cases provided above, several other tests not shown here were
performed. These were examining the effect on the deviation between the
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solutions from the four parameterization methods for power factor adjustments
and for variation of other network constraints, such as the active and reactive
generation limits. However, no significant difference was observed between the
resulting market solutions from the different parameterization methods (as in
Cases 1 and 4).
In order to examine if the above conclusions can be supported in the case of
larger and more realistic systems, simulations on the IEEE 30-bus and 57-bus
systems are described in the subsequent sections.
8.7 Numerical results on the IEEE 30-bus system
The IEEE 30-bus system [191] used here consists of 30 buses of which 22 have
load demand, 37 transmission lines, 4 on-load tap-changing transformers, and 6
generators, each one forming an individual strategic firm (entitled F1 to F6). For
this and for other larger systems the algorithm was unable to converge to an
equilibrium solution when the (α, β)-parameterization was employed, possibly
due to the complications discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7, but this will be
further discussed in the next section. Convergence problems for the (α, β)-
parameterization method have also been reported by [116]. Hence, only the
solutions of the other three parameterization methods are provided for this
system and the results are given in Table 8.4.
Based on the conclusions from the results on the 3-bus and 5-bus systems, it was
investigated whether the β-parameterization method would have produced
different results on the 30-bus system for a particular level of transmission
congestion. The tests started from transmission limits of 2.0 p.u. for the entire
network (Case 9), where there was no transmission congestion. The limits were
gradually reduced and it was found that within the domain of 1.16 to 1.10 p.u.,
for which 3 transmission lines were congested, there was a deviation between the
solution from the β-parameterization and the results from the α- and kF-methods.
Note that the range of transmission limits that resulted in different β-solutions for
the 30-bus system is much smaller than those for the 3-bus and 5-bus systems.
203
TABLE 8.4
RESULTS FOR THE IEEE 30-BUS SYSTEM: MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR CASES 9 TO 11
Case 9: No Congestion and |V|±10%
b F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W.
α- 3034 1709 5676 2815 731 1246 9.68 4.88 9.46 4.09 19559
β- 3033 1709 5679 2817 728 1246 9.68 4.88 9.46 4.09 19561
kF 3034 1709 5676 2815 731 1246 9.68 4.88 9.46 4.09 19559
Case 10: max 13.1S p.u. (3 lines binding) and |V|±10%
b F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W.
α- 2840 1839 5212 3111 949 1258 9.25 4.74 9.06 4.02 18748
β- 2970 1845 5132 2980 950 1176 9.48 4.80 9.28 4.07 19103
kF 2840 1838 5213 3112 947 1261 9.25 4.74 9.06 4.02 18744
Case 11: max 4.0S p.u. (6 lines binding) and |V|±10%
b F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd S.W.
α- 2229 2339 3595 1988 356 514 7.01 2.87 6.97 2.96 14181
β- 2213 2338 3586 1987 358 519 7.01 2.85 6.96 2.95 14198
kF 2230 2338 3595 1988 356 514 7.01 2.87 6.97 2.96 14182
Case 10 presented in Table 8.4 corresponds to an intermediate case for a limit of
1.13 p.u. When the transmission limits were further reduced, the solutions of the
α-, β- and kF-parameterizations became very similar to each other. Case 11 shows
the solutions for a limit of 0.4 p.u. For the latter case it can be presumed that, if
an (α, β)-solution could be obtained, it would have been different from those of
the other three methods, following the pattern observed for the smaller systems.
During the procedure of reducing the transmission limits, it was observed that for
certain values the number of congested lines in the solutions from the different
parameterizations was not the same, and hence their results were dissimilar since
they corresponded to different network operations. Similar observations were
also made when the bus voltage limits were varied. Further elaboration on this
takes place in the next section on the IEEE 57-bus system. However, in all cases
with the same number of congested lines, the parameterization solutions were
following the pattern discussed above.
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8.8 Numerical results on the IEEE 57-bus system
The larger IEEE 57-bus system [191] is tested to show the complications that
arise in relation to the solutions provided from the different parameterization
methods for more realistic situations. This system consists of 57 buses of which
42 have load demand, 63 transmission lines, 17 on-load tap-changing
transformers, and 7 generators, each one forming an individual strategic firm
(entitled F1 to F7). Again, results are presented for the α-, β-, and kF-
parameterizations, as shown in Table 8.5. The last column of the Table shows the
number of congested lines cL for each equilibrium solution.
TABLE 8.5
RESULTS FOR THE IEEE 57-BUS SYSTEM: MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR CASES 12 TO 13
Case 12: No Congestion and |V|±10%
b F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 S.W. ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd cL
α- 6122 4866 1437 1803 9459 1768 7759 41229 19.86 6.58 19.36 5.33 0
β- 6279 4797 1250 1755 8962 2532 7527 41083 19.87 6.54 19.38 5.33 0
kF 6130 4859 1425 1801 9462 1761 7760 41158 19.82 6.56 19.32 5.33 0
Case 13: max 7.1S p.u. and |V|±10%
b F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 S.W. ΣPg ΣQg ΣPd ΣQd cL
α- 6837 3889 1448 1602 8929 2016 7592 40043 19.14 6.15 18.69 5.15 2
β- 7343 3148 1257 1641 8955 2664 7240 40277 19.45 6.18 19.00 5.16 3
kF 6852 4346 9 1321 9349 2727 7362 37889 17.69 5.89 17.25 4.96 5
Case 12 corresponds to normal operating conditions and no congestion exists in
the network. When the MVA transmission limits of the system are reduced to 1.7
p.u. in order to impose transmission congestion (Case 13), the number of
congested transmission lines for each parameterization method is different as
shown in the last column of Table 8.5. Hence, the three solutions for Case 13
correspond to different network operating conditions and they significantly differ
from each other. Different cases with a variety of reduced limits for particular
transmission lines and for the entire network were examined, but the three
parameterization methods were resulting in dissimilar network operations in
almost all cases. This also happens for other larger systems. Even though for the
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smaller systems the four parameterization methods were giving solutions that
correspond to the same operating conditions under network congestion and at
least two solutions were in numerical agreement, for the larger systems this is not
the case. Similar observations are made for variations of the bus voltage limits,
since the voltages have a direct impact on the reactive transmission flows.
The occurrence that the parameterization methods give solutions that correspond
to different network operations only for the larger systems may be owing to the
fact that there is a wider combination of alternative routes for the power flows to
follow. In larger and more complex networks the active and reactive power flows
can be redistributed to suit a more appropriate scenario for the ISO objective, for
only a small change in the supply function bids submitted from the strategic
firms (in this case resulting from the different form of the parameterized bids).
An observation for dissimilar congestion configurations for the different
parameterization methods has also been reported in [116], for a linearized DC
39-bus system.
As far as the (α, β)-parameterization is concerned, as a congestion pattern is
changing for an adjustment in a bid during the iterative process, a different (α,
β)-strategy may become more profitable for some player, and the successive
resulting situation can correspond to a different congestion pattern that may give
rise to a more profitable (α, β)-strategy for a different player, and so on. This
may be another possible reason for the convergence problems of the (α, β)-
parameterization for large systems as pure strategy Nash equilibria may not
exist7.
Referring to the above observations, the impact of the parameterization method
chosen on the equilibrium solution for more realistic systems is evident. The
investigation on whether there is a correct choice on the parameterization method
for each particular power system and network conditions or not, is a topic of
future research.
7 Convergence problems may also be attributed to the existence of multiple equilibria as
discussed in Section 2.7, but it should be recalled that these should not be expected in large
numbers for realistic situations under the restrictive conditions of the AC model, according to
[128].
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8.9 Conclusions for Chapter 8
This chapter has examined the impact of the choice of parameterization method
for the linear SFE model, on the electricity market equilibrium solution. It has
been shown that, under the AC network modelling assumptions the (α, β)-
parameterization does not yield Cournot solutions as mentioned in the literature,
but, instead, the resulting producers’ surplus is lower than that of the other three
methods. This is due to the fact that an equilibrium (α, β)-solution with Cournot
profits cannot be sustained in the presence of AC network constraints as it is
affected by the interactions between the equilibrium strategies of the individual
market players (which depend on the nonlinearities of the AC network). In
addition, it was shown that it is not profit incentive for the strategic firms in the
AC model to reveal their true intercept from the marginal cost in the (α, β)-
parameterization, as in the unconstrained multi-period linear SFE model [79],
while a profitable (α, β)-equilibrium strategy may require a bid that is much
lower than the corresponding marginal cost function. The profit for the latter case
will be owing to the increased level of market price, which depends on several
factors related to the AC modelling, and not only on the strategic bids.
A pattern was observed for the relation between the equilibrium solutions from
the different parameterization methods. For systems up to 30 buses, the α- and
kF-parameterizations resulted in identical solutions for all tests, while the
solutions for all the parameterization methods were very similar for no
transmission congestion or strict voltage limits. When limiting bounds were
introduced in the network, different solutions were observed for the β-
parameterization when the stress in the network was low, and for the (α, β)-
parameterization in the presence of tighter network limits. However, no pattern
was observed for larger systems, because each parameterization method was
resulting in different number of congested lines, due to the complexity of the
transmission network, and hence to dissimilar network operational conditions.
Thus, it has been shown that the relation between the equilibrium solutions from
the four parameterization methods is directly dependent on the presence and
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severity of the transmission congestion in conjunction with the level of the bus
voltage limits.
The proposed interior point algorithm has been able to provide solutions for the
α-, β- and kF-parameterization methods for all systems. The employment of the
(α, β)-parameterization has successfully solved the small 3-bus and 5-bus test
systems, while it has difficulties in converging to equilibrium solutions for large
systems. These convergence problems may arise due to oscillations in the
convergence process caused by a continuum of equilibria as reported in the
literature. However, multiple equilibria for the (α, β)-parameterization are not to
be expected in large numbers for realistic networks, but only for small trivial
systems (for which the proposed algorithm did not encountered any particular
convergence problems). Another possibility for the convergence complications
of the (α, β)-parameterization is the successive alterations of the transmission
congestion patterns in the network, which are responses to any adjustments in the
strategic bids, owing to the complicated meshed network structure of larger
systems. A change in the congestion pattern may render a different (α, β)-
strategy more profitable for some player and the successive market conditions
may correspond to a different congestion pattern that gives rise to a more
profitable (α, β)-strategy for a different player, and so on. This is not the case for
the other three parameterization methods, because they are allowed fewer
degrees of freedom for the choice of the strategic supply function bid than the (α,
β)-parameterization, and hence less complicated interactions between the
players’ strategies are expected.
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Chapter 9:
Convergence characteristics of the electricity
market SFE algorithm
9.1 Introduction to the computational performance
characteristics of linear SFE models
Even though the computational time required for obtaining optimal solutions for
the analysis of theoretical electricity market scenarios is not of primal
importance, the conditions for simulating real-time practical situations during the
market clearing process require high efficiency for the iterative procedure in
terms of computational performance and robustness. For example, the
application of an algorithm for the simulation of an electricity bid-based market
with bidding intervals of 15 minutes entails computational requirements in the
order of seconds, independent of the network operational conditions being able to
handle any variations in the system parameters for each time interval.
The computational performance of a market equilibrium algorithm is directly
related to the numerical method and mathematical framework employed, while
the particular network representation and modelling of the bidding strategies also
interfere with the efficiency of the algorithmic procedure. Factors that
correspond to binding inequality constraints for certain market conditions, such
as the presence of network congestion and reduced limits on constrained system
variables, and the complexity of the examined system further affect the
computational performance. In addition, functional inequality constraints may
have a greater effect than simple inequality constraints when binding, due to
higher execution times. The studies in the existing literature on the linear SFE
models (presented in Chapter 2) occasionally provide information about the
computational performance of the implemented market algorithms. The required
CPU times for convergence reported in the literature are summarised in Table
9.1, where information on the numerical framework is provided for reference.
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The studies on the AC-network linear SFE models did not elaborate on the
computational performance of the algorithm, except [89], which mentions a
number of iterations between 200 to 600 for solving the IEEE 14-bus system
with 2 strategic players.
TABLE 9.1
CPU TIMES FOR THE LINEAR SFE MODELS REPORTED IN THE LITERATURE
Reference Numericalmethod
Network
representation CPU time System Parameterization
[126] Golden sectionsearch method Quantity limits 3 seconds 6-firm structure β-parameterization
[134] NCP formulation DC model 5 minutes 30-bus system kF-parameterization
[104] Coevolutionarycomputation No constraints 1 second 5-firm structure All parameterizations
[136] Lagrangeoptimisation DC model 3 minutes 30-bus system kF-parameterization
[116] CP formulation DC model 172.8 seconds 39-bus system (α, β)-parameterization
[116] Diagonalizationmethod DC model 3.6 seconds 39-bus system (α, β)-parameterization
[116] Regularizationmethod DC model 61.9 seconds 39-bus system (α, β)-parameterization
[114] Diagonalizationmethod DC model 5 seconds 6-bus system (α, β)-parameterization
[138] Mixed integerNLP DC model 27.5 seconds
8 6-bus system kF-parameterization
It can be seen that the introduction of DC representation requires higher CPU
times than the unconstrained cases and that the numerical method employed for
the solution of the problem significantly affects the computational performance
(see the three models from [116] on the 39-bus system). Small systems (6 buses)
can be solved within 5 to 28 seconds, while the required CPU times for larger
systems (30 to 39 buses) are ranging from few seconds to 5 minutes depending
on the numerical framework. The parameterization method chosen also affects
the CPU time requirements, as observed in [116] (not shown here).
By reviewing the models in the existing literature, it can be seen that the
proposed numerical algorithms solve relatively small linearized DC systems in
the order of seconds or minutes. However, the application of such algorithms in
practical systems preconditions superior efficiency and reduced execution times.
8 The CPU time given in [138] is 11 minutes for a 24-interval market simulation. The figure
presented in Table 9.1 is the average CPU time per interval.
210
The implemented electricity market algorithm in this Thesis, which considers the
more realistic AC network representation, has exhibited high computational
performance with exceptionally low execution times. The convergence
characteristics of the proposed algorithm are examined in the next sections.
9.2 Analysis of the convergence characteristics of the proposed
electricity market SFE algorithm
The proposed algorithm has successfully been used for simulating various
network and market conditions for several test systems ranging from 3 to 118
buses in Chapters 4 to 8. Solutions for small systems (3 to 5 buses) have been
obtained in extremely low execution times, being in the order of few
milliseconds. For example, the test cases for the 5-bus system in Chapter 7,
Section 7.6.1 that include transformer components and congested transmission
lines required a CPU execution time between 62 and 203 milliseconds with a
number of iterations between 10 and 28. Such figures are one or two orders
lower than the corresponding for the DC or unconstrained systems from the
existing literature, as shown in Table 9.1. In order to demonstrate the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm on solving larger systems, the presentation of the
convergence characteristics of the algorithmic procedure are based on the test
cases performed on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems in Chapter 5, Sections
5.3 and 5.4 respectively. The analysis includes graphical presentations of the
iterative process in terms of power mismatch and complementary gap
minimisations. In addition, the convergence process for the different
parameterization methods is elaborated in Section 9.3.
Concerning the terminology used in this chapter, a reference to simple
constraints denotes the bus voltage and transformer tap-ratio control constraints
and the active and reactive power generation and absorption capacity limits (even
though the voltage constraint, which is formulated in rectangular coordinates, is
actually a quadratic function of the real and imaginary bus voltage components;
see (3.60)). A functional constraint refers to the MVA transmission inequality
constraint (3.57), which is a complicated function of the rectangular voltage
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components. The tolerances of the break point for the algorithm are as described
in Section 3.10. The algorithm was implemented and run on a Pentium® 4 CPU
3.20GHz, 0.99GB of RAM.
9.2.1 Convergence for the IEEE 14-bus system
The number of iterations and the required CPU time in milliseconds for each
case performed on the IEEE 14-bus system are provided in Table 9.2, indicating
the number of binding constraints. The Case No. refers to that used in Chapter 5.
For this system, the number of variables updated after each iteration is 2259, the
dimensions of the Newton matrix is 527×527 and the number of the active
inequality constraints is 94.
TABLE 9.2
CONVERGENCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM
Case No. No. of iterations CPU time(milliseconds)
No. of simple
binding constraints
11 11 203 8
12 12 219 7
13 8 140 7
14 11 188 7
15 16 281 7
22 12 203 8
23 11 187 8
24 14 265 7
From Table 9.2 it can be seen that for all the tests on the 14-bus system, the
algorithm converges within 8 to 16 iterations, requiring 140 to 281 milliseconds
of CPU time. The algorithm demonstrates excellent computational performance,
proving its efficiency with an average CPU time of 211 milliseconds for the
examined test cases, which is much lower even from that for the small
unconstrained market structures reported in the literature. The algorithm was
tested on hundreds of different test cases for this system, with a broad range of
different input parameters and constraint limits. It has demonstrated its
robustness by providing consistent results for all tests and reaching feasible
solutions for the Nash equilibrium in milliseconds, for a system that involves
repeated updates of more than 2250 variables.
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By comparing the performance of the algorithm with that of the AC model in
[89], which solves the same system with a number of iterations between 200 to
600 for 2 strategic players considering constant reactive load demand and no
transformers, it can be seen that the model in this Thesis is by 17 to 50 times
more efficient. This proves that the primal-dual interior point formulation is more
computationally efficient than the diagonalization schemes.
9.2.2 Convergence for the IEEE 118-bus system
The behaviour of the algorithm convergence for the larger IEEE 118-bus system
is presented in Table 9.3 and Figures 21 and 22. Table 9.3 shows the number of
iterations, the required CPU time in seconds, the number of functional inequality
constraints, i.e. the MVA transmission branch constraints, that are binding and
the number of simple binding constraints. The Case No. is as in Chapter 5. In
Figures 21 and 22, the maximum absolute active or reactive power mismatch and
the complementary gap, respectively, are plotted for each iteration. The number
of the variables updated for each iteration in the iterative process for this system
is 17350, the dimensions of the Newton matrix are 4064×4064 and the number of
the associated active inequality constraints is 758.
TABLE 9.3
CONVERGENCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM





16 44 7.563 0 80
17 43 7.343 0 91
25 43 7.562 7 77
26 46 8.500 7 78
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Figure 21: Maximum absolute active/reactive power mismatches for the
convergence of the IEEE 118-bus system test cases.
Figure 22: Complementary gap minimisation for the convergence of the IEEE
118-bus system test cases.
By observing the information provided for the 118-bus system, it can be seen that
for most of the cases the convergence characteristics are very similar, with CPU
times between 7.3 to 8.5 seconds. However, it should be mentioned that the
binding functional inequality constraints in Cases 25 and 26, and the additional
simple binding constraints in Case 17 do not reduce the efficiency of the
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algorithm in terms of convergence. By comparing the characteristics for Cases 26
and 16, which have about the same number of simple binding constraints but
differ by 7 binding functional constraints, the increment in the required CPU
time is inexpensive, being less than 1 second with only 2 extra iterations. The
graphical presentation of the iterative process shows that the algorithm
demonstrates quadratic convergence characteristics near the final solution.
To further test the ability of the implemented algorithm to converge in very small
CPU times, Case 26 was performed again, with strict MVA limits of 1 p.u. at all
transmission branches in the system. The output results have indicated that 20 of
the MVA functional inequality constraints were binding at that limit, imposing
heavy transmission congestion in the network. However, the algorithm
converged within 48 iterations in 9.843 seconds. The extra 13 binding functional
inequality constraints have increased the required CPU time by less than 1.35
seconds, compared with the original Case 26. This shows that the implemented
algorithm is extremely efficient and robust, being able to provide SFE results for
large power systems, such as the IEEE 118-bus system, subject to several
binding functional and simple inequality constraints, dealing with tens of
thousands variables being updated after each iteration. These advantageous
features stem from the fundamental principles of the interior point method.
9.2.3 Discussions on the convergence of the algorithm
The algorithm has proven its efficiency and robustness on solving large scale
nonlinear systems, such as the examined IEEE 118-bus system. It has been
shown that the proposed electricity market model is able to handle larger power
systems than those involved in the existing literature, since it can provide SFE
results under various network operational conditions independent of the system
complexity, while it has improved realism and accuracy of the resulting market
outcome. The exceptional computational performance and the small required
processing time of the algorithm, along with its ability to provide robust market
solutions, give the opportunity to employ the proposed model for simulations of
electricity markets of large systems under on-line environments. Markets with
small bidding time intervals, such as half hour or 15 minutes, can be investigated,
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by modifying the algorithm accordingly to take into consideration the transition
between successive time intervals and accommodate the power generation and
load demand fluctuations.
9.3 Investigation of the computational performance of the
different parameterization methods
In order to check if the convergence characteristics of the primal-dual interior
point algorithm are different and examine any dissimilarities in its efficiency for
each parameterization method under the AC network representation, the average
required CPU time and average number of iterations for the test systems
investigated in Chapter 8 are presented in Table 9.4. The minimization of the
absolute power mismatches and complementary gap, for each parameterization
method in Case 5 from Chapter 8, are illustrated graphically in Figures 23 and 24
respectively.
TABLE 9.4



























Figure 23: Maximum absolute active/reactive power mismatches for the
convergence of the different parameterization methods.
Figure 24: Complementary gap minimisation for the convergence of the
different parameterization methods.
From Table 9.4 it can be seen that the CPU times and number of iterations for the
α-, β- and kF-methods are similar, while the (α, β)-parameterization requires a
CPU time and number of iterations about twice those for the other three methods,
when converging. However, all the CPU times are comparable and relatively
small, since there are of the order of milliseconds to a few seconds. By
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comparing the different parameterization cases for the IEEE 57-bus system, it
can be seen that the kF- parameterization that resulted in more congested lines
than the others (see Case 13, Chapter 8) requires higher CPU time, but the 3
extra functional binding constraints involve an additional execution time of only
2.5 seconds. The figures presented show that the computational performance of
the algorithm is equally superior for all the parameterizations. The only weakness
of the proposed model is the convergence problems for solving large systems
using the (α, β)-parameterization.
Case 5 from Chapter 8 was chosen for the graphical representation of the
convergence characteristics for the four parameterization methods in Figures 23
and 24, because all parameterizations provide solutions and involve strict limits
with two functional inequality and other simple constraints binding (see Chapter
8). From the graphs it can be seen that the α- and kF-methods show exactly the
same quadratic converging behaviour, while the behaviour of β-parameterization
deviates from those two after about 15 iterations. The β- and (α, β)-
parameterization algorithms demonstrate quadratic convergence characteristics
as well, near the final solution.
9.4 Factors that enhance the computational performance of the
algorithm
The presentation of the convergence characteristics of the proposed electricity
market algorithm in the previous sections and the comparison with the models in
the existing literature, have proven its superior computational performance. The
factors that contribute to the enhancement of the algorithm’s efficiency and made
possible the application of AC network modelling on large systems with reduced
execution times are summarised below:
- Application of the primal-dual interior point method:
The mathematical formulation of the bi-level market problem using this method
exhibits improved convergence for solving large systems. This is owing to the
fact that the convergence process of the interior point algorithm is very
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insensitive to the size and complexity of the problem as the number of iterations
increases with the logarithm of the number of variables involved.
- Rectangular coordinates representation:
By representing the system variables and power flows in rectangular coordinates
complex form, the computational efficiency of the algorithm is enhanced due to
the advantages of the resulting quadratic objective functions and constraints (see
Section 3.1).
- Introduction of complementarity function:
The complementarity formulation for the ISO KKT condition and the non-
negativity constraint of the active load demand variable enhances the
computational performance of the algorithm since there are no extra slack and
dual variables involved in the computations. In addition, the robustness of the
algorithm is improved, since any possible ill-conditioning complications due to
the complementarity expressions are eliminated.
- Sparse matrix techniques:
By arranging the elements in the Newton matrix in a 4 by 4 structure in order to
resemble the sparse configuration of the admittance matrix in the conventional
Newton power flow, the processing of individual sub-matrices for the system
variables and the slack/dual variables can be accomplished. This reduces the
matrix storage requirements and the computational effort in the algorithmic
procedure.
- Elimination of slack and dual variables:
The elimination of the slack and dual variables associated with the bidding
variables from the Newton matrix equation using Gaussian elimination, which is
made possible by the application of the aforementioned sparse matrix techniques,
reduces the computational effort during the iterative process. This is so because
they are retrieved after the solution of the Newton matrix equation and are not
involved during the calculation of the Newton step vector.
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9.5 Conclusions for Chapter 9
The convergence characteristics of the proposed interior point algorithm were
investigated, demonstrating the superior computational performance and
robustness of the implemented electricity market model in providing Nash SFE
solutions. The application of the algorithm on large nonlinear power systems
with CPU times of the order of few seconds has been successful, dealing with
tens of thousands of variables and constraints. These features have been
compared with the computational performances of the models in the existing
literature, showing that the formulation of the bi-level market problem by
employing the primal-dual interior point method is superior over the
diagonalization and the other methods proposed. It has been shown that even
when several functional or simple constraints are binding the computational
performance of the algorithm does not deteriorate, proving the functionality of
the interior point method. The distinct characteristics of this method have made
possible the realisation of the AC network representation that adds realism to the
electricity market model and improves the accuracy of the market predictions,
giving the opportunity for the proposed model to be applied for market
simulations of practical power systems.
The convergence to SFE market solutions for the different parameterization
methods has been examined to show that the algorithm can perform equally well
independent of the modelling of the strategic bid. It has been found that, if the
algorithm converges, the execution times are similar for all the parameterization
methods, being in the order of milliseconds or few seconds. The α-, β-and kF-
parameterizations did not exhibit any problems in providing robust equilibrium
solutions, while the employment of the (α, β)-parameterization method is





The work presented in this Thesis has focused on the analysis of the strategic
behaviour of the profit-maximising market participants in bid-based electricity
pool markets and the role of the network characteristics and constraints in
providing incentives for the exercise of market power. A nonlinear primal-dual
interior point algorithm based on linear SFE theory has been implemented using
the AC network representation to simulate several case scenarios on small and
large power systems for the investigation of different aspects related to the
system and market operation. The strategic behaviour of the individual
generating firms that own generating units with linear marginal costs of
generation is modelled by supply function bid offers that are constructed by
parameterizing their linear marginal cost functions. The market clearing price for
each time interval of the bidding process is determined in terms of nodal prices in
order to represent the energy price and the short-term transmission costs.
The mathematical formulation for the market problem involves a number of
features that enhance the computational performance of the algorithm, which is
able to provide equilibrium solutions for realistic AC systems with CPU times in
the order of a few seconds, with the potential for applications on practical power
systems and markets with small bidding time intervals. The proposed model can
be utilised to serve the interests of (a) the ISO for determining the required
system parameters for social welfare maximisation and preventing anti-
competitive behaviour from the strategic players, (b) the generating firms for
building optimum strategies according to the equilibrium bid predictions for
profit maximisation, and (c) the system designer for identifying the areas of the
system that are most prone to the exercise of market power due to the
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weaknesses in the network structure with the prospect for improvements to assist
the social welfare maximisation process.
The contributions of this Thesis can be separated into three parts. The first one
depicts the effects of the network features in general and of different controls in
particular on the strategic actions of the generating firms and on the electricity
market outcome. The second contribution is the examination of case studies
involving the introduction of new generating units on the electricity market in
terms of conventional sources and photovoltaic grid-connected systems. The last
part of the analysis addresses the issue of modelling the strategic behaviour of
the generating firms by implementing different forms of linear supply function
bids. Investigations on these three topics have been performed under normal and
stressed network operational conditions to show the interrelation of network
congestion with the resulting effects on the electricity market outcome.
10.2 Evaluation of the presented work
The analysis described in the preceding chapters has proven the importance of
employing the AC network representation for the implementation of electricity
market models, as the presence of reactive power and control methods in the
system have a major impact on the strategic behaviour of the generating firms
that considerably affect the market outcome. The impact of control methods on
the electricity market outcome has been examined by investigating various test
cases with transformer tap-ratio control, voltage control on the generation buses,
limitations on the reactive power capabilities of the generating units, and load
power factor adjustments. It has been shown that each of the aforementioned
control methods has a distinct effect on the nodal prices, firms’ strategies and
profits, social welfare and power distribution in the network. The implementation
of each of these control functions in the electricity market algorithm contributes
to the realism and accuracy of the market solution, providing the opportunity for
practical applications. Furthermore, it has been shown that the operation of the
control functions is affected by the degree of congestion present in the network
and the market operators should take such considerations into account during the
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system design process in order to avoid associated inefficiencies due to market
power complications.
By implementing the more realistic AC meshed network model to represent the
electric power system, the investigation of a variety of topics related to the
interactions between the strategic firms and the topology of the network became
possible. Two different studies that involve the introduction of new generating
units in the system have taken place. The first one examines how the location of
new conventional generators affects the interactions between the existing and
new firms in the market and the effects on the market outcome. The numerical
results have shown that the profits of the new firm and the existing companies
are directly related to the location of the new generators and the topology of the
network, while the overall market outcome is affected accordingly. The second
investigation is concerned with the introduction of grid-connected solar energy
production in the electricity market and the economic and operational aspects of
grid-connected photovoltaic systems are explicitly represented in the electricity
market model based on data collected from an outdoor PV park. The numerical
analysis shows that the strategic generating firms are given incentives from the
characteristics of the PV units to change their strategies and affect the market
outcome for their benefit, while it is demonstrated that modelling of the
nonlinear PV reactive generation and of the dependency of PV power production
on the intensity of the applied solar irradiance is required for a more accurate
market solution.
Following the employment of linear SFE theory based on supply functions
constructed by parameterizing the linear marginal cost of generation for the
investigation of the strategic interactions in the electricity market, analysis takes
place to illustrate the effect of modelling the supply function bid using different
parameterization methods on the resulting equilibrium solution. The four
parameterization methods that vary the slope and/or intercept of the marginal
cost functions have been implemented in the electricity market model and several
test cases have been performed on a variety of power systems. The numerical
analysis has shown that the market solutions obtained from the four different
parameterization methods may be very similar or differ substantially, depending
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on the level of network congestion present and the size of the system. The
observations on the interrelation between the market solutions from the different
parameterizations have been compared with those in the existing literature and
noteworthy conclusions related to the AC meshed network modelling have been
drawn.
10.3 The major contributions of this Thesis
The major contributions of this Thesis are summarised as follows:
1) Implementation of a nonlinear primal-dual interior point algorithm based
on linear SFE theory and AC network modelling for equilibrium analysis
of the electricity market, applicable to large systems with superior
computational performance.
2) Modelling of the transformer power flows, losses and tap-ratio control in
the equilibrium market algorithm.
3) Investigation of the impact of transformer tap-ratio, reactive power and
voltage control on the electricity market equilibrium.
4) Investigation of the effects of a new generating unit’s location on the
electricity market outcome
5) Modelling of grid-connected PV generating units in the electricity market
algorithm, with representation of the economic and technical aspects, and
analysis of the effects of solar irradiance levels and PV reactive power
generation on the electricity market.
6) Implementation of the four different parameterization methods for the
linear SFE model and investigation of the interrelation between the
resulting market equilibrium solutions.
The main factors that enabled the research in this Thesis to take place are the
employment of the AC network model and the high efficiency of the algorithm,
which is owing to the valuable features of the interior point method. The general
observations of the work presented suggest that the representation of the AC
network nonlinearities should be included in the analysis of electricity markets in
order to provide a better understanding for the strategic behaviour of the market
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participants and obtain more realistic market predictions. In addition, it has been
shown that the topology of the network under investigation affects the market
outcome and therefore the implemented market model must be flexible and able
to adapt to the particularities of each study.
10.4 Suggestions for further research
The versatile nature of the primal-dual interior point method provides the
opportunity for further expansion of the electricity market algorithm by
incorporating extra equality or inequality constraints in the formulation to
represent other network components and controls. For example, the capability
curve constraint for a synchronous generator characterised by the field, armature
and absorption limits of the machine can be incorporated in the model by
defining additional inequalities in the ISO problem and appropriate system
variables and elements in the Newton matrix equation, to represent the trade-off
between the active and reactive power generation. In a similar manner, other
network components, such as reactive sources (e.g. shunt reactors and capacitor
banks), and control functions, such as phase-shifting transformers, can be added
in the formulation of the AC market algorithm. The integration of these and other
components in the market model will provide the ability for further analysis of
the issue of market power in practical systems and result in more realistic market
outcome predictions.
Apart from the representation of additional network components, inequality
constraints can be incorporated in the interior point formulation to model a
market with price caps, while the existing constraints for the bidding variables
can be utilised to represent bid caps on the strategic offers. As there has been no
investigation of the SFE model that applies price and bid caps on AC systems in
the literature, useful observations related to the nonlinearities of practical
systems may be obtained. Another topic that can be examined using the
implemented market model is the effect of demand elasticity on the strategic
behaviour of the market participants by considering simultaneously price-
responsive and constant components for both active and reactive load demand.
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An interesting subject can be examined by modelling a joint market for active
and reactive power. Reactive nodal pricing can be accomplished for synchronous
generators and reactors by incorporating bid offers and profit components for the
reactive generation in the market algorithm. Using this model, analysis that can
shed light on how strategic firms would compete in a joint active and reactive
power generation market with supply function bidding can be undertaken. Other
possible investigations may include the comparison of synchronous generators
with other reactive sources in terms of economic efficiency, the trade-off
between the profits from the active and the reactive power sales, and the extent to
which the AC network components interfere with the ability of the strategic
players to exercise market power in the case of active and reactive nodal pricing.
Other more challenging relevant research topics include the modelling of multi-
period bid-based pool markets and the implementation of piece-wise supply
function bid offers using the AC meshed network structure. A multi-period
market model requires the consideration of intertemporal network constraints for
the generating units, such as initial conditions and start-up costs, ramp up and
down rate limits, minimum up and down times, and maximum start-ups and shut-
downs, which can be represented accordingly in the interior point formulation. A
model that uses piece-wise supply function bids can be obtained by iterating in
the bid offers function space and can be refined by reducing the length of the
successive segments of the optimal supply function trace in order to provide
market solutions that correspond to the general SFE format. Both of these
advanced models can be implemented in conjunction with any of the ideas
mentioned in the beginning of this section with the prospect that such research
studies on AC market structures may lead to the establishment of new conceptual
ideas about the function of practical bid-based energy pool markets.
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APPENDIX I
Contribution of the transformer formulation




List of the elements of the Newton matrix
equation that result from the modelling of
transformer
Appendix I presents the expanded terms for the individual contributions to the
elements of the Newton matrix and right-hand vector of (3.137) from the
modelling of transformer power flows and losses, and tap-ratio control, as
derived from the linearized versions of the KKT condition equations for the
market problem (4.2)-(4.16). Each linearized equation precedes the elements for
which it is responsible for, and the right-hand vector element, which is calculated
from the KKT system (3.95)-(3.110) is presented last. Note that the x terms in
equations (4.2)-(4.16) correspond to ],,,,[ tfefex jjii , since they represent
only the transformer contribution. The inequality term ht is equal to the tap-ratio
t, as defined in Section 3.5.2. The element of the Newton matrix that corresponds
to the row of 2La in the right-hand vector and the column of b from the
associated linearized equation is represented by ba  - . Since the Newton
matrix is symmetric, the element ba  - is identical to ab  - . The evaluated
expressions for the derivative terms in the following elements can be found in
Appendix II. Note that the following elements may not be the actual elements of
the Newton matrix equation in the formulation of the interior point algorithm but
only a part of them, since they correspond only to the transformer contribution.
The modelling of other network components may also contribute to the following
elements of the Newton matrix equation.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































itti QqQqPpPp  
TR
itp Pt i  -
TR
jtp Pt j  -
TR
itq Qt i  -
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TR
jtq Qt j  -
1-  ttl ht t
1-  ttu ht t























































itp QQPP   






































































ifetit QqQqPpPp jijijiji  
ii ette  --








































ifftit QqQqPpPp jijijiji  
ii fttf  --
jiij eeee  --


























ifetit QqQqPpPp jjjjjjjj  
jj ette  --
jiij feef  --
jiij ffff  --













ifftit QqQqPpPp jjjjjjjj  
jj fttf  --
TR
iettii Ppe i -
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TR
jettji Ppe i -
TR
ifttii Ppf i -
TR
jfttji Ppf i -
TR
iettij Ppe j -
TR
jettjj Ppe j -
TR
ifttij Ppf j -
TR
jfttjj Ppf j -
TR
iettii Qqe i -
TR
jettji Qqe i -
TR
ifttii Qqf i -
TR
jfttji Qqf i -
TR
iettij Qqe j -
TR
jettjj Qqe j -
TR
ifttij Qqf j -
TR
jfttjj Qqf j -











































iftitf QqQqPpPpL jjjjj  





ixttp PxPLi   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
iiii peep   --
jiij peep   --
iiii pffp   --
jiij pffp   --
ijji peep   --
jjjj peep   --
ijji pffp   --
jjjj pffp   --
TR
itti Pp   -
TR
jttj Pp   -








ittp PLi  
][2
TR
jttp PLj  





ixttq QxQLi   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
iiii qeeq   --
jiij qeeq   --
iiii qffq   --
jiij qffq   --
ijji qeeq   --
jjjj qeeq   --
ijji qffq   --
jjjj qffq   --
TR
itti Qq   -
TR
jttj Qq   -







ittq QLi  
][2
TR
jttq QLj  
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Analysis of equation (4.6):
xQqPpL TRixti
TR





it uhlhqQpP   




















































ifti QqQqPpPp jjjj  
tt tt   --
tiit pp   --
tjjt pp   --
tiit qq   --
tjjt qq   --
1-  tttt hl
1-  tttt hu














iti ulQqQqPpPp  
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Analysis of equation (4.7):
tPL TRitpi   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
ii pp tt    --
jj pp tt    --











Analysis of equation (4.8):
tQL TRitqi   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
ii qq tt    --
jj qq tt    --











Analysis of equation (4.9):
ttt sltttttsll slhslL   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
tsltt sll   -
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1-  tttt hl 
tslt sll t   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][][2 tslttsltttl slslhL ttt  
Analysis of equation (4.10):
ttt sutttttsuu suhsuL   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
tsutt suu   -
1-  tttt hu 
tsut suu t   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][][2 tsuttsutttu susuhL ttt  
Analysis of equation (4.11):
tttt sltltslsl llL    2
Elements of Newton matrix:
tsltt lsl   -
1- 
tltsl 
tslt lsl t   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][2 ttt ltslsl lL   
Analysis of equation (4.12):
tttt sututsusu uuL    2
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Elements of Newton matrix:
tsutt usu   -
1- 
tutsu 
tsut usu t   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][2 ttt utsusu uL   
Analysis of equation (4.13):
ttt slthLtl   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
1-  ttl htt
1-  tl slt
Element of right-hand vector:
minmin
2 ][ tslthslhL tttttl  
Analysis of equation (4.14):
ttt suthLtu   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
1-  ttu htt
1-  tu sut
Element of right-hand vector:
maxmax
2 ][ tsuthsuhL tttttu  
Analysis of equation (4.15):
tttt slllslLtsl   2
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Elements of Newton matrix:
ttsl sllt   -
ttsl lslt   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][2 tt lslLtsl  
Analysis of equation (4.16):
tttt suuusuLtsu   2
Elements of Newton matrix:
ttsu suut   -
ttsu usut   -
Element of right-hand vector:
][2 tt usuLtsu  
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APPENDIX II
Derivative terms for the elements of the




List of derivative terms included in the
elements of the Newton matrix equation
associated with the modelling of transformer
The derivatives terms presented here correspond to the transformer terms TRiP
and TRiQ contained in the active and reactive power mismatch equations (3.55)-
(3.56). For the examination of a transformer branch i-j, the corresponding terms
for buses i and j can be determined from equations (3.38) and (3.41), subject to
the location of the tap-ratio control mechanism. If the transformer tap-ratio
control is located at bus i, the primary bus, the transformer contributions to the
mismatch equations are:




















If the transformer tap-ratio control is located at bus j, the secondary bus, the
transformer contributions to the power mismatch equations are calculated by







 )]()([)]()([ 22 iijiijjjjjjjjiijiijjjjjjjj
TR
j fgebtfgebtffbegtfbegteP 
 )]()([)]()([ 22 iijiijjjjjjjjiijiijjjjjjjj
TR
j fbegtfbegtffgebtfgebteQ 
The x terms associated with the following formulations are those associated with
the above equations, i.e. ],,,,[ tfefex jjii . The derivative terms that correspond
to the situation where the transformer tap-ratio control is located at bus i are
given first and those at bus j follow next.
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 22 22 jjjjjj
TR
jtt fbebQ 
3rd derivatives:
0 TRieet Pii
0 TRifet Pii
 ij
TR
ieet gPji 
 ij
TR
ifet bPji 
0 TRitet Pi
0 TRieft Pii
0 TRifft Pii
 ij
TR
ieft bPji 
 ij
TR
ifft gPji 
0 TRitft Pi
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 ij
TR
ieet gPij 
 ij
TR
ifet bPij 
0 TRieet Pjj
0 TRifet Pjj
0 TRitet Pj
 ij
TR
ieft bPij 
 ij
TR
ifft gPij 
0 TRieft Pjj
0 TRifft Pjj
0 TRitft Pj
0 TRittt
TR
iftt
TR
iett
TR
iftt
TR
iett PPPPP jjii
0 TRieet Qii
0 TRifet Qii
 ij
TR
ieet bQji 
 ij
TR
ifet gQji 
0 TRitet Qi
0 TRieft Qii
0 TRifft Qii
 ij
TR
ieft gQji 
 ij
TR
ifft bQji 
0 TRitft Qi
 ij
TR
ieet bQij 
 ij
TR
ifet gQij 
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0 TRieet Qjj
0 TRifet Qjj
0 TRitet Qj
 ij
TR
ieft gQij 
 ij
TR
ifft bQij 
0 TRieft Qjj
0 TRifft Qjj
0 TRitft Qj
0 TRittt
TR
iftt
TR
iett
TR
iftt
TR
iett QQQQQ jjii
0 TRjeet Pii
0 TRjfet Pii
 ij
TR
jeet gPji 
 ij
TR
jfet bPji 
0 TRjtet Pi
0 TRjeft Pii
0 TRjfft Pii
 ij
TR
jeft bPji 
 ij
TR
jfft gPji 
0 TRjtft Pi
 ij
TR
jeet gPij 
 ij
TR
jfet bPij 
 jj
TR
jeet tgPjj 4
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0 TRjfet Pjj
 jjj
TR
jtet egPj 4
 ij
TR
jeft bPij 
 ij
TR
jfft gPij 
0 TRjeft Pjj
 jj
TR
jfft tgPjj 4
 jjj
TR
jtft fgPj 4
0 TRjett Pi
0 TRjftt Pi
 jjj
TR
jett egPj 4
 jjj
TR
jftt fgPj 4
0 TRjttt P
0 TRjeet Qii
0 TRjfet Qii
 ij
TR
jeet bQji 
 ij
TR
jfet gQji 
0 TRjtet Qi
0 TRjeft Qii
0 TRjfft Qii
 ij
TR
jeft gQji 
 ij
TR
jfft bQji 
0 TRjtft Qi
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 ij
TR
jeet bQij 
 ij
TR
jfet gQij 
 jj
TR
jeet tbQjj 4
0 TRjfet Qjj
 jjj
TR
jtet ebQj 4
 ij
TR
jeft gQij 
 ij
TR
jfft bQij 
0 TRjeft Qjj
 jj
TR
jfft tbQjj 4
 jjj
TR
jtft fbQj 4
0 TRjett Qi
0 TRjftt Qi
 jjj
TR
jett ebQj 4
 jjj
TR
jftt fbQj 4
0 TRjttt Q
